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ABSTRACT 
Modern Turkey emerged out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, 
which was famous for its grandeur and which extended over on three 
continents. Religion was the cohesive bond, which cemented different 
ethnic entities and religious groups together. However, during the 19*'^  
and 20*"^  centuries diverse people, who were influenced by the ideas of 
the French revolution and to some extent dissatisfied with the 
Ottoman administration struggled to carve nation states out of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
In the early and mid 19^^ century a rising Muslim Intellectual class 
attempted to respond to the European threat to the Ottoman Empire 
through internal, westernizing reform. This was the beginning of 
Tanzimat. The reforms of Tanzimat in the sphere of civilian and military 
bureaucracy, education and the judiciary aimed to strengthen the 
central state and arrest its decline and disintegration. At the same its 
secularizing influence did weaken the religious establishments and 
caused a serious split within the state between the Ulema and the 
bureaucratic elements. 
Its impact was that on the one hand, battles with insurgent 
nationalities encouraged a sense of cohesion among the remaining 
peoples and territories while on the other hand, at the end of 20"^ 
Century, the Ottoman Empire was reduced to mainly Turks and other 
Muslims and this culminated in the fierce Turkish nationalism. 
The World War I, destroyed the Ottoman Empire and set in motion the 
events that ended the Osmani Sultanate and Caliphate. The only major 
Turkish military victory of the war occurred at Gallipoli in which the 
Turkish commander, Mustafa Kemal, emerged from the war as the only 
victorious Turkish general. Thus after a period of more than a century 
of violent struggles, the Ottoman Empire, though deprived of its Arab 
and European provinces rose again in the form of legitimate nation 
state. 
In fact, after the successful termination of the War of Independence 
(1919-1922) the task of Kemal and his followers was to transform 
Turkey into a modernized, industrialized and secularized nation state. 
They did not feel the need to maintain elements of traditional culture 
as has been the case with the most nationalist leaders of developing 
countries. Neither was religion used to mobilize the masses in Turkey 

as has been and is still the case in such countries as Iran, and Libya. 
Here Kemalist idea of a national community ran counter to the Islamic 
conception of a community, which is essentially religious. Kemal and 
his colleagues viewed the inherent characteristics of Ottoman culture 
as impediments to nation building and to the assertion and 
development of Turkish culture. The reforms undertaken involved the 
liberation of the nation from foreign control and influence, religious 
control and theocratic allegiance. These reforms were aimed at 
strengthening the nation, as well as to secularize the Turkish state and 
society along with the realization of political participation and bringing 
about changes in the socio-economic structure of the country. 
They had already perceived the exploitation of religion, Islam by the 
Ulema to foster their own corrupt and retrogressive establishments. 
They saw these establishments as a link to a discredited past and as a 
barrier to economic progress and modernization. The Ottoman era and 
everything associated with it, except a few glorious moments of 
conquest and imperial grandeur, was condemned or discounted in 
history books and official parlance. 
In addition to Kurds who are forced to come to urban centers, large 
number of peasants leave the countryside in search of better life in 
cities. They mostly bring with them Islamic customs. The absence of 
infrastructure and job for these uprooted peasants is reflected in the 
shantytowns spreading in major Turkish cities. 
These problems have led to create an atmosphere of crises and have 
led to an enormous vacuum into which Islam and the Welfare Party 
accommodated well, promising the dispossessed the social justice and 
an opportunity for a better life. The growing failure of Turkey's ruling 
military and other political parties who are mainly accused of 
corruption and nepotism have failed to solve these problems and did 
not come with some concrete economic policies, which would redress 
the grievances of these masses. This is the main reason causing more 
and more Turks to seek salvation in Islam and particularly Erbakan's 
Welfare Party, which has promised to mitigate their sufferings. In the 
process, the masses of dispossessed turned to Welfare Party as the 
only alternative to express their aspiration and grievances. 
Welfare Party came to power after 1995 general elections not through 
revolution of Turkish politics but through ballot, contesting elections. It 
has stirred the Western countries who think Turkey had gone in the 
hands of Islamic fundamentalists. At the domestic front also, military 
too did not approve of its policies and intervened once again in Turkish 
politics in 1997 and forced the Welfare Party out of the power which 
mostly think is an undemocratic way. 
The rise of political Islam in Turkey has its impact on national and 
international affairs. Turkey's relations with West were thought to get 
strained and apprehensions were expressed that Turkey, which has till 
then friendly relations with United States, might not be its ally any 
more. Furthermore Turkey's application for membership of European 
Union was viewed in the perspective of religious revivalism. 
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Soon after the Republic was proclaimed with Kemal as its President, 
the republican regime began a concerted attempt to create a secular 
state along European lines discarding religion almost for private use. 
They undertook many administrative reforms to change society and 
facilitate secularism, which however, remained basically limited to 
urban centers, which contained only twenty percent of the Turkish 
population at the time. Until the 1950's the bulk of Turkey's rural 
population remained untouched, isolated and traditional, while in the 
cities modernity permeated most aspects of social life. This change 
created a volatile social fabric where the new and old, the modern and 
the traditional and the secular and the anti-secular, lived side by side. 
The expectation of the secular ruling elite that the policies of the 
1920's and 1930's would diminish the role of religion in public life did 
not materialize. As early as 1925, religious grievances came to the 
forefront which was one of the main reasons of the rebellion of Sheikh 
Said, an uprising in Southeastern Turkey that may have claimed as 
many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed. 
With the onset of multi party system and the relaxation of authoritarian 
political control in 1946, large numbers of people began to call openly 
for a return to traditional religious practices. During the 1950's certain 
political parties found it expedient to join religious leaders and bring to 
some extent Islamization of society and advocated adjustment of 
religion and religious precepts along with the state affairs. 
The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools 
began in the late 1940's. The government initially responded by 
authorizing religious instructions in state schools for those students 
whose parents requested it. Under Democratic Party rule during the 
1950's, religious education was made compulsory in secondary 
schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children 
excused. Government also setup secondary schools (Imam - hatip 
Okullari) for the training of imams and preachers. Initially these schools 
grew very slowly but their numbers expanded rapidly to more than 250 
during the 1970s, when the pro-Islam National Salvation Party 
participated in coalition governments. 
After the 1980 coup, the military although secular in orientation, 
viewed religion as an effective means to counter socialist ideas and 
thus authorized the construction of ninety more imam hatip high 
schools. Thus military regime also favoured the use of religion to be 
taught more widely in schools. 
In short during the 1970's and 1980s, Islam experienced a kind of 
political rehabilitation because right-of-centre secular leaders perceived 
religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with left-of-
centre secular leaders. 
The state's more tolerant attitude towards Islam encouraged the 
proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of 
new mosque and Quranic schools in cities as well as the establishment 
of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its 
role in Turkey besides the establishment of religiously oriented 
professional and women's journals. 
Despite strong control over politics, populist nationalism and religious 
revivalism started to emerge during this time. Religious organizations, 
which had surfaced in the 1960's mushroomed in the 1970s. Different 
Tarikats and Sufi orders remerged. The role-played by Tarikats and 
other religious orders in the revival of Islam cannot be ignored and 
disregarded. The two mentionable committees Nurcus and Fethullahci 
are well known. The Fethullahci, which have a broad network of 
religious schools in Central Asia as well as in Turkey, help in 
disseminating religious affairs in the Turkic region. 
The revival of Islann in contemporary Turkey has questioned the 
legitimacy of secularism. It is still not interested in reconciliation with 
the forces of modernity. In essence, the Islamic idea of legitimacy 
negates both secular legitimacy and secular authority. In these religious 
groups an aversion to Kemal Ataturk can be easily discerned. The 
modernizing and secularizing policies of the Kemalist era and Turkey's 
Westernization process during his presidency are viewed as having 
been contradictory to the interests of Islam and to have alienated the 
Turks from their Islamic Ottoman heritage by bringing Turkey closer to 
the West. 
These religiously oriented groups sought salvation in political Islam. For 
these groups, the nation should not be a secular political entity but 
rather a community of believers. Because of the highly religious nature 
of these parties, they have usually been banned once they gained any 
sort of popularity. But these are an important force as they continue to 
rise under different guises. The first such party, the National Order 
Party, was closed down for becoming too aggressive and vocal. It 
emerged later as National Salvation Party and was subsequently 
banned by military government after the 1980 coup. Then again it 
emerged under the name of Welfare Party. 
The record is quite clear that it is the country's armed forces and their 
security agencies, which are the ultimate arbiter in politics. The militia 
regards itself as the constitutional protector of the state, so exercises 
substantial but indirect influence over government policy and actions 
of politics. 
Since the installation of the multiparty regime in 1945, the military, as 
the guardian of the Ataturkian principles intervened in politics three 
times (inl 960-61, 1971-1973 and in 1980-83) to 'clean up the mess 
created by politicians' in general and to safeguard the principles of 
republicanism and secularism in the Turkish policy in particular. 
Turkey's population is predominantly Muslim, which constitutes 99% 
of the total population. There is a population explosion with a massive 
unemployment with 4 out of 10 people unemployed. Its 70% 
population is under 30 years of age. Inflation is about 35%, which eats 
away the income of the workers. 
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Preface 
PREFACE 
More than 75 years after the foundation of Turkish Republic, the 
Kemalist legacy has been challenged from within and without. The rise 
of recently banned Welfare Party to power in 1996, had attracted 
worldwide attention towards it. It was thought that Turkey where the 
most radical secular revolution of any state in Muslim world had 
occurred is facing an Islamic fundamentalist challenge to its secular 
basis. 
This study is an attempt to analyze the changes and events occurring 
in the twentieth century Turkey, which has its antecedents in Ottoman 
Empire where Islam was the cohesive bond between its different 
entities. Its transformation to the secular republic founded by Kemal 
Ataturk and then again the revival of Islamic sentiments has made 
Turkey's politics an interesting subject to study. 
In order to discern the nature of Ottoman-Turkish continuities, this 
study initially deals with a brief account of the basic structure of 
Ottoman Empire and the process of its disintegration, which was, 
hastened by the influence of Western ideas and modern education 
which in turn led to social and cultural awakening of the Turks. The 
social transformation, Europe was under going in nineteenth century, 
as well as the compelling reforms in Ottoman Empire undertaken 
during Tanzimat, to modernize the Empire in order to combat the 
internal and external threat is also discussed in the first chapter of this 
study. The Young Turks revolution, which is characterized by its fierce 
national movement in the period, when three ideologies namely 
Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism co-existed, has also been brought 
to light in this chapter. 
Thus chapter one provides the setting for the next chapter that deals 
with the study of Turkish Nationalism, which as a dynamic concept 
has flourished in Turkey and shaped its destiny. Its development can 
be seen clearly inter-twined with the social, political, ideological and 
linguistic forces, which culminated in the synthesis of this concept 
with nation building. In this regard Ziya Gokalp's thinking and ideology 
that provides the intellectual base for Turkish nationalism is also dealt 
with in chapter second. 
After establishing the Republic, the concept of nationalism gained 
momentum. The nationalization of the Republic and its various aspects, 
under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is deliberately included in this chapter, in 
order to make our analysis pertinent. 
Chapter three of this study focuses on the Kemal's secularizing and 
modernizing reforms which saved Turkey from total annihilation after 
dissolution and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. 
Chapter four analyzes the re-emphasis of Islamic sentiments which 
began with the transition to the multiparty period and the contribution 
made by various political parties in accommodating religion with the 
state. It also highlights the arguments of the supporters and opponents 
of Kemalism which has come to light ever since Kemal pursued his 
Westernizing and modernizing policies. 
The recent rise of political Islam in Turkey which is examined in terms 
of a complex interplay between four major processes: the policies of 
the parties on the center right towards religion, state sponsored 
religious activities and education, the consolidation of establishments 
of Islam, the impact of Sufi orders and communities, and the growing 
organizational strength and electoral base of the Islamist Welfare Party. 
The study of all these factors is elaborately dealt with in chapter five. 
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The political confrontation between secularists and Islannic forces, the 
corruption scandals of its political elite, the accusation of wide spread 
nepotism, the high budget deficit and rising inflation happen to be the 
characteristics of the present political system of Turkey. 
Both domestic conflicts and international changes demand a re-
orientation of Turkey's policies. The revival of Islamic sentiments and 
the Islamist Welfare Party had its impact and implication on the 
Turkey's domestic policies in general and on foreign policies in 
particular. In the last and sixth chapter an effort has been made to sum 
up the impacts of all these internal and external upheavals. Further 
more, study of each chapter has given rise to some conclusions, which 
have also been incorporated in this chapter in a cumulative way. 
While working on this study I had unstinted and encouraging support 
of my supervisor Dr. S. Shamir Hassan. I wish to thank him profusely 
for his able guidance. 
I was also lucky to have the opportunity to discuss various specific 
points of my study with Prof. Mohd. Sadiq. For his valuable 
suggestions and encouragement, I would like to express my deepest 
thanks to him. 
IV 
I wish to go on record to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to 
Prof. Mrs. Tayyaba Husain, Chairperson of the Centre of West Asian 
Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, for her moral support and 
encouragement. 
Thanks in full measure are due to Dr. G. Mursaleen, Dr. Md. Gulrez, Dr. 
Javaid Iqbal and other staff members of Centre of West Asian Studies, 
Aligarh Muslim University, for their encouragement. 
The unfailing help from the staff of the research library of the Centre 
of the West Asian Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, especially from 
its documentation officer, Mr. M. Alimullah is worth mentioning. 
I also owe my thanks to Mohd. Shoeb Sultan who took all the pains in 
typing and computer processing of this thesis. 
My source of inspiration has been my Taaya, late Mr. G.H. Inqilabi, the 
man with the slogan, 'spread the light and dispel the darkness' and 
whose campaign was against intellectual starvation. 
At this juncture, I fondly remember my late beloved mother who tried 
to inculcate in us the precious combination of undaunted intellectual 
courage with the sense of reality and responsibility. 
I also express my thanks to my father and other family members for 
their moral support and sustained encouragement, which enabled me 
to carry out my work uninterruptedly and harmoniously. 
I am affectionately beholden to my little angel 'Saidu' whose presence 
around me kindled hopes in my hours of despair. 
Finally, I am thankful to my colleagues and friends, Zameer Ahmad, 
Najmi Raja, Hashim Mukhtar, Mohd. Umar, Abid Yousuf, Zahida 
Rasool, Tabassum Ara and Nighat Niazi for their whole hearted 
cooperation which can never be ignored. 
Shafqat Afa Siddiqi 
VI 
^ MOLDOVA ^Ah^ 
N '^/^ •"" 
ROMANIA '•-< 
? o 
RUSSIAN S , -% 
FEDERATION i o 
"•x_ 
S/ac/( Sea 
-/"? 
BULGARIA - ' 
r '^  > 
k ^ ^ T U R 
-^__ t CYPRUS 
Mediterranean Sea LEBANON 
\ 
GEORGIA ^ • ~ -
'---^ Nagomo 
Karabakh 
Map 1. Turkey at the beginning of the 21^* Century 
VII 
w 
Expansion of the Ottoman Empire w 
• • " 1520 ^ $ ^ vassals 
1566 :'-^:'' vassals 
^ 1 6 8 3 vassals 
Map 2. The Ottoman Empire 1683 
VIII 
V 
BALKAN 
V STATES 
. ^ - |aionika_ ^ c ~ ^ 
S •> \ \ . • 
{ 
Ottoman Empire in 1914 
Map 3. The Ottoman Empire 1914 
IX 
Chapter - i 
OTTOMANS AND THE AWAKENING IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A PRELUDE TO THE 
REPUBLIC 
Ottoman Empire, which extended over three continents, was famous 
for its grandeur. There are different versions of the origin^of Ottomans 
but it was usual to trace their genealogy to the tribe of Kayi Khan, a 
branch of the Oguz Turks, in turn according to legend, descendants of 
Japhet, son of Noah. It is generally believed that they were forced to 
migrate under Mongol pressure, from their home in Central Asia to 
eastern Anatolia, and after turbulent years of raids and wanderings, 
their settling was under Ertugul, in the domains of the Seljukid ruler, 
Ala al-din. It was Ertugul's son, Osman who was the actual founder of 
the Ottoman state. 
The Turkish people, according to the writers, was not a newcomer to 
the family of nations. It was rather a very old race, which had since 
ancient times spread under different names in large areas. They had 
close relations with the ancient Iranians, and were known to the 
See Inalcik, H., 'Rise of Ottoman Historiography' in Lewis, Bernard and Holt, 
P.M. (eds.), Historians of the Middle East, London 1962, pp. 152-216. Also 
Menage, P.L. 'The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography', Ibid., pp. 168-
179. 
Greeks and the children of Israel. Thousands of years before the 
Islannic era they had already conquered the regions of India, Turan, Iran 
and Babylonia^ 
Being in close contact with the centers of civilization, they served as 
intermediaries between the cultures of different people. While they 
inhabited Turkestan they constituted the link between China and Iran, 
and served to transmit the fruits of civilization of each to other. They 
rendered the very same service in Western Asia by acquainting the 
Egyptians, Assyrians and Babylonians with one another.^ 
Similarly their contribution to Islam was also great. According to 
history writers the Turks are credited with the spread and defence of 
Islam, as well as its internal revival especially since decadence and 
disintegration began to threaten the Islamic world in the later centuries 
of Abbasid rule. No doubt, Islam originated with Arabs and it was the 
Arabs who conquered vast lands of the Islamic Empire and spread 
Islamic civilization. But the Arab Caliphate eventually grew weak and 
powerless, and it was the Turks who stepped in at a moment of crisis 
Kushner, David, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 7876-1908, London, 1977, 
p. 3 1 . 
ibid 
to Islam, and who ruled and protected the Islamic countries and 
peoples in the East and West ever since. 
According to Midhat, the first pure Turks to appear in Islamic history 
were the Seljuks and the Seljuks are to be credited with the spreading 
of the Turkish race throughout the Muslim world, they strengthened 
once again the Abbasid Caliphate, after it had disintegrated and grown 
incapable of upholding the position of Islam in the world. The same 
author adds that they blocked the expansion of Byzantium, which had 
taken advantage of Muslim weakness, and they stood up to the 
challenge of the crusaders.^ However, the services of the Turks to 
Islam reached its highest degree under the Ottomans. The Ottoman's 
expanded the domain of Islam to new territories and created the 
strongest and most stable Islamic state the world had ever known and 
a major achievement of the Ottomans was their success in uniting the 
Sultanate and the Caliphate, which had long existed as separate 
institutions. 
The Ottoman Empire was a polyglot, multiethnic state governed by a 
remarkably cosmopolitan though profoundly Islamic ruling elite. Until 
the eighteenth century, a majority of the Sultan's subjects were non-
Midhat, A. Mufassil, cited in Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 35. 
Muslims. The organization and administration of the state centered 
around the classic Millet system in which each religious community 
was legally recognized through its own character, governed by its own 
religious law, and led by its own religious leader. The religious leaders 
of each Millet acted as judges for their own people and intermediaries 
between them and the state.^ Turks, Kurds, Arabs and other Muslims 
belonged to the Muslim Millet, while Jews belonged to the Jewish 
Millet and so on. Taxation varied for each Millet. Non-Muslim were 
always taxed at a higher rate than Muslim, and the religious leaders 
generally performed the function of tax collector.^ 
S. Mardin perceives that this segmented Ottoman society served to 
retard the growth of secondary structure, thereby reinforcing the 
dominant role of religion in society.^ 
There was yet another basic social stratification of the Empire which 
divided its people in two main groups. The first group, called askeri 
(military) represented the Ottoman state elite to whom the Sultan had 
1 Shaw S.J., Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim 
III, Cambridge, 1971 , p. 9 1 . 
Ross, Jeffrey A. 'Politics' Religion and Ethnic Identity in Turkey' in Michael 
Curtis (ed.). Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Colorado, 1981 , P. 324. 
Mardin, Serif, 'Religion in Modern Turkey' International Social Science 
Journal, 24, 1977, pp. 287-286. 
delegated religious or executive powers and this class included arnny, 
civil servants and Ulema. This class was privileged and was entirely 
exempt from taxation^ The second group was reaya, comprising the 
bulk of Muslims and non-Muslim who were taxed. 
The Ottoman state was a military encampment for the propagation of 
Islam. The Sultans had not only expanded the daral-salam, the territory 
of Islam, but they had become powerful because of victorious 
campaigns and had enriched the empire through tribute and booty. But 
the Empire was gradually shocked because of the steady defeats in the 
later part of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.^ 
This made Ottomans feel insecured and threatened on three fronts: 
economically, because of loss of revenue; politically, because of loss 
of power; and psychologically, because of their inability to expand the 
realm of Islam. 
Furthermore, when the Empire entered into early nineteenth century, it 
was undergoing the process of decaying. The increasing feudalisation 
of the Ottoman administration, the military defeats and weak internal 
^ inaiclk, H. 'Turkey, The Nature of the Traditional Society', in Ward and 
Rustow (eds.). Political Modernization in Japan and Turl(ey, Princeton 1964, 
pp. 43-44. 
^ Armajani, Y., Middle East Past and Present, New Jersey, 1970, pp. 231-32. 
security was weakening the empire from within. Moreover the 
European economic transformation and revolution had a considerable 
impact on the traditional order^ of the Ottoman Empire. During the 
nineteenth century the regional leaders monopolized the political and 
economic power resources at hand and initiated processes of regional 
state formations and from the Ottoman perspective, we may perceive 
the feudalisation of the Ottoman Empire as a process of 
monopolization which was one of the driving forces for the modern 
state formation in West Asia and the Balkan's.^ The emergence of the 
modern political landscape of West Asia was substantially due to the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 
The de facto independence of Egypt under Mohammad AM (1805-48) 
and his occupations of Ottoman provinces in Syria and Cecilia (1831-
40), the search for autonomy of the Lebanese Emir Bashir Shihab II 
(1788-1840) and the modernization and formation of an Independent 
Tunisia under Ahmat Bey (1837-55) are some examples of it. Besides 
there were dramatic events in Empire's European provinces which 
included Serbian revolts of 1804-6 and 1815-17, the Greek War of 
^ Issawci, C , The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914, Chicago, 1980, p. 
3. 
^ For detailed account of Arab State see Harik, I, 'The Origin of the Arab State 
System', in Luciana (ed.). The Arab State, Berkeley, 1990, pp. 1-28. 
Independence (1821-29), the rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1857 and 1875 and the subsequent uprising in Bulgaria 1876. 
Thus during the nineteenth century, Turkey's international and internal 
situation was steadily deteriorating, for the Empire was dragged into a 
multilateral power struggle among political entities that is states, proto 
states, local principalities, ethnic and religious groups all of which were 
fighting for independence. 
These events may be also attributed to the social and political change 
in the out look of the Ottomans which was brought by Westernization 
into which the Empire entered in the eighteenth and in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. This shaked the very foundations of the 
Ottoman Empire. The contacts with the West resulted in the 
culmination of the concepts of nation, freedom, homeland, and 
equality.^ Thus beginning with the successful Greek uprising in the 
1820's the Ottoman Empire was no longer facing only threats of 
' These contacts were established through Ottoman embassies abroad, 
student missions to Europe and foreign instructors and teachers invited to 
Turkey to manage and staff new schools. Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 3. 
encroachment from the outside, but also threats of disintegration from 
withinJ 
Tanzimat 
There was profound effect of Western ideas on the Christian peoples 
living in the Empire who were becoming now increasingly restless and 
were demanding rights of freedom and equality, which hitherto had 
been denied them. Since the Empire was weak and also the struggle 
against it was backed by foreign powers, so it saw itself beset by 
external conspiracy and internal betrayaP. Thus to combat the internal 
and external threat, some reforms especially in the military were 
carried out. These reforms materialized in the form of Tanzimat; which 
were initiated in the last decade of reign of Sultan Mehmood II (1809-
39). Thus, it is obvious that the prime reason, that the rulers of the 
Ottoman Empire in the early and mid nineteenth century wanted to 
bring reforms in almost all spheres of Empire was an attempt to 
Ibid 
Jung, Dietrich and Piccoli, Wolfango, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman 
Legacies and Greater Middle East, New York, 2 0 0 1 , p. 39. 
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safeguard the integrity of the Empire in a world that was becoming 
increasingly dominated by European powers and Western civilization.^ 
Mehmood II the greatest of the Turkish rulers since Suleiman the 
magnificent annihilated in one bold step stroke the corps of 
Janissaries,^ whose influence had become detrimental to the welfare of 
the Empire. Hence then a series of internal reforms including military 
and administrative organization followed. 
Thus, during this period of turmoil and tribulations, the reforms of the 
Tanzimat not only aimed to modernize society but also were rather 
determined by the political events of the day. However, its military 
reforms were insufficient to enable it to face external threats, and the 
modernization of the Ottoman administration was unable entirely to 
contain the internal feudalisation of the state.^ 
Kushner, David Op.Cit; pp 5-6 
A new military force composed of 'slaves of the Porte' was organized by 
Murad I. These men came to the ruler as his pencik or one one-fifth share of 
booty captured from the enemy, when these youths came to the Sultan, 
they were educated in Turkish language, Islam, Arabic and other 
characteristics of the Ottoman way. Then they were given military training 
and organized as infantry called 'yeniceri' new force, or Janissary corps or as 
cavalry, called sipahis. Shaw S.J. & Shaw, E.K. History of the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turl^ey, Cambridge, 1976, Vol. I, p. 26. 
Jung and Piccoli Op.Cit; p. 40 
Sultan Mehmood II had appointed a commission to work out 
comprehensive reforms under the leadership of his minister of foreign 
affairs, Reshid Pasha considered in many ways the real architect of the 
nineteenth century Ottoman reforms^ Only a few months after the 
death of Mehmood II, the Hatt-i-Sherif was promulgated by his son and 
successor, Abdulmecit I (1839-61) in November, 1839. The period 
after the accession of Abdulmecit I (1839-1861) witnessed many 
reforms which mainly initiated many of the Mehmood M's programs 
and plans and were carried through under the leadership of Mustafa 
Reshid Pasha, epitome of the men of Tanzimat^ (Tanzimat Cilar) a 
group that he created to assist and succeed him eventually in the 
effort, to transform Ottoman state and society.^ Reshid Pasha after 
residing in Paris and London for many years had returned with clear 
ideas of European progress. 
The major political administrative trends of the Tanzimat can be 
summarized as: 
Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford, 1961 , p. 105. 
Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 105. 
Shaw & Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Tur/cey, Vol. II, 
Cambridge, 1977, p. 58. 
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• the abolishment of the patrimonial system of tax framing 
and the creation of a monetized and rationalized system to 
levy taxes; 
• the secularization and formalization of education and of the 
administration of justice; 
• the functional differentiation of branches of government; 
• an increasing division of the powers of government leading 
to the establishment of an Ottoman parliament and an 
Ottoman constitution; 
• a differentiation of the means of physical force according 
to the separate realms of internal and external security; 
• the introduction of a new system of provincial 
administration. 
This brief summary of Tanzimat reforms clearly indicates that they 
wanted transformation from a traditional system towards a legal 
system of domination. Yet it cannot be denied that these reforms 
caused massive changes in the social fabric of Ottoman society and 
these new social forces whose foundations had been laid by the 
reforms of the administrative, military and educational institutions of 
the Ottoman state, later played an essential role in the formation of 
Turkish Republic. 
The policy of modernization and reforms designed in this respect was 
mainly to fill the most conspicuous gaps between the Ottoman Empire 
11 
and the West. This policy was a victory for the modernist intelligentsia-
chiefly army officers and government officials in the foreign services 
whose influence expanded further and who found themselves engaged 
in a struggle with the conservatives.^ 
In the Hatt-i-Sherif of Gulhane, were enumerated certain measures 
which would bring the structural changes in the political and economic 
foundations of the traditional order. The reforms to be carried out may 
be summarized as: to establish the legal order of a modern state; a 
guarantee of property and civil rights for all subjects of Sultan 
irrespective of their religion or sect, the introduction of universal 
conscriptions and the reduction of the term of military service to four 
or five years; the reorganization of provincial administration, based on 
functionaries with fixed salaries and on a clear division between private 
property and the means of administration. However, in this decree, the 
reaffirmation of the rights of minority did not materially change the 
picture.^ 
1 Karpat, Kemal H, Turkey's Politics, The Transition to a l\/lultiparty System, 
Princeton, 1959, p. 9. 
Lenczowski, George, The IVIiddle East in World Affairs, Fourth ed. London, 
1980, p. 43. 
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Provinces were reorganized according to the French model along with 
the initiation of a number of other legal transformation. Also in 1850's 
and 1860's state courts and new secular penal, commercial and 
maritime codes were introduced alongside the religious Shariat courts 
based on Islamic lawJ However, new trade laws enacted were 
modeled on European examples. 
In the second Tanzimat period, Sultan Abdulmecit confirmed the 
reform measures of the Hatt-i-Sharif of Gulhane and the Tanzimat in 
general, with a strong emphasis on religious liberty and equality for his 
non-Muslim subjects. This period is mainly associated with the decree 
and the promulgation of Hatt-i-Humayun edict of IS*"" February 1856. 
This edict guaranteed religious freedom, equal rights for admission to 
public employment and public schools, generally applicable tax 
regulations and property laws and laws against corruption, extortion 
and torture. It also emphasized to take steps to improve the 
infrastructure of the empire regulations to guarantee unimpeded 
commerce and trade.^ 
' Lewis Bernard, Op.Cit; pp. 106-128. Also see Hurewitz, J.C. Diplomacy in 
the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1914, Vo. I, 
Princeton, 1956, pp. 113-116. 
^ Hurewitz, J.C. Op.Cit; pp. 149-53. 
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Thus one essential feature of the second Tanzimat period was the 
opening of the Ottoman Empire to international trade and foreign 
capital. Free trade agreements were extended to many European 
states. Thus opening the Ottoman lands to foreign investment and the 
Ottoman market freely accessible for the sale of European 
commodities, depriving Ottoman government of mercantile instruments 
such as monopolies, taxes and tolls that could have been used to stop 
a further deterioration of the financial situation of the state.^ In fact, 
Ottoman government had already begun borrowing abroad in order to 
meet the financial difficulties created by the Crimean war (1853-56). 
Its impact was that only 16 years later, the Empire found itself 
completely dependent on foreign loans, while debt servicing consumed 
one-third of its treasury income.^ As these terms of trade were to 
extreme disadvantages of the Ottoman economy, and the failure to 
reform the financial administration of the Empire, led to national 
bankruptcy in 1875.^ 
^ Zurcher E.J., Turkey: A Modern History, London, 1993, pp.49-50. 
2 Ibid, pp. 67-68. 
^ 45 Percent of the gross amount of money borrowed between 1854 and 
1914, was used to liquidate previous debt of the Ottoman governments. 
Issawci, C. Op.Cit; pp. 362-63. 
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Thus, Hatt-i-Sherif of Gulhane and the subsequent Hatt-i-Humayun 
aimed at complete reconstruction of the Ottoman state along Western 
lines. These reforms virtually abolished absolutism and brought the 
validity of principles and laws beyond individual caprice and laid the 
foundation for a constitutional state of modern type. These reforms, 
deemed as a return to the real spirit of the Sharia, canon law of Islam, 
guaranteed individual liberty for all subjects promised security of 
person and property and the equality of all Ottomans, irrespective of 
religion. 
Educational programs were developed by specialized committees 
within the legislative bodies of the time. As a result hundreds of plans 
reports and programs emerged, pointing towards the creation of a 
system of secular and utilitarian education to train all Ottomans from 
the elementary to the most advanced stages. The new system of 
education, which developed slowly, was opposed by many Ottomans 
out of reverence for the old or the quite justified fear of what the new 
schools might bring. So the reforms brought about by the Tanzimat 
were met with great resistance in the orthodox circles. 
This was the time when a new spirit was creeping into the Turkish 
intelligentsia. Constitutional reforms at this time gave impetus towards 
15 
an intellectual renaissance. On the line of the Russian Revolution this 
intellectual nnovement remained confined for years among the 
enlightened aristocrats and officers under European influence. In 
addition to the reforms introduced by the Sultan, changes were 
effected on a more widespread demand. The political and the 
intellectual transformation, the latter expressing itself chiefly in the 
literacy sphere were two aspects of a single process, as the both 
sprang from a single source. As the students were sent abroad for 
studies and Western languages were taught in Turkey, this imbibed a 
new sprit in the rising literate class. 
The literate figure responsible for the transformation of the first 
intellectual stimulus to positive achievements was Sinasi Effendi. He 
returned to Constantinople in 1859 after a years study in Paris and 
published a translation of French poets, which was the first purely 
literary translation from a Western language into Turkish. In 1960 the 
publication of first unofficial Turkish newspaper entitled Tercuman-i-
Ahval (The Interpreter of Circumstances) began, both of these marked 
an epoch in Turkish literature. 
IB 
The great increase in Ottoman publications, and especially the 
development of the press, contributed considerably in disseminating 
ideas and the aspirations of the common people in a simplified 
language. Sinasi Effendi was the initiator of this new simplified 
language through his translation and his newpaperJ 
Not only a new language but also a new world appeared on the horizon 
in these translations. Matters related to the scientific discoveries and 
inventions of Europe, which reveal the man's inquiring sprit, were 
published. This offered a comparison with the existing conditions in 
the East and for the first time venerable traditions were judged in a 
critical sprit. 
A new kind of educated bourgeoisies grew in number and kind with 
the reform process and demanded further participation in state and 
society. This class emerged out of the modern education, carried by 
the reform efforts of the Ottoman state, which depended upon the 
professionalization of the administrative system and therefore modern 
education. Because during Tanzimat period there was a dramatic 
Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 58. 
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change in the literacy campaigns as contrast to the traditional lack of 
interests shown by the Ottoman rulers towards literacy J 
As Kushner puts it, the expansion of state activities into new spheres, 
which included the building of a new educational system required that 
Turkish became an all purpose language, easy to learn and easy to 
understand^ and an effective and clear means of communication 
between the government and the people. 
Thus modernization of the Ottoman state gave rise to a literate public 
especially in the urban centers of the empire. These Ottomans were 
generally concerned with the social, cultural and political questions 
posed by the modernization of Ottoman Society^ and influenced much 
by the thoughts of Western Europe, which were more liberal. In 1865, 
a group of these young intellectuals along with the Westernized 
bureaucrats, journalists and some modern oriented Ulema, began to 
1 Before 1830 the number of books printed did not exceed one hundred even 
though the first printing press for the dissemination of papers and bool<s 
among Muslim population came as late as 1927, for the Jewish community 
was allowed to introduce a press as early as 1493-94, but on the condition 
they did not print in Turkish or Arabic. See Karpat, Kemal H. 'The mass 
media', in Ward and Rustow (eds.), Op.Cit; 1964, pp. 255 -571 . 
Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 56. 
Mardin, Serif 'Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in 
the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century', in Benedict et al., (eds.), 
Turkey, Geography and Social Perspectives, Leiden, 1974, p. 403 . 
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spread their ideas among the literate public.^ These young intellectuals 
known as 'Young Ottomans' tried to synthesize Islam with the ideals 
of the enlightenment. 
These Young Ottomans were the fore runners of a new brand of young 
men who were not satisfied with modernizing the machinery of the 
state only but wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy and 
revitalize Islam.^ Among these the most important intellectual, 
theoretician and writer of the Young Ottomans was Namik Kemal (d. 
1887). He was an effective critic of Tanzimat, which in his opinion had 
achieved a degree of modernization but had not freed the individuals 
from internal tyranny nor freed the nation from foreign domination.^ 
According to Kemal H. Karpat, their thoughts can be divided into three 
categories. Firstly, the constitutional ideas of the young Ottomans 
concerned the introduction of a constitutional order and representative 
institutions, which were to be based on Islamic principles, secondly, 
they supported the concept of a strong central state and finally, they 
promoted the idea of a new political identity in which the traditional 
^ Mardln, Serif 'Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective' in Evin and Heper (eds.), 
State, Democracy and the Military: Turl<ey in the 1980s', New York, 1988 
p. 3 1 . 
^ Armajani, Y Op.Cit; pp. 236. 
^ Ibid. 
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loyalty to the Millet, the religious community, was to be replaced by 
the Vatan the fatherland, which is above religious, ethnic or regional 
divisions.^ 
The Young Ottomans were perhaps the first ideologists of Islam in 
modern times who tried to take best from the West and graft it onto 
Islam. Together with a group of bureaucrats and officers under the 
leadership of the former Grand Vezir Midhat Pasha, they formed the 
core of the Ottoman constitutional movement backed by diplomatic 
pressure and parts of the Ottoman army, achieved the promulgation of 
an Ottoman constitution and the establishment of a representative 
assembly.^ Even though the Young Ottoman failed to graft Western 
ideologies to the body politics of Islam, they were successful in 
introducing new values to the Turks. 
Thus Ottoman society under the impact of modernization became 
much more diversified than under the traditional social order, for 
modern forces which evolved during the Tanzimat played progressively 
major roles in economic, political and cultural sectors of the Empire and 
there were internal fragmentation among the individual social groups 
Karpat, Kemal H, 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908', 
InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies. 3, 1972, pp. 262-265. 
Jung & Piccoli Op.Cit; p.45. 
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such as the U/ema, the bureaucracy of the army, all of these having 
different interests and committed to either modern or traditional 
values. 
Halide Edib, sums up the impact of reforms in this way, 'The new 
West had entered the Ottoman world as a method in thought. 
Institutions were changing, but in accordance with the spirit of the old 
tradition. The rights of man were regarded as an interpretation of 
Moslem ideals, and the state did not now observe any distinctions or 
discriminate in favour of any community in the benevolent institutions 
it tried to create... Thus one by one-new Western ideas and forms 
were interpreted, assimilated and incorporated in what Turkey had 
inherited from the old East, without the old or the new upsetting the 
balance in its favour'.^ 
Nevertheless, Tanzimat inaugurate and endorse an era of reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, however, it was as much the result of upheavals in 
the eighteenth century as it was the cause of change in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
Edib, Halide, Conflict of East and West in Turiiey, Delhi, 1935, p. 60. 
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Hamidian Absolutism and the Young Turks Movement 
The period of the reign of Abdulhamid (1876-1908) is usually referred 
to as a period of absolutist or despotic ruleJ During that period power 
shifted more and more in the hands of the Sultan and his close 
entourage in the palaces. Abdulhamid adopted not only a rigid policy of 
centralization, but came to govern as an autocrat, with his own system 
of surveillance and spying to safeguard his personal rule.^ As a result 
many members of the ruling class were excluded from power and often 
punished either because of their disloyalty or suspicion thereof. 
However, he continued the attempts of the Tanzimat reformers to 
modernize and centralize the administration and to enforce central 
state control over the provinces. Educational reforms were extended 
and empire's communication facilities enhanced the dissemination of 
newspapers, periodicals and books, though under heavy state 
1 For a brief period after Abdulhamid's ascension, the forces of reform seemed 
victorious. On Dec. 23, 1876, Midhat Pasha succeeded in including the new 
Sultan to proclaim a constitution, which guaranteed civil liberties and 
provided for parliamentary government on general representation but this 
turned out to be a brief liberal interlude. Jealous of his power, Abdulhamid 
soon reverted to repressive policies and dismissed and banished Midhat 
Pasha, and in 1877 prorogued the newly created parliament, suspending the 
constitution. There after for thirty years he ruled as absolute monarch, 
Lenczowski, George Op.Cit; p. 44. 
Kushner, David Op.Cit; pp. 5-6. 
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censorship and so did the influence of Western ideas, though owing 
mainly to members of the literate public in exileJ 
It may be more appropriate to say that the reforms under Abdulhamid 
served the mobilization of the administrative power of the state, which 
helped the state to monitor its populace more closely and to secure the 
Sultan's domination through enlightened despotism.^ Moreover, 
Abdulhamid adopted Islamist policies as an ideology of unity and 
allowed himself to be influenced and surrounded with Ulema and Sufi 
Sheikhs notably leaders of religious orders.^ Thus, with the economic 
wealth already falling heavily into the hands of Europeans and non-
Muslims even the traditional occupation of government now seemed to 
elude the reach of the elite group. As a matter of fact this elite 
comprised new groups as the military personnel, lawyers and 
journalists and gradually they started to voice their grievances and call 
for a search for new ideological and political answers. There emerged 
many protest groups of varied manners both within and without the 
empire having same ideology, which were soon bound to each other 
throughout Europe. They came to be called 'Young Turks'. They took 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 181-94. 
^ Jung and Piccoli Op.Cit; p. 47. 
^ Zurcher, EJ Op.Cit; p. 83. 
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up the task of shaking the Empire out of its lethargy. This party drew 
its inspiration from the West and wanted to remodel the Empire into a 
liberal constitutional monarchy.^ 
From the very beginning of this movement it attracted both Muslim 
and non-Muslims. Turks and non-Turks, who were united in their 
opposition to the personal rule of the Sultan but there was no unity in 
their programme.^ While non-Turks were more inclined towards far 
reaching liberalization and decentralization, their Turkish partners for 
the most part shared with their adversary, the Sultan, the basic 
concern for the preservation of a strongly unified Empire. It was this 
group of mostly Turkish officials and professionals centered around the 
Committee of Union and Progress, which later, came to dominate 
Ottoman politics after the 1908 revolution. 
The Committee of Union and Progress, the organization behind the 
Young Turks movement, gained much strength and was increasingly 
able to rally support within the ranks of the armed forces. At the turn 
of the century the centre of internal opposition had moved from 
Istanbul to Solonika from where a group of young officers, civil 
^ Lenczowski, George Loc.Cit. 
^ Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 6. 
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servants and intellectuals controlled the activities of the opposition in 
the Empire^ 
With the mutiny of the Ottoman troops posted at Macedonia, which 
was triggered by the discussions about a Russian, British intervention 
there, gave a chance to the young Turks movement to start a 
campaign in July 1908, demanding restoration of the constitution. 
Sultan Abdulhamid's attempt to crush the insurgence failed as the 
troops he had dispatched refused to do their duty. This compelled the 
Sultan to give in and thus the imperial master was deposed by the, 
group of new educated professionals in the military and civil service. 
The Young Turks revolution of 1908 had the objectives of curbing the 
autocratic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid as well as preserve the integrity 
of the three immediate problems. First concerned the nature of the 
Ottoman government, now that Abdulhamid was deposed. Second 
was that of defining the identity of the citizen - subjects of the 
Empire, and the third was regarding the territorial integrity to be 
Jung and Piccoli Op.Cit; p. 53. 
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defended and frontiers to be stabilized. These three problems were 
increasingly intertwined.^ 
Constitutional government was established, after the elections were 
carried out freely and the representatives of all the races in the Empire 
were indeed representative personalities. The words liberty, equality 
and justice was the cry of every heart. 
As Halide Edib puts it, 'the new regime came into existence without 
blood shed even when one of the most tyrannical and violent of 
regimes had been changed into a brand new constitutional one.^ 
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) became increasingly 
involved in politics though it was not yet a political party and one of its 
own members Salt Pasha was appointed premier. As Committee of 
Union and Progress went to the elections held in 1908 and won an 
over-whelming victory to the house of deputies. Sultan Abdulhamid II 
was replaced by Mehmet V (1909-1918). 
An important ideology that developed during the young Turks period 
was that of nationalism. It originated in literature and history and had 
^ Karpat, Kemal H. Turkey, Policies, p. 19. 
^ Edib, Halide, Turkey Faces West, Yale, 1930. pp. 125-128. 
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the beginning of a purely cultural character and the man who became 
the philosopher and major journalistic exponent of Turkish nationalism 
wasZiya Gokalp (1876-1924) J 
The process of Westernization was stepped up and consequently there 
emerged political parties, parliamentary forms and above all, an 
increasingly important role of the press. 
Attention was also given towards economic reforms. European 
advisers were invited for finance, customs, administration, irrigation, 
law and of course military and naval training and organization.^ 
However, the greatest achievement of the regime was in the 
educational field where a complete change was affected. Increase in 
the number of the Mosque, schools, the establishments of a 
considerable number of normal schools and lycees, the enlargement 
and the better organization of the university with the help of German 
professors are some of its achievements. 
' A detailed study of Ziya Gokalp's, life and works has been written by Uriel 
Heyd, Foundation of Turkish Nationalism, London, 1950. 
^ Davison R.H., Turkey, New Jersey 1968, p. 114. 
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The ideology of secularism started to gain popularity. Islam could be 
more openly discussed. The press began to discuss women's r ights\ 
who were now given equal chances of education as men. 
The Young Turks regime immediately after its coming to power got 
involved in a series of wars. After its defeat in Tripoli and Balkans it 
enjoyed a brief period of peace which ended when it entered the great 
War 1914-1918, where Young Turks era ended in the chaos of defeat. 
However, its contribution to the institutional, ideological and social 
development that underlay the emergence of the modern Turkish 
nation and the Turkish republic was really great. 
Although the Ottoman monarchy formally existed until the 
proclamation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the young Turks 
revolution marks the end of the imperial order and with the collapse of 
the Empire in the wake of World War I, it was this same group, which 
produced the leaders of modern Turkey. 
This elaborate discussion reveals that the reforms of nineteenth 
century, made in the spheres of civilian and military bureaucracy, 
education, and the judiciary aimed to strengthen the central state and 
' Ibid. 
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arrest its decline and disintegration while weakening the religious 
establishments for the Tanzimat's secular modernization caused a 
serious split within the state between the Ulema and the other 
bureaucratic elements. And the social and political dynamics of the 
reform process eventually destroyed the foundations of the Sultanate 
and put an end to more than 500 years of Ottoman rule. One can see 
it as an incipient step towards democratization and later on secular 
ideals cherished by the coming generation, which was finally led by the 
brilliant hero of the Turkish nation, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
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Chapter - ii 
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Evolution 
The ideas of nation, language and fatherland which constituted the 
basis of nationalism did not undergo a uniform line of development in 
Turkey but varied constantly according to changing internal and 
external conditions. Turkish nationalism appears as a series of 
successive movements with different and often conflicting ideological 
foundations and goals. For example; the adjustment of the pan Islamic 
Universalist concept developed under Abdulhamid II (1876 - 1909) to 
the Pan Turanian ideas of the Young Turks (1908 - 18) and eventually 
their rejection in the war of liberation (1919 - 22) and the Republic 
(from 1923) gives a limited concept of Turkish nationalism. 
The development of Turkish nationalism took place primarily within the 
framework of a nation state. It was secular movement, which aimed at 
creating a nation with an identity of its own based on the specific 
cultural characteristics of Turks. ^  Within the Ottoman Empire 
nationalism developed at first among the non - Muslim minorities who 
The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. I Cambridge, 1970 p. 552. 
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were successful in establishing independent nation states during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. During the World War I (1914-
18), the Arab revolt resulted in the ennergence of Arab nation state; 
the Turks were the last to beconne nationalists.^ 
In fact, if we try to trace the origin of nationalism in Turkey, we will 
find the nationalisnn as a political philosophy and slogan was for the 
first time raised by non-Muslim communities who lived in far-flung 
areas of the Ottoman Empire. This idea was a byproduct of the 
increasing influence of the European power in eastern countries. It is 
therefore the earliest slogan of nationalism and was heard immediately 
following the French Revolution. The Ottoman concept of a Pan 
Ottoman philosophy, which the state attempted to pursue to achieve 
legal and political equality and form a homogeneous Ottoman society, 
was unable to prevent the newly emerging political philosophy of 
nationalism nor could the Pan Islamic movement prevent the spreading 
of these ideas among the non-Muslims.^ 
Berkes Niyazi, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, London, 1959. 
p. 7 1 . 
Kara!, Enver Ziya 'The Principles of Kemalism' in Kazancigil, AN and 
Ozbudun, Ergun (eds.), Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State, London, 1981 , 
p. 18. 
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Though Turkey's relations with modern Europe developed much later, 
yet the Turkish thinkers were quick enough to study the nature of the 
change affected in Europe and the Turkish nationalism followed as a 
consequence which of course, was more marked than any other 
movement in the Near and Middle East. Turkey copied European 
institutions more closely than any other westernized country in the 
Middle East. She abandoned everything Oriental and medieval that still 
survived, only to stand at par with the contemporary Europe. It 
became indifferent to her traditional character, perhaps it may have 
been due to the fact that Turkey did not boast of any great past 
civilization of her own that the Turks were willing to be fully 
Europeanized. The constitutional reforms in Turkey also owned its 
origin though partly, to Mohd. Ali, who through his victorious 
campaigns in Syria and Asia Minor and his exemplary modernization of 
Egypt's government made Turkey feel, the necessity of transforming 
from an oriental absolute despotism which she experienced unchanged 
since centuries into a modern constitutional state. Sultan Mahmood II 
(1808-39) was the first of the Ottomans to realize the necessity of 
creating an army trained on European lines and a modern absolute 
administration. This was the beginning of the Tanzimat. 
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The reformers of the Tanzimat sought to appeal to the loyalties of non-
Muslims by advocating a doctrine of Ottomanism. It was a design in 
which a shared sense of Ottoman nationality would link members of all 
the Millets. Unfortunately, Ottomanism never had much impact beyond 
a narrow circles in Istanbul for most Christians, especially those in the 
Balkans, rejected it for their own nationalism and most Muslims saw it 
as a threat to their divinely ordained way of life.^ 
However, contradictions in the statements of the exponents of 
Ottomanism and difficulties in practicing it were unavoidable.^ 
Although many statesmen and officials were sincere in their attempts 
to apply Ottomanism a totally secular outlook, but a totally secular 
outlook had yet to develop among them and old religious allegiances 
were still too strong to be dismissed overnight. While some found the 
new doctrine a good means by which to ensure the internal security of 
the state or please foreign powers, the others were eager to maintain 
the position of Islam and their own predominant position as Muslims in 
the multi-religious, multi-national Empire.^ 
^ Ross, Jeffery A., Op.Cit; p. 327. 
^ Davison, R.H. Op.Cit; pp. 270-278. 
Kushner David, Op.Cit; p. 3. 
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The contribution of literature and literary figures already discussed in 
chapter first, too culminated in the nationalist sentinnents among the 
masses. 
Sinasi's pupil Namik Kemal (1840-1888) was considered even better 
than his master in poetical power. During the Tanzimat period, the 
term vatan underwent a major transformation, assuming the meaning 
of the French patrie. It came to be applied to the territory of the 
Ottoman Empire as a whole, to which as advocated by Ottomanist 
doctrine, all citizens were to hold allegiance. Namik Kemal was one of 
the leading exponents of this ideology. He was responsible for the 
propagation of the new concept, emphasized the role of Islam as the 
real bond between the Ottoman Muslim and his homeland.^ 
Namik Kemal's play Vatan Yahut Silistre (The fatherland or Silistre) 
was first performed in Istanbul and evoked powerful emotional reaction 
from the audience.^ It spoke of the defence of Silistre, on the Danube 
against the Russians during the Crimean war, and was imbued with an 
intense patriotic spirit. 
^ Lewis, Bernard, p. 333. 
^ Ibid. p. 154. 
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There was an upsurge of patriotic feeling in Turl<ey once again in 
1897, around the time of the Turl<ish - Greel< war, and it found 
expression in yet another celebrated literary work, Mehnned Emin's 
Turkce Siirler (poems in Turkish)^ Mehmed Emin (1869-1944), trained 
as civil servant, showed an early interest in writing, particularly poetry, 
and was greatly influenced by folk tales and the movement towards a 
popular literature, expressed in simple language. In his poems, which 
are written in simple and relatively pure Turkish, the Anatolian peasant, 
suffering but devoted to his faith and homeland became the hero. 
The most famous of these poems, 'A voice from Anatolia' or going to 
the Battle' is worth quoting in part: 
I am a Turk; my faith (din) and my race (cins) are mighty. 
My chest, my essence, is filled with fire, 
A man is the slave of his fatherland, 
A Turkish son will not stay at home, I shall go. 
I shall not let the Book of Muhammad (PBUH) be removed, 
I shall not let the banner of Osman be taken, 
I shall not let the enemy attack my homeland. 
The house of God will not be destroyed, I shall go. 
These lands are the home of my fathers. 
My house, my village, are the corner of the place. 
Cited in Kushner, David Op.Cit; 53 
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This is a homeland, this is the arm of God, 
A son will not destroy the home of the father, I shall go. 
Mehmed Emin's poems were imbedded with an intense religious spirit, 
but it was as strong as his patriotic sentiments. 
The period between 1870 and 1876 saw the rapid development of the 
Turkish Press, which also played a significant role in the transformation 
of Turkish life and thought, as it promoted a practical spirit, people no 
longer accepted what came with oriental submissiveness and fatalism 
as the decree of destiny. For the first time in the near East a public 
opinion and public spirit came into being. 
The circulation of the papers, reached a wide circle in social life as the 
papers were circulated in coffee- houses and bazaars. These papers 
gave a wide coverage to the international happenings. In this way the 
press contributed to the removal of long standing barriers between the 
Ottomans and the outside world. The educated reader could acquaint 
himself with some facets of Western culture, customs and tastes as 
well as about the European political movement. This helped in arousing 
people's desire to follow the West's lead and Westernize their own 
country. Thus under the cover of historical and cultural discussions. 
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Turkish national sentiment found expression, anticipating the Turl<ish 
movement of later years. These expressions were found in almost all 
Turkish periodicals, of which the most important were the three major 
dailies of the period, Sabah (morning), Tercuman-i-Hakikat (interpreter 
of truth) and Ikdam (effort). These enjoyed the highest circulation and 
stability of all newspapers. 
This period of progress was speedily followed by an era of corrupt and 
unbridled tyranny, for the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid (1876-1908), is 
referred to as a period of despotic rule. As a matter of fact while the 
Tanzimat were characterized by the growing power of the bureaucracy 
and the rise of constitutional forces, Abdulhamid II dissolved 
parliament and suspended the Ottoman constitution in 1878. He could 
not tolerate any kind of opposition to his rule. 
However, he continued the attempts to modernize and centralize the 
administration and to enforce central state control over provinces. 
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Although under heavy censorship^ the dissemination of newspapers, 
periodicals and books increased further, as did the influence of 
Western ideas owing mainly to members of the literate public in exile.^ 
The autocratic rule of Abdulhamid resulted in a rebellion against him, 
there the Sultan yielded to some of their demands, but at the same 
was alerted and alarmed because the liberal ideas had taken roots on a 
wider scale which aimed against Sultan. He was opposed to the 
nationalist movement and considered it a challenge to his absolute 
authority as well as to the Ottoman Empire as a whole. To him Islam 
was the force that had consolidated the Empire and enhanced his own 
prestige both within the European powers as well as in the Orient. He 
therefore became the most zealous supporter of Pan Islamism.^ He 
wished to confirm the supremacy of religion in political life as was 
during the medieval period as that it might withstand all the assaults of 
modern thought. 
' Jung & Piccoli Op.Cit; p. 47 . 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 181-94. 
Ibid 
38 
Thus, it will be pertinent to say that in the Hamidian despotic rule, 
Ottomanism was replaced with a somewhat manipulative though 
emotionally potent Pan IslamismJ 
After the end of this despotic rule and the coming of young Turks to 
power in 1908, nationalism developed as a moment supported by a 
three interrelated ideologies. While Islamism lent support to the 
conservatives, Ottomanism by the bureaucracy and younger generation 
stood as a bulwark for Turkism. These ideologies attached importance 
to Islam in their own manner. The conservatives and Ottomanists since 
backed by Abdulhamid viewed it as the basic principle of state, 
whereas the Turkists regarded it as an element to go into the making 
of a nation. But none had fully classified the vital relation between the 
nation and the state. The Ottoman state, still a multinational 
structures, was deeply entrenched in its own traditional philosophy of 
government whereas the nation proper did not yet exist.^ 
After the Young Turk revolution of 1908 deposed Abdulhamid II, 
voices of a purely Turkish nationalism came to be increasingly heard. 
At the same time, a highly romanticized variant called Pan Turanism 
^ Ross, Jeffery A. Op.Cit; p. 327. 
^ The Cambridge History of Islam Op.Cit; p. 558. 
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began to be expressed by a diverse group of intellectuals and 
publicists, many of whom were Turkic emigres from Russia. Thus the 
decade of the young Turks rule only intensified the progress that was 
leading the Turks towards political nationalism. In fact, the period of 
young Turks rule was marked by continuous warfare and rebellion, and 
the Ottomans, by the end of the World War I, had lost all their 
remaining possessions with the exceptions of Anatolia and a small part 
of Thrace with the capital Istanbul. This loss of Turkey's cosmopolitan 
character, together with vast chunks of territory left its imprints on 
Turkish political culture. Thus fear of partition and subversion 
constantly haunted this Turkish elite and bred growing suspicion of 
foreigners and their sinister domestic collaborators who wanted to 
divide up the country and undermine its national unity. These pressures 
both at the periphery and at the centre itself could not but increase the 
sense of isolation and unity of the Turks and accelerated their 
conversion to Turkish nationalism. So the Young Turks committed to 
get the Turkish nationalism intensified was quite clear from their 
activities and policies adopted. 
As Uriel Heyd puts it, the leading Turkists, including Semseddin Sami, 
Necib Asim, Veled Celebi, Mehmed Emin and others seem to have 
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constituted a circle of intellectuals professing Turkish nationalism of a 
cultural character J Further the restoration of freedom made it possible 
to resume discussions and debates with intellectuals of other streams 
of thoughts. In 1908, the Turkish society (Turk Dernegi) was 
established, aiming at studying the history and culture of all Turkish 
peoples. However, due to its intellectualism and extreme approach to 
language reform, the society failed to enlist the support of wider 
circles. Its place was largely taken by a new society, or club, formed in 
1912 and called Turkish Hearth (Turk Ocagi) aiming to advance 
education and raise the scientific social and economic level of the 
Turks who are the foremost of the peoples of Islam, and to strive for 
the betterment of the Turkish race and language.^ Also many journals 
notably the Istanbul Yeni Mecma (New Review) and the Gene Kalemler 
(Young Pens) appearing in Solonika were playing a similar role in 
dissemination of Turkist ideas.^ 
As a matter of fact, Solonika became a Turkist center of its own, 
characterized by a group of writers and intellectuals who sought 
a national revival in all spheres of life, among them Ziya Gokalp 
^ Heyd, Uriel, Foundation of Turkish Nationalism, London, 1950, p. 108. 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 350. 
^ Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 99. 
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(1876-1924) who was to become the main theoretician of Turl<ish 
nationalism is worth to mention here. 
A number of scholars have contributed to this investigation to consider 
Turkish nationalism as a Phenomenon of modern age emerging in the 
nineteenth century out of the political situation inside the Ottoman 
Empire. Hans Kohn believes that the genesis of Turkish nationalism can 
be traced to the first constitutional reforms in Turkey in 1826 (1769 -
1849) due to the victories of Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt in Syria 
and Anatolia. These reforms brought a chain of events, the Young 
Turks revolution, and the participation of Ottoman Turkey in world war 
I (1914 - 18), and the strong nationalistic tendencies of the Committee 
of Union and Progress which reached their climax during first world 
war, in the form of Anwar Pasha's Pan Turkish attempts.^ 
Lewis, V. Thomas asserts . 2 
When the Western idea of nationalism was first 
explained to Ottoman society the word for 
nationalism did not exist in the Turkish 
language. The phrase 'Young Turks' was 
1 Kohn, Hans, A History of Nationalism in the East, London, 1929, pp. 222-
226. 
Lewis, V. Thomas, 'Nationalism in Turkey, Nationalism in the Middle East, A 
series of Address' The Middle East Institute, Washington, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
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coined in Paris by a few young westernized 
Ottomans, when it was translated into the 
language of the Ottoman Empire, it did not 
read Gene Turkler (Young Turks) but Gene 
Osmanlilar (Young Ottomans). The Young 
Turks movement does not on all counts 
deserve to be labeled Proto Turkish 
nationalism. It was the defeat of 1918 and its 
consequences that created the deep nationalist 
sentiments which gave rise to modern Turkish 
nationalism. Here is the source of the 
existence, henceforth of a Turkey which was 
Turkey of, by and for Turks, and for an most 
part, only Turks. 
Uriel Hyed observes that Turkish nationalism evolving between 1911 
and 1913, when the first signs of nationalism could be seen in the 
works of the young Turks.^ 
Max Hilldebert Boehm believes even the religious phenomenon may be 
understood as a source of primitive forms of nationalism. It appears 
through a close analysis that in the sphere of the Christian religion at 
Heyd, Uriel Op.Cit; pp. 32-34. 
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least, there is a starting point for nationalism and it is only the dogma 
which is strictly supranational.^ 
Their view points towards the difficulty in identifying the origins of 
Turkish nationalism with recent history and divert is for the 
manifestations of nationalism in the remote past of the Turks in Asia 
Minor. However, if we look in the remote past of the Turks in Asia 
Minor, we find a very interesting phenomenon, i.e. Turkification of 
Anatolia, which occurred in the eleventh to fifteenth centuries during 
the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks. This process of Turkification 
was not achieved by massacre of native populations. It came as a 
result of the assimilation of the local population and their acceptance 
of the Turkish language, Turkish religion, i.e. Islam and its culture. The 
question remains however, regarding linguistic phenomenon of the 
Turkification of Anatolia, an expression of Turkish nationalism. In an 
excellent report by a group of scholars there is an enlightening 
explanation of the equation between culture and language in the early 
' Boehm, Max Hilldebert, 'Nationalism' Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, New 
York, 1933, XI, p.236. 
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stages; Culture follows language and the literature written in that 
language will form one of the proudest part of the national heritage.^ 
The ties between language and nationalism helped rather convincingly 
the Turkification of Anatolia in the four centuries from the eleventh to 
the fifteenth, and had some of the characteristics of modern 
nationalism with its aggressiveness and aggrandizement plus its 
denationalization of minorities and conquered peoples.^ 
The Turks were already devout Muslims at the dawn of their conquest 
and Turkification of Anatolia was paralleled by Islamization of that 
country. The Turkification of Anatolia leads us to think that the 
Islamization of the Turks (which preceded Turkification of Anatolia) did 
not denationalize them. The Turkification of Anatolia from eleventh to 
fifteenth centuries was wider in scope and in its impact than that of 
the Kemalist period. Hence, it is possible to trace a general line of 
Turkish national policy that continued through eleventh, thirteenth and 
fifteenth till the twentieth century and it is quite clear that Turkification 
is a continuous and intrinsic element of the Turkish national policy and 
lies at the heart of Young Turkists and Kemalists. 
Study group of members of the Royal Institute of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 'Nationalism', London, 1939, p. 15. 
Hertz, Frederick, Nationality in History and Po/itics, London, 1945. 
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The ten years from the revolution to the end of the World War I though 
not happy ones for Turkey were vital to the growth of Turkish 
nationalism. 
The spirit of the new nationalism, which ousted the earlier Turkish 
patriotism of the romantic poets and reforming statesmen under 
European influence, was summed up by Halide Edib in her great 
political novel She had received European education in the American 
women's college at Scutari. Even in 1921 a Turkish statesmen said of 
her book "That is our national ideal". In it she wrote of the new 
nationalism.^ 
As I listened (to the speeches at Pan Turanian 
gathering) my soul was profoundly moved and 
I felt how deeply the aspirations of the new 
Turkey are rooted in our forefathers' very 
being; the music welled up from the innermost 
source of our Turanian blood and carried me 
away, so that to this day I still seem to hear it 
and I realized that we must learn to descend to 
the springs of life if we would breathe into our 
political aim the power of inspiration to win the 
people for its accomplishment. 
Quoted from Memories of Halide Edib, New York, 1926. 
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Thus the movement forged links with ancient traditions. There was 
nothing to be discovered of a cultural heritage. All Turkish culture had 
been borrowed from Persia or Arabia. What survived of the past were 
the customs and songs of the primitive nomad tribes and the cruel war 
like deeds of victorious barbarian hordes. But it was precisely to these 
memories that Turkish nationalism reverted. They began to distinguish 
three period in the History of Islam, an Arabian and Persian era, both 
past and a Turkish era now dawning. The ancient customs of the 
steppes were to be revived. Instead of calling children by the 
customary Muslim names, long forgotten Turkish names were restored. 
Similarly festivals that had never been observed before in memory of 
past events, such as the anniversary of the capture of Constantinople, 
were celebrated, and the government decreed that they should be 
observed as school holidays. 
This new nationalism found political expression in endeavours that 
were particularly active during the World War I, one of the most 
important task was that of strengthening the economic position of 
Turks, who had played no part hitherto in trade and manufacture, but 
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had left them to the Greeks and Armenians.^ The boycott of the 
Greeks and the establishment of Turkish co-operative societies and 
Turkish banks in the larger cities of Anatolia all served this end, and 
over all these particular activities hovered the nationalist spirit, the 
ideal adopted by the Turks from modern chauvinist Europe with all its 
variety and false interpretations of history. True, the Turks refused to 
admit as much as may be seen from the words of Ziya Gokalp,^ "Turan 
is no illusory fatherland. The Turkish tribes living together in Asia will 
gather around the Turkish flag and form a great Empire. Turks ought 
not to live like mere conglomeration of men without reason or purpose; 
they should unite as a single whole creating an eternal life formed of all 
the transitory lives of the individuals". 
Ziya Gokalp and the Theory of Turkish Nationalism 
Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) recognized as the father of Turkish 
nationalism, was the theorist of the nationalist movement and one of 
the greatest Turkish thinkers. He is regarded as author, poet. 
Kushner, David Op.Cit; p. 101 . 
Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, Trans, and ed. By 
Berkes, Niyazi New York, 1959 and Ziya Gokalp, The Principles of Turkism, 
Trans, and Annot by. R. Deverux, Leiden, 1968. 
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sociologist, historian, philosopher, man of public affairs and ideological 
slogan makerJ 
Ziya Gokalp, an introvert genius, led the checkered life of an 
intellectual, a scholar and a political revolutionary who heralded the 
renaissance of nnodern Turkey. Actually his influence over the Turkish 
intelligentsia came through his writings, which were to propagate his 
ideas of nationalism, the dream of Turkish youth. The debacle of the 
Ottoman Empire and the subsequent emancipation of Turkey from the 
military influence of the British Empire, and the clear realization of the 
road to progress in fact, vindicated the ideas of Ziya Gokalp. The urge 
of the Turkish youth and the intelligentsia to restore the real vigour in 
the sick Turkish nation synthesized with the sentiments of Ziya 
Gokalp. 
The ideas of Ziya Gokalp created an atmosphere and a parallel that 
provided the inspiration needed for a change in popular mentality from 
monarchy to democracy, from religious orthodoxy to free thinking and 
from the traditional East to the progressive West. The rapidity of the 
reforms succeeding one after the other that followed, from 1913^ 
^ Hostler, Charles Warren, Turkism and the Soviet, London, 1957, p. 101 . 
^ Shaw and Shaw Op.Cit; p. 202 
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through the first decade of the Republic, were reinforced, and in many 
ways made possible, by the ideological basis and support that the 
writings of Gokalp provided. Thus changes accepted and represented 
previously as indispensable to the survival of the nation were 
transformed into goals that were considered desirable by the people at 
large. At this time Ottoman Empire seemed to be decaying, but, 
instead of lamenting the loss, his ideas provided inspiration for building 
up a new nation with firm roots in the past and trust in the future. This 
optimism and constructive approach was the light (Turkish Ziya) that 
favoured the building of a new society.^ The inherent limitations of 
Ottoman nationalism, since it had grown out of reaction against 
Christian minorities, began to defeat its own end through reaching into 
conflict between the concept of nation (Millet) Which only 
encompassed the Muslims for Christians and minorities were treated as 
different Millets. Ottoman nationalism with its concept of fatherland 
could not succeed because it has its roots only in the sentiments of 
Muslim Turks, who believed that defending their territory was as 
necessary as to defend Islam and thought it as their religious duty. But 
to intelligentsia, a more sophisticated interpretation of nationalism was 
Ibid. 
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needed for they were concerned with the fate of the state. Literary 
figures like Ibrahim Sinasi had inspired the people and the intelligentsia 
with the zeal and love for fatherland. As already discussed the real 
beginning of Turkish nationalism came through the linguistic movement 
initiated by the Young Ottomans like Ziya Pasha and Namik KemaP 
Through this movement they wanted to reach the greatest number of 
people who could understand only a simplified Turkish language. 
Gokalp was in favour of modernization through the ability of using all 
the instruments and weapons produced by the most progressive 
nations. According to him "...modernization does not mean similarity to 
Europeans in appearance and living only".^ Gokalp's synthesis of 
Turkish nationalism, Islam and western civilization is rested in his book 
Turklesmek, Islamlesmek Ve Muasirlasmak. He believed the religion 
and nationalism were not mutually separate but co-existent so "this 
approach seems to be the expressive of a mind which without seeking 
to cease to be essentially Islamic tries to widen its bases and extend 
The young Ottoman Ziya Pasha (1825-80), Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-71) and 
Namik Kemal (1840-88) are credited with being the pioneers of the new 
literary movement. 
Gokalp, Ziya, Turklesmek, Islamlesmek, Muasirlasmak, Ankara, pp. 10-11. as 
cited in Feroze, M. Rashid Islam and Secularism in Post Kemalist Turkey, 
Islamabad, 1976, p. 98. 
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the limits of its horizon to nationalist ideology".^ His aim was to 
establish modern Islamic Turkish state. The need of the time was that 
the Turks should be well at western arts, sciences and technology. 
Regarding their spiritual requirements, they would not borrow anything 
belonging to European religion and nationalism. 
During his lifetime Ziya Gokalp witnessed three turning points in 
Turkish history. Abdulhamid H's reign (1876 - 1909), the second 
constitutional period (1908-9) and the formative year of Mustafa 
Kemal's Turkey, which was the period of a remarkable change in the 
political and social set up of the Turks as well as of the Ziya Gokalp's 
intellectual evolution. The changing patterns of society, the new 
modes of thought and the resultant conflicts arising from it, these all 
factors conditioned and moulded the thoughts of Ziya Gokalp. 
Nationalism was the most important aspect of westernization as 
formulated by Ziya Gokalp. His writings on Turkish nationalism 
centered around Turkification, Islamization and modernization. He was 
a firm believer in that a synthesis of these three intellectual currents 
could be made through a groundwork for the modern Islamic Turkish 
^ Mohd. Sadiq, Ziya Gokalp, The making of an ideology. Cultural Turica, 
Ankara, Vol. V-VI-VII, 1968-70, p. 12. 
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culture. He has set forth three steps in order to achieve this 
programme. The first step being the secularization of the Turkish 
national state, this will modernize the Turkish society through 
absorbing the knowledge and techniques of the West and at the same 
time also preserve the Turkish and Islamic elements of culture. 
Secondly, Turkey would gain importance in the Muslim world by 
unifying the Oguz Turks living outside Turkey. The final step would be 
that Turkey would become a source of inspiration for the cultural unity 
of all Turkish-speaking peoples.^ 
Gokalp's religious outlook was conditioned and moulded by the social 
conditions i.e. traditions customs art, folklore and language of that 
time. As Rosenthal puts it, "the central idea of his social philosophy is 
evolution, both of society and of the factors, including religion that 
determine it."^ Rosenthal further writes, nationalism for Gokalp is a 
spiritual value, just as cultural nationalism at par with religion, is 
another spiritual value. He is conscious of the difficulty to delimit 
national against religious education, since Islamic traditions belong to 
^ Ziya Gokalp, as cited in Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 99 -101 . 
^ Rosenthal, Erwin I.J. Islam in the Modem National State, Cambridge, 1965, 
p. 5 1 . 
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Islam as a religion and also to the nations that contributed it, the 
Arabs, Persian and Turks J 
Gokalp rejected racism and blind sentimental attachment to the past. 
The past traditions and the Islamic background could provide the Turks 
with a stable base for participation in contemporary western 
civilization. Turkification, Islamization and contemporarization were 
thus compatible with each other, all joining together and strengthening 
both state and society,^ 
Gokalp was not against Islam but he favoured what was essential and 
beneficial for the society and wanted to discard the things, which 
hampered the progress of Turkish society. To Gokalp Islam was most 
important, as a source of ethics and it was fully capable of being 
modified to meet the needs of the time.^ He opposed the concept of an 
'Islamic civilization' under which the Turks had mistakenly accepted 
the cultural values of other peoples. At the same time he regarded 
Ibid, pp. 59-60. 
Hasan, Syed Sibtey, Life and Works of Ziya Gokalp, Institute of Islamic 
Studies, XXVIII, Aligarh Publication Series, 1988, p. 53. 
Shaw and Shaw Op.Cit; p. 303. 
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Islam as an important factor in stimulating patriotfsrin cind/^^basis for 
solidarity and cooperation with other Muslim peoples.^ 
Gokalp emphasized the need for a complete reorganization of the 
educational system in Turkey and stressed the importance of the three 
fold purpose of Turkish education i.e. it had to be Turkish, Islamic and 
modern. These three elements were must and complementary to each 
other, otherwise he said, they may become inconsistent and mutually 
contradictory, because if secular education went beyond its limits it 
would encroach upon the Turkish and Islamic ideas. Thus he wanted 
the modern educationists to demarcate the boundaries between 
national and religious education and this required extensive research so 
as to differentiate the real Islamic traditions from Persian, Turkish or 
Arab traditions. According to him, education had to be nationalized and 
teaching was to be modernized.^ 
At the same he wanted legislation to be rescued from the limitation of 
the religious law, and the religion left to the Ulema. The Sheikhul Islam 
himself was supposed to be as independent from the control of the 
state as the legislature would be from him. He was in favour of the 
^ Kushner, David Op.Clt; pp. 99-100. 
^ Berkes, Niyazi, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (Selected essays 
of Ziya Gokalp), London, 1959, pp. 245-247. 
55 
elimination of the religious endevments as according to hinn they 
consumed much of nations wealth. On integral progressive policy he 
writes, "the religious schools and courts had to be abolished to end the 
long standing dualism between secular religious elements that existed 
in Ottoman society and the religious law had to be supplanted by 
secular law"J 
On the status of women the Gokalp asserts that the position of 
women had to be restored to the high place it had enjoyed in ancient 
Turkish society. However, much Islam had developed its produces 
towards women to save them from discrimination, its modern 
manifestation had held them down, prevented them from taking their 
rightful place in the Turkish Nation. Women should be given the same 
education as men, they had to be allowed to earn their living in the 
same way as men; they could no longer be subjected to the 
degradation that was inherent in polygamy, which was allowed by 
traditional Islam. The family had to be developed as a basic unit in 
society, and towards this end family names had to be adopted as was 
done in Europe.^ 
' Ibid. 
2 Ibid. p. 302. 
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Supporting the Turkification of Islam Gokalp wanted to replace Arab 
traditions by Turkish traditions. The rituals and prayers to be carried 
out in the Turkish language and in the Turkish manner and the 'Quran' 
to be taught in Turkish so as to make it easier to understand the 
religion and appreciate God for more than they could, when reciting 
phrases in a foreign language.^ 
In fact Gokalp wanted a modernized Turkish nation having the religion 
of Islam as the source of its ethics and an "up to date Muslim Turk" 
having his sentiments focused on the nation and national dignity. He 
wanted Turkey to develop into a powerful and progressive state with 
nationalism as a sentiment, a guiding spirit and as an ideal.^ 
Nonetheless, it was Gokalp's theory of Turkish nationalism that 
inspired the Kemalist regime. Gokalp actively supported the people's 
party founded by Mustafa Kemal. The first constitution of Turkish 
republic has been largely upon Gokalp's views. Even after Gokalp's 
death, his ideas continued to be a source of inspiration to the leaders 
of Kemalist regime. 
' Ibid. p. 304. 
^ Hasan, Syed Sibtey Op.Cit; p. 68. 
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Nationalism and The Republic 
Turkish nationalism grew out of the two conditions: on the one hand, 
battles with insurgent nationalities encouraged a sense of cohesion 
among the remaining peoples and territories. On the other hand, at the 
end of the 20*^ century the Ottoman Empire was reduced mainly to 
Turks and other Muslim. 
This Turkification process had already begun during the period of the 
Young Turks in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire. The Young 
Turks learned the power of nationalism from the struggle of Ottoman 
peoples whom they fought against to keep the remaining parts of the 
Empire together. Thus, by the end of the World War I and the Turko-
Greek War that lasted from 1919 to 1922, there were few non-Muslim 
peoples left in Anatolia that subsequently became the Turkish 
motherland. The majority of Turkey's two million Armenians were 
deported to Syria and Mesopotamia in 1915 by the Ottoman Young 
Turk administration,^ so that they could side with advancing Russian 
troops and declare independence in Eastern Turkey. These deportations 
continued until 1918 and it has been estimated that as many as 1.5 
Ross, Jeffery A. Op.Cit; pp. 327-328. 
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million Armenians died or were ki l led\ The remaining Greeks, who had 
not fled after the Turko-Greek war, were exchanged for Turks (in fact, 
Muslims) in Greece under a treaty that went into effect in 1924. This 
homogenization of the populations helped the republican elite declare 
the rest of the population Turkish. 
As a matter of fact it was not the initial aim of the founding elite to 
create an ethnically 'pure nation' which was rather fashioned by the on 
going events. Anatolia was still more cosmopolitan than was officially 
recognized and that they were the heirs of multinational, multicultural 
empire.^ They accordingly named the country the state of the Republic 
of Turkey. 
The efforts of the ruling elite were to substitute Turkish identity for 
Ottoman identity. However, Ottomanism was a supra identity that 
allowed sub or cultural and ethnic identities to coexist with it. One 
cannot ignore that Ottoman (the house of Osman) was the name of the 
ruling dynasty, which gave its name to the all-encompassing state. 
Hence, it was ethnically neutral; in contrast, Turkish identity was 
^ Nationalism, Now and Then, http://www.cyprus.confl ict.net/ergil.htm. 
' (bid. 
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ethnic in cultured Decades of indoctrination and a heavy dose of 
nationalist education created a deep sense of pride in being a Turl<. 
Nationalism was one of the three basic ideas, which emerged during 
1923-25 as the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic. It, in 
its simplest meaning claimed Turkey for the Turks. Nationalism was 
the step for attaining independence and for establishing a Republic. 
The Ottomanism turned into Turkish Nationalism because of the 
territorial losses and the refusal of the minorities to renounce their 
national aspirations in favour of a multinational Ottoman state. Further, 
the exodus of minorities in 1927 made Turkey ethnically and culturally 
homogenous which enabled it to fulfill the aims and goals of Turkish 
nationalism. 
In this regard various branches of government, through the Republican 
Peoples Party and the Turkish Hearth organization inherited from the 
Young Turks, played a great role to expound the doctrines of 
nationalism. To achieve this purpose was very difficult because of the 
century old influence of the Ottomans and foreigners alike on the 
Turks. 
Ibid 
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Agreements were signed to guarantee the territorial integrity and 
independence with a number of neighbouring countries. Trade and 
friendship treaties signed with Britain, Hungry, Germany, Bulgaria and 
other enabled Turkey to re-enter into the Concert of Nations and later 
into the League of Nations on July 18, 1932J The Kemalist tenets 
successfully inspired the masses by asserting that these trade and 
friendship treaties with various countries were signed which helped to 
resolve the conflicts with those countries which paved the way for 
economic and social development of Turks. 
The nationalism of Turkey involved a self-imposed isolation of 
individuals from the world and an entirely self-centered view of Turkey. 
It is clearly manifest from the fact that Western institutions, practices 
and ideas were accepted, but the instruction in foreign languages and 
non-Turkish history was reduced in the schools, partly in reaction to 
over emphasis of foreign languages and history. 
So as the nationalist ideal found its way into the hearts of the Turkish 
people it was attended by the same social developments elsewhere. Of 
these three may be distinguished as peculiarly characteristic, the rise 
of a new language, a new attitude towards religion, and the entry of 
' Ibid. 
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women into public life. At this time the attitude of the new nationalism 
towards religion was not so marked as ten years later. 
The republic of Turkey was born from the ashes of Ottoman Empire 
and accepted nationalism, by necessity as its main ideology to replace 
the broader concept of Islamism and Ottomanism. In Turkey, however, 
nationalism was identified with and represented in the form of a 
political state almost from its inception, and its identification gave to it 
both exclusiveness and cultural political absolutism in all fields of 
human activity.^ Because the idea of nationalism also served as an 
outlet for expressing all the bitterness and pain caused by the downfall 
of an Empire, which had stood for centuries on equal footing with the 
major powers of the world.^ 
However, nationalism in Turkey did not remain immune to the social 
and economic transformation. The rising middle classes used 
nationalism to protect themselves against social currents. The 
historical - cultural aspect of nationalism described above were bound 
to lose intensity as the goals, which, they served, were attained. But 
socioeconomic considerations, growing in importance, let the middle 
^ Karpat, Kemal, H Op.Cit; p. 252. 
^ Lewis, Bernard 'History wrijing and national revival in Turkey', Middle 
Eastern Affairs, IV, 1953, pp. 223-225. 
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classes to maintain the intense, all embracing character of nationalism, 
either by insisting on old slogans or when these became obsolete, by 
finding new ones, supposedly for maintaining national solidarity against 
social currents disruptive of unity J 
In internal affairs, nationalism became the supreme force dominating all 
activities in the society, visualizing problems and moulding ideas in the 
light of its own conceptions. Idealistic Turkish intellectuals had viewed 
nationalism,^ cleared of Islamic influences, as an avenue leading to the 
creation of a national culture and universal understanding. The 
Republic was to start a new life under the aegis of nationalism. 
Consequently it tried to dissociate itself from the past and all that it 
entailed.^ 
Mustafa Kemal's definition of Turkish nationalism was, "The Turkish 
people forming the Turkish Republic are called the Turkish nation"."^ 
The doctrine of Turkish nationalism was expounded by the state 
Karpat, Kemal H Op.Cit; p. 253. 
See Memories of Edib, Halide, Yew York, 1926, pp. 326, ff. Also L. Levonia, 
Muslim Mentality, London, J . 928, pp. 55-56. 
It is for this reason that history was written in the Republic in order 'to 
destroy what remained of Ottoman and Islamic feelings of identity, and 
replace them by one that was purely Turkish' and to restore national self-
respect, which had been badly undermined in the past by the west 's own 
biased anti-Turkish history. See Lewis, Bernard History Writing, pp. 224-25, 
See 'Relation of Turkey'. Near Eastern culture and Society, pp. 179-187. 
Karal, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; p. 18. 
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through various media channels, through press, schools and other 
various institutions of government. Kemalist ideology highlighted that 
Turks had played an important and leading role in the developments of 
world civilization, and that it were the Turks who had contributed most 
to what had been achieved in the Ottoman Empire. 
Turkish nationalism had cultural as well as humanist aspects. The 
ideologies of the Turkish nationalism tried to make it a point that 
Turkish nationalism was not based on Turkish race. It was rather based 
on Turkish language, that is Turkish nationality is for the people who 
speak Turkish, who are brought up with Turkish culture, share Turkish 
ideals and who live on Turkish soil. These people are Turks, regardless 
of race and religion. 
The Turkish nation regards itself as a prized and honourable member of 
the human family. Turks loved all humans and have no feeling of 
hostility unless the country's national pride or interest is violated. 
Turkish nationalism became a symbol of peace at the time when 
extreme, racism was identified with imperialism.^ ^ 
Karal, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; pp 18-19. 
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In search of a unifying myth, long forgotten roots of the pre Ottonnan, 
pre Islamic era were re-introduced. However, this process was adopted 
to act as an ideological glue for national cohesion. In the absence of a 
medieval high culture that could be labeled Turkish, the nationalist elite 
found their glory in its history. The search for and consolidation of new 
national identity were carried to extremes. The Turkish Historical 
Society was founded in 1925, in order to highlight the role of Turks in 
history. The theories like 'Sun Language Theory' were concocted. 
According to 'Sun Language Theory' all languages emerged out of 
Turkish.^ As a reminder of those days, the presidential banner consists 
of a sun representing the Turkish Republic encircled by 16 stars, 
symbolizing the Turkish state that were presumably created by Turks 
through out history. This reminder of glorious past was a panacea for 
Turkish pride wounded by the loss of Empire. 
As the Turkish nationalism became the official doctrine of the Republic, 
a variety of cultural, linguistic and educational policies were pursued 
that emphasized the distinctive genius of the Turkish people and 
pointed out their pre-lslamic and possibly their post-Islamic role and 
Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 375-376. 
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identity. Moreover, reforms were introduced to get rid of all the 
hurdles, which would come in the way of progress. 
In order to take Republic at par with European nations, modernization 
and Westernization continued at high speed and along with the reforms 
sanctified by law. A multitude of other Western habits, views, 
methods of work and business were adopted on an individual or group 
basis in all fields. Islamic education was discouraged. It was thought to 
produce the conservatives with narrow intellect, who were not fit to 
the needs of the time, which demanded more rational and scientific 
oriented class. In 1925 only 284 students had remained in the 
theological school, in 1926-33 the number fell from 167 to 2, and in 
1941 it was closed for the lack of students and later it had become 
the institute for Islamic research. Imam-hatip (clergy) schools were also 
closed.^ 
Nationalizing Education 
Strong concerned attacks were aimed at obscurantism, mysticism, 
supernaturalism and traditionalism. Nationalizing education, no doubt. 
On the religious schools, see Reed, Howard A. "Turkey's New Imam-Hatip 
Schools", Diet Welt des Islam, Vol. IV 1955, No. 2-3 pp 150-63, The 
Faculty of Divinity at Ankara, part I and II The Muslim World, October 4 , 
1956, pp. 295-312 and XLVII, January 1, 1957, pp 22-35 respectively. 
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was one of most important. In the Ottoman Empire, education had 
been under the control of the Ulema. Besides each mosque, there was 
usually a school. In small town, the Mosque was used as a school, 
where the children were taught to read the Koran to pray and to 
perform the basic rituals of Islam. Those who wanted higher education 
attended special schools that trained the Ulema. As a result for 
centuries whatever schooling a Turk could receive was in or near the 
Mosque, where one of the chief functionaries was the Hoca (hoja) or 
teacher. The emphasis was on teaching Islamic sciences and Arabic 
languages, which was not understood by most Turks. Elementary 
education was limited to this sort of teaching unless the student 
sought to become a member of the Ulema and make himself an 
authority on Islamic law. ^ 
From the Tanzimat days in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
European type schools began to appear, though their number was not 
large and the system of education underwent many ups and downs. 
But due to the unstable political conditions of the Tanzimat and the 
constitutional period any remarkable progress in this field was 
checked. During the Young Turks period education was again given its 
^ Allen, H. E., The Turkish Transformation, A Study in Social and Religious 
Development. Chicago, 1935, P. 92. 
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due importance. Not only were the number of government schools 
increased but also the students were encouraged to study abroad. 
Consequently, a number of Turkish Muslims began attending the 
European and American schools within the Empire already maintained 
by the missionary agencies. Also, remarkable advances were made by 
the previous foundations (Awkaf) in the religious schools maintained 
by them. This has been aptly described by Halide Edib^as: 
The madaressas for the first time were to have 
modern teachers instead of the old scholastic 
curriculum and the staff. The Mosque schools, 
which so far taught only the Quran and which 
were housed in little holes, were now 
modernized and a dozen schools were 
amalgamated in one big and up-to date building 
in an important center. Each was to have a 
modern staff with a modern curriculum. The 
boys schools were organized by AN Bey, a very 
capable and progressively section chief in 
Awkaf. The girl schools as well as the small 
mixed ones were to be organized by Nakie 
Hanun as the general director. 
Memories of Edib, Halide, New York, 1926, p. 351 , 
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It was felt that Turkey's education was unsystematized therefore now 
under the Republic education was taken away from the Ulema. All 
traditional madaressas were closed down and their place was taken up 
by the government built schools on the model of the West. Education 
was proclaimed to be universal and free J The different millets 
continued to provide separate schools, hospitals and other social 
institutions for those wishing to use them, with the government 
consisting only that all millet children receive their elementary 
education in the state schools or according to curriculum established 
by the Ministry of Education, in order to provide the common bonds for 
them to participate fully in Turkish life. However, provision was made 
by the state for further training of religious personnel. At the lower 
level, new schools were opened to train the imams and preachers and 
at the higher level a faculty of Theology was established at the 
Suleymaniya Mederse, which was affiliated to the University of 
Istanbul. This religious institution was brought under the direct control 
of the Ministry of Education. Its new faculty was established with an 
intention to provide modernized and scientific form of religious 
instruction, which could serve the purpose of a secular, westernized 
Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; pp. 375-377. 
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republic. Education no longer worked to produce good and faithful 
Muslinns but good and faithful Turks. Islann, in so far as it could 
contribute to the new ends, were retained, but religious instruction 
was not given by turbaned Hojas but by the regular secular teachers 
and was so presented, as to produce devoted Turks.^ 
Republican Nationalism and the Religious Ethos 
Although Mustafa Kemal never attacked Islam but was against the 
Ulema who, through their superficial knowledge of Islann, were 
exploiting the people for self-aggrandizement. He made frequent 
references to Islam whenever he tried to justify his reforms and the 
programmes of the nationalist government.^ What he aimed at was to 
limit the practice of religion within the boundaries of the places of 
worship and also to separate religion and state. Thus not only the 
political and social influences of the Ulema were suppressed but also it 
was a step towards reducing the role of religion in the social and 
cultural life of the people.^ It was always explained to the people that 
these reforms were not against Islam but just to put and end, to the 
' Allen, H.E. Op.Cit; p. 101 . 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 98. 
^ For a detailed discussion on Kemal's Secularization see Chapter III 
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power and influence of the Ulema^ who, for their nnotivated interests 
were misleading the masses. 
Nationalizing Language 
The most critical stages in the Turkish transformation were exemplified 
best in the adoption of the Latin script.^ There had been proposals of 
the improvement of the Arabic script since time of the Tanzimat, 
though nothing very much had come of them. The more radical idea of 
abandoning the Arabic script entirely and replacing it by the Latin 
alphabet was put forward and discussed in Turkey in 1923 and 1924, 
but was decisively rejected.^ 
Mustafa Kemal opened a nationwide campaign in August 1928 and in 
November the same year a law was passed by the Grand National 
Assembly making the use of the Latin script for Turkish compulsory 
1 Lewis, Bernard writes, 'Mustafa Kemal wanted to break the hold of the 
Ulema. However they still had great power and influence. A large part of the 
educational facilities of the country were under their control, the law relating 
to family and personal matters were still directed by the code they 
administered. This was the only authority to challenge the new leadership. In 
fact this was the aspect of the conflict. Cp. Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 258-
60. 
Berkes, Niyazi Op.Cit; p. 476. 
Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 2 7 1 . 
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and prohibiting the use of Arabic script in all public affairs after 
December 1 of the same yearJ 
Mustafa Kemal's purpose in changing the alphabet was not to prevent 
Turks from reading the Quran. He wanted to reduce illiteracy and 
develop a uniform and logical Turkish language. He rightly concluded 
that it was easier for Turks to learn to read and write using Latin 
alphabet. He and the members of the assembly each took a black 
board to the villages and towns and proved that the Latin alphabet was 
an easier medium. The introduction of a new alphabet was a 
staggering undertaking in the printing of books for the growing schools 
of the country, but it was done. Turks everywhere knew for the first 
time how a word was to be pronounced from the way it was written.^ 
Kemal's nationalist and populist theories demanded that the Turkish 
language should be truly Turkish, with the disappearance of the 
existing duality of language those of the place and the people. He, 
therefore, ordered that all the Arabic and Persian words should be 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 88 also Berkes, Niyazi Op.Cit; pp. 474-6. 
^ Armajani, Y. and Ricks, T.M. Middle East Past and Present, New Jersey, 
1986, p. 246. 
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eliminated, ^ since the Turkish language, which had been overwhelmed 
by such an invasion, had been reduced to merely verbs and suffixes in 
literally works. In the words of Mustafa Kemal, "the Turkish nation 
which knew how to defend its country and noble independence must 
also liberate its language from the yoke of foreign language".^ 
At the beginning of the 1930's language reform movement was 
revitalized. Mustafa Kemal along with some of the prominent members 
of the Turkish Historical Congress, held at Ankara in July 1932, and 
suggested to them the establishment of a society for the study of the 
Turkish language. As a result, Turkish linguistic society called 'Turk Dil 
Kurumu' was formed. According to article 2 of its status the aim of the 
society was to bring about the genuine beauty and richness of the 
Turkish language to elevate it to the high rank it deserves among world 
languages. To attain this objective a special committee was set up for 
research in linguistics and philosophy, etymology, grammar and 
syntax, vocabulary and terminology, the collection of words and 
publications. In 1932 the first Turkish language congress was 
convened in Istanbul. The Congress elected the society's Central 
^ Because these two languages (Arabic and Persian) were considered to be the 
language of Islam. 
^ Heyd, Uriel, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, Jerusalem, 1954, p. 9. 
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Committee, which decided the following main steps towards speedy 
reform of the ordinary-non-technical vocabularies.^ 
1. The collection and publication of the Turkish word 
material present in the popular language and old texts. 
2. The definition of the principles of word formation in 
Turkish, and the creation of words from Turkish roots in 
conformity therewith. 
3. The suggestion and propagation of such genuine Turkish 
words as might replace words of foreign origin used in 
Turkish especially in the written language. 
In order to enable the society to carry out its work the government and 
the administration fully supported it by decreeing in November 1932 
for the collection of all such Turkish words which were generally in use 
of the common people but not found in the written language. The 
Turkish linguistic society turned out glossary after glossary of genuine 
Turkish terms. Some caught on, many did not. Nevertheless there was 
failure to expel all foreign words from Turkish. The movement was 
then restrained in accordance with newly invented 'Sun theory of 
' For details regarding the founding of the society and its works see Hyed, 
Uriel Op.Cit; ^.2b ff. 
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language'. This theory was propounded at the Third Turkish Congress 
held in 1936. It taught that all languages of mankind were derived 
fronn Turkish, so that in using any Arabic or Persian word they needed, 
the Turks were only reclaiming their own since they had originally been 
Turkish words.^ 
Importance Given to Family Names 
Another significant publicized event was the forced adoption and use 
of family names. Only a few of the old Turkish families had names, 
and many did not use them. The Grand National Assembly gave to 
Mustafa Kemal the name of 'Ataturk' (Father of the Turks). His close 
friend and second in command, Ismet, became Ismet Inonu, in the 
honour of his two commemorating victories over the Greeks at Inonu in 
1921. Appropriate names were given to other party leaders by Grand 
National Assembly. The head of each family went to precinct police 
headquarters and selected the family names from the list of approved 
Turkish words and names, or a combination of these. No one else in 
that district could take the name. Most names had a meaning, such as 
Mango, Andrew, Turkey, London, 1968, p. 60. 
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Biyiklioglu (son of the man with a mustache), ustundag (mountaintop), 
and Kirkagaclioglu (son of the man with forty trees) J 
Another step taken in this direction was a law passed by Grand 
National Assembly shifting the capital from Istanbul to Ankara in the 
Anatolian highlands. It was intended to remove the republican 
government from foreign influences, from cosmopolitanism, and from 
stagnating influence of the old Ottoman Sultanate and its conservative 
entourage. Many towns were renamed in modern Turkey. Angora 
became Ankara, Syrna became Izmir and Adrianople became Edirne. 
After 1932, letters addressed with the old named were not delivered.^ 
The thematic discussion on the concept of nationalism and its growth 
in Turkey especially after the establishment of the Republic leads one 
to reach at certain conclusion, which can be summarized in the 
following paragraphs. 
The concept of nationalism underwent certain changes after the 
liberation of Turkey and establishment of modern Turkish state. During 
the 1920's and 1930's the theories of Turkish nationalism were 
severely expounded to achieve the Republican aims and after the 
Fisher, Sydney N., The Middle East: A History, New York, 1960, p. 397. 
Peretz, Don, The l\/liddle East Today, llionis, 1971 , p. 154. 
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accomplishment of these objectives they were mostly abandoned. The 
idea of Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic, as it did not aim to 
achieve greatness by regaining lands once ruled by the Ottomans but 
to build their own land a modern state for the Turks within the 
boundaries of the republic.^ 
The Turkish nationalism replaced the regionalism and prevented class 
struggle and ideological derisiveness. The spirit of solidarity prevailed 
and discredited the ideologies of Ottomanism and Pan Islamism. 
Turkish nationalism encouraged the Turks to build their own land, 
without fostering aggressive irredentist aspirations. 
Although nationalism in Turkey was of Western origin, the form it 
took, in Turkey differed substantially from the original model. It was 
used to gather the support of the masses by the Westernized classes 
of the Middle East. The masses, although affected by its cultural 
aspect, accepted nationalism by identifying it with religion. 
Nationalism in Turkey produced practical results. It unified various 
sections of the Turkish population around common cultural goal, it 
created a feeling of national solidarity, it oriented the cultural 
: *' 
^ Shaw and Shaw Op.Cit; p. 376. L ' - P / ' n . ^ \ * 
development of the country in accordance with the original character 
of the nation, and finally, it gave to the individual Turk a feeling of 
national pride.^ 
Ataturk's 1922 victory over the invading allies helped to arouse a 
national sentiment of an intensity that had never before existed among 
the Turkish masses.^ In fact nationalism was itself the result of 
modernization and westernization and all other social, economic, 
cultural and political forces were subject to one of these two 
tendencies. In its first two and a half decades the Republic was 
dominated by the modernist secularists led by Mustafa Kemal who 
easily succeeded in implementing his westernization policy and the 
goal set by Mustafa Kemal for the new Turkish national state was 
nothing less than nationalization and westernization. Such a radical 
approach towards modernization has not even been adopted by any 
Muslim nation except Turkey. The Westernization programme actually 
adopted by Kemal was concerned mainly with the political and 
economic programmes of the Turkish nation state for the prevailing 
poor economic conditions and the fragile political setup needed a 
complete re-organization. 
^ Karpat, Kemal H. Op.Cit; p. 254. 
^ Peretz, Don Op.Cit; pp. 152-53. 
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Although Mustafa Kemal laid the foundations of the Turkish nation 
state on Gokalp's principles, which served a source of inspiration for 
him, he also infused in them his own revolutionary doctrines. 
Since the occupation of Turkey by foreign powers and the consequent 
strong anti-imperialist ideas developed during the war of liberation had 
given a new political dimension and dynamism to Turkish nationalism, 
which in the past had appeared, as a device adopted to save the 
empire. In the war of liberation, it turned from a passive into a dynamic 
ideal with a definite goal, the creation of a state and nation for Turks 
alone. Thus the state emerged before the nation comprising of the 
young officers, intellectuals, and to a lesser extent the civil servants 
who undertook the difficult task of creating a nation by following at 
the beginning, for lack of anything better Gokalp's blue prints. 
It was Turkish nationalist movement based on Gokalp's ideas that 
saved Turkey from a total annihilation after the World War I (1914 -
18) under the leadership of the charismatic personality of Mustafa 
Kemal. 
The group of Mustafa Kemal consisted of radical secularists and 
revolutionaries who aimed at a complete breakup with the past so as 
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to achieve a programme of total modernization and westernization. The 
immediate problem of this newly created state was to find common 
bonds for the internal unity and cohesion. It is a fact that the survival 
of Turkey may be credited to the genius and wisdom of Mustafa Kemal 
who emerged as the natural leader of the nation. 
In the next chapter an attempt would be made to examine his 
contribution in reforming and introducing various secular reforms to lay 
strong foundation and a clear object for future growth of Turkey on 
Western pattern. 
80 
Chapter - Hi 
SECULARIZATION OF TURKEY UNDER 
MUSTAFA KEMAL 
Turkey was dominated by the struggle between two groups, the 
conservatives - religious and the modernists - secularists which were 
influenced later on by nationalism and particularly Turkish nationalism 
which was the essential rallying cry for the War for Independence and 
the Republic\ In fact nationalism was itself the result of modernization 
and westernization and all other social, economic, cultural and political 
forces were subject to one of these two tendencies. 
A decade of war and revolution accompanied by massacre and 
counter- massacre, banditry, blockade and foreign occupation had 
decimated the population and shattered the economy of Turkey^. 
However, Turks were the only one of the central powers able to 
overturn immediately the vindictive settlements imposed by the Allies 
following World War I. Because, Turkish resistance ultimately was led 
to success by Mustafa Kemal. 
Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 375 
Ibid p. 373 
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After winning the War of Independence, the Turl<ish republic adopted a 
constructive policy based on a positive self-image and optimistic 
assessment of its future as a nation under the leadership of the victor 
on the battlefield, i.e. Kemal Ataturk. He did indeed, do more than any 
one else to create the Turkish republic on the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire. He was able to accomplish this by bringing together elements 
of resistance that had already emerged. He co-coordinated their 
efforts, expressed their goals, personified, their ambitions and led to 
victory \ 
Ataturk represented perfectly the well-trained knowledgeable military 
bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire, guided by a view of the 
interests of the state.^ Whatever Mustafa Kemal envisaged for Turkish 
nation was based on his ideas and policies, which he adopted from his 
early days of the War of Independence to his death in 1938. His 
principles are the fundamental conceptional basis of the Turkish 
revolution that ensured immediately after the War of Independence 
and, resulted in the formation of a national and secular Turkish state. 
This event, which occurred in the years following the collapse of the 
'• Ibid p. 340. 
^ Mardin, Serif Op.Cit; p. 108. 
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Ottoman Empire gave birth to Kemalism named after the leader of the 
movement, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk\ 
Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) was born in Solonika in 1881. His father 
died when he was seven and his mother wanted him to receive a 
religious education and become a Muslim preacher. Ataturk chose, by 
his own will and decision a military education^. When he was 
appointed Inspector General of the North Army posted in Samsun, this 
provided an opportunity to go to Anatolia and to work for National 
liberation. Mustafa Kemal was promoted to the rank of commander-in-
chief and was conferred with the title of Ghazi in recognition of his 
distinguished services. 
A resolution of the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey as a 
Republic on October 29, 1923 and Mustafa Kemal was elected its first 
President^. 
Mustafa Kemal was a revolutionary from the very beginning of his 
career. He was influenced by the excitement and style of the patriotic 
' Karal, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; p. 1 1 . The political ideology, Kemalism, are the 
radical reform measures implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It 
constitutes six principles: nationalism, statism, republicanism, revolutionism 
and secularism. In February1937, they were incorporated into the Turkish 
constitution, Ahmad, Feroze The Making of Modem Turkey, 1993, p. 63. 
' Ibid p. 15 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 246-249. 
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poetry of Namik Kemal. His ideas did not differ mucin from tlnose of the 
radical member of the Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdit^ and Ziya 
Gokalp. He was able to develop a pattern of thought peculiar to 
himself and since he enjoyed a unique position of being the hero of the 
Turkish revolution and the head of the State, therefore, he directed his 
policies to the needs of the time. He transported his country from the 
middle ages to the threshold of the modern era and a stage beyond^ 
Kemal asserted that 'the aim of the reforms we have already carried 
out and are continuing to carry out, is to transform Turkish society into 
a modern society in every aspect^. 
Here, this study will mainly be focused on secularization process 
brought by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and its impact on the society in 
general. 
After the successful termination of the War of Independence (1919-
22), the task of the Kemal was to transform Turkey into a modernized, 
industrialized and secularized nation State. The Kemalist idea of a 
Abdullah Cevdit (1869-1932) was one of the founders of the Secret 
Revolutionary Society, which was formed with the purpose of overthrowing 
Sultan Abdul Hamid at the Military Medical School of Istambul in 1898, 
which was later developed into the Union and Progress Party. 
Kinross, Lord Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation, London, 1964, p. 503. 
Karal, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; p. 15. 
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nation community ran counter to the Islamic conception of a 
community, which is essentially religious, thus his reforms constituted 
a turn of history for the Turkish nation. Since, the Islamic 
establishments had opposed efforts at modernity during the Ottoman 
Empire and took an adverse stand to the nation liberation movement. 
These historical realities facilitated the integration of Turkish people 
around a secularist and nationalist platform during the Kemalist period. 
Hence during the Kemalist era, Ottoman Islamic legacy was replaced 
by a national, secular and political culture. 
It is a fact that the founder of the republic Mustafa Kemal could not 
have played his role successfully without the backing of other 
prominent figures in the nationalist and later in the Kemalist 
movements. Amongst his closest associates, Ismet Inonu was one of 
the most crucial contributors and somehow a necessary complement 
to Ataturk,^ Though he played an eminent role in Turkish politics for 
over half a century, he could not match the charismatic qualities of 
Mustafa Kemal. 
^ Heper, Metin, Ismet Inonu, The Making of a Turkish Statesman, Leiden, Brill, 
1998, p. 9. 
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Secularization is one of the distinguishing features of the Kemalist 
revolution, which was given top emphasis in republican Turkey. Turkey 
remains today the only Islamic country whose constitution stipulates 
that secularism is one of the basic organizational principles of the state 
(Constitution of 1961, Art 2)\ The principle of secularism had 
emerged in the Ottoman Empire as a practical necessity, and a 
preamble for modernization. This now became one of the pillars of the 
new government.^ 
The term secularism has been used in various senses, but it finally 
acquired an ideological meaning in the nineteenth century as the 
differentiation of state and religion, and it became a political term 
signifying freedom of conscience^. 
For a long time the idea of secularism served as a conceptual basis for 
those modernists who tried to lessen the role of religion in the state 
affairs. The Ottoman Empire like any other medieval empires made 
religion and state inseparable. However, Mustafa Kemal considered this 
phenomenon as the basic cause of all problems in the Ottoman Empire 
whether ethnic, social or political. So his secularism involved not just 
' Kazancigll, Ali and Ozbudun, Ergun Op.Cit; p. 3 
^ Karpat, Kemal H. Op.Cit; p. 2 7 1 . 
^ Kara!, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; p. 22 
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separation of the state from the Institution of the state religion but also 
liberation of the individual nnind fronn the restraints imposed by the 
traditional Islamic concepts and practices, modernization of all aspects 
of state and society that had been moulded by distorted Islamic 
traditions and ways.^ It was on the line of this principle that the 
abolition of Sultanate Caliphate, the office of the Sheikhul Islam and a 
series of other reforms ending the union of the state and religion, the 
chief characteristics of the Ottoman Empire, were abolished. According 
to A.S. Adivar, it was a rationalist scientific anti-traditionalist and 
anticlerical philosophy,^ which was adopted by Kemal to bring 
transformation of the republic. 
The principle of secularism as developed by the Turkish ideologues is 
more extensive than its Western version. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
implemented this principle in all aspects of life. It was not only 
implemented in government offices and institutions but every effort 
was made that secularism was reflected in the fields of social life, 
culture, language, literature and in day to day life as well. 
^ Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 384. 
^ Adivar, A.S. 'The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey' in T. 
Cyler Young (ed.), Near Eastern Culture and Society, Princeton, 1951 , p. 
128. 
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Ataturk recognized the freedom of conscience as the most natural and 
crucial rights of the individual. Each person has liberty to think and 
believe freely, to possess his own political view and to act in a way 
that suits him as far as the regulations of any religion are concerned.^ 
To achieve this object a number of steps were taken to first secularize 
the state itself. In this direction the underlying steps were taken which 
subsequently became the salient features of the republic. 
Abolition of Sultanate 
With the occupation of Constantinople by the allied troops, the 
Sultan's government had become handicapped for the want of revenue 
and army, and had become for all practical purposes a prisoner, still his 
political intrigues continued and he never thought for a moment to 
reconcile himself with the government at Ankara. Allied powers who 
still insisted on recognizing the Sultan's government in Istanbul, invited 
him as well as the nationalists to the peace conference at Lausanne. 
This act of allied powers precipitated the clash because the British 
refused to recognize the nationalist government as the sole 
representative of the nation. This caused much indignation as both the 
Karal, Enver Ziya Op.Cit; pp. 22-23. 
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government of Sultan as well as that of Ankara was invited at the 
Lausanne conference. Here Refat Pasha, whonn Ankara had appointed 
to be the vali of Eastern Thrace, compelled the Sultan to withdraw its 
acceptance of the invitation. This left the Sultan's government 
completely hanging in balance.^ 
The mistake committed by the British proved fatal to the Sultanate. 
Mustafa Kemal had made his decision of separating Sultanate and the 
Caliphate and abolishing the former. From now onwards there was to 
be no Sultan but an Ottoman prince, who would hold office as Caliph 
only, with religious but no political powers. By this compromise 
Mustafa Kemal hoped to disarm the opposition of the religious 
elements to political change, to retain the advantages of a legitimate 
and revered authority above politics, and at the same time to end the 
personal autocracy of the Sultan.^ 
Mustafa Kemal now feeling confident delivered a long speech on Nov. 
1, 1922 in which he lucidly described the evolution of Sultanate and 
Caliphate. Citing the examples from history he claimed that the two 
could be separated and the former could be abolished while retaining 
^ Luke, Harry, The Old Turkey and the New, London, 1955, p. 165. 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 252. 
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the later. Now the Sultan was nothing but temporal sovereign and that 
sovereignty had been taken over by the people.^ 
The Grand National Assembly passed a law on 1^* November 1922 
deposing Sultan Mehmet VI and voiding all laws of his government. 
The resolution passed by Grand National Assembly contained two 
articles. In the light of one article, it was declared that 'the Turkish 
people consider that the form of government in Istanbul resting on the 
sovereignty of an individual had ceased to exist on March 1920 and 
now was a history, the second recognized that caliphate rested on the 
Turkish State, and that assembly would chose as caliph that member 
of the Ottoman house who was, in learning and character, most 
worthy and fitting^. On October 29, 1923, the Turkish National 
Assembly passed a law proclaiming Turkey to be a Republic. The 
Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin (1918-22) had gone into exile 
on November 17, 1922. The Turkish Grand Nation Assembly had 
appointed his cousin Majid a successor to him on November 18, 1922 
in the capacity of the caliph of Islam.^ 
^ Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 449-450. 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op. Cit; pp. 253-54. 
^ Karpat, Kemal H. (ed.). The Ottoman Empire and its Place in the World 
History, 1974, p. 18. 
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Abolition of Caliphate 
After the abolition of Sultanate, Kemal's next move towards the 
complete secularization was abolition of caliphate. The Caliph Abdul 
Majid flouted Mustafa Kemal's authority quietly and determinedly at 
Istanbul. He was backed by the opposition, especially the defeated 
members of the first assembly. Propaganda was unleashed that 
Kemal's intention was to destroy Islam and statements were being 
issued in favour of the Caliph. Now it was deliberately made public 
that Mustafa Kemal was irreligious and a fanatical non-believer. This 
propaganda stirred almost the whole Muslim world and concern was 
shown over the fate of caliph inside and outside Turkey.^ 
However Mustafa Kemal seized upon the opportunity and prepared the 
ground by reaching an agreement with his chief supporters. Influential 
newspapers were persuaded to campaign against the Caliphate as a 
hurdle in the way of progress.^ The Caliph, emphasizing the need of 
the preservation of Caliphate, and the concern of the Muslims all over 
the world, asserted that he would not resign from the Caliphate 
Two eminent Indian Muslims Agha Khan and Ameer AM wrote a letter to 
Ismet Pasha in 1923 emphasizing that the caliphate to be placed on a basis 
that would command the esteem of Muslims everywhere. For more details 
see P. Price, History of Turkey, London, 1961 p. 128. 
Davison, R.H Op.Cit; p. 129. 
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keeping in view, the great importance of his office.^ Thus the Caliph 
became the focal point for the opponents of the new regime, who 
wanted to re-establish the Caliphate and Sultanate. However, the 
republic of Turkey was founded on the basis of nationalism and 
national sovereignty, so it could not fit in, the institution of Caliphate, 
which had been established on the policy of asserting the primacy of 
religious law. 
One can assess the Kemal's virulent dislike for the institution of 
Caliphate from his statements quoted below when he retorted to the 
Caliphs asking for increased privileges as^ 
Let the Caliph and the whole world know 
that the Caliph and the Caliphate which 
have been preserved have no real meaning 
and no real existence. We cannot expose 
the Turkish Republic to any sort of danger 
to its Independence by its continued 
existence. The position of Caliphate in the 
end has for us no more importance than a 
historic memory. 
Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 84. 
See Nutuk, Vol. II pp. 846-48. As cited by Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; pp. 368-
69. 
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On February 29, 1924, the Caliph Abdul Majid attended his last Friday 
Selamik, the last such ceremony ever attended by a member of the 
Ottoman dynasty. Four days later, on March 3, 1924, the Grand 
National Assembly duly passed the bill abolishing the Caliphate. The 
Caliph was thus deposed and he was banished from the country along 
with all the other members of the house of Osman. Abolition of 
Caliphate, made modernists think that the obstacle to secularization 
and modernization of the country was removed. 
Kemal's efforts during the first four-year of the republic were devoted 
essentially to shaping the government to consolidating his control over 
it and to secularization designed to bring Turkey closer to Western 
civilization. The declaration of the Republic and the abolition of the 
Sultanate and the Caliphate resulted in the formal recognition of the 
fact that sovereignty belonged to the people.^ 
The abolition of the Caliphate was followed by more radical 
pronouncements of Mustafa Kemal on the policies of the Turkish 
Nation State. He described Caliphate as a legend of the past which had 
no place in his age, in any case, Turkey has quite clearly and definitely 
Shaw and Shaw Op.Cit; p. 375. 
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severed her relationship with her religious past, and marched on the 
road to progress breaking all shackles of the past.^ 
Abolition of tlie Office of Sheikh-ul-lslam 
The official religion of the Ottomans was Islam and the majority of the 
Turks were Sunni Muslims. It was generally understood that religion 
and state are one. Next to Caliphate another important office of 
religious significance was that of the Sheikh-ul-lslam. The political 
function of the Sheikh-ul-lslam was formally confined to his power of 
issuing fatwas. In the Ottoman Empire of 19^^ and 20**" century, the 
Sheikh-ul-lslam no longer played this important role. Appeal was 
occasionally made to the traditional authority of this institution when 
need arose as on the occasion of the deposition of Abdulhamid in 
1909, or the fatwa against the nationalists of Ankara in 1920. After 
the victory of Turkish nationalists all that remained in Constantinople 
of the old government institutions of the Ottoman Empire was 
abolished. Their functions were taken over by the officers of the new 
government at Ankara. This government no longer included the Sheikh-
ul-lslam. In the constitution of the new government, a Shariya Wakalati 
Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 100. 
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had been instituted but the anti-clerical spirit of Grand National 
Assembly did not allow this imitation of the Sheikh-ul-lslam to survive.^ 
Simultaneously with the abolition of the Caliphate the Grand National 
Assembly passed two more laws, abolishing the office of the Sheikh-
ul-lslam and the ministers of Sharia and Awkaf replacing them by a 
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri) and Directorate General 
of Pious Foundation (Evkaf Umum Mudurhiya) and to unify all 
educational institutions into one single modern system under the 
Ministry of Education.^ The Directorate of Religious Affairs was 
appointed by the Prime Minister. The duties of the director included the 
administration of Mosques, appointed and dismissal of religious 
functionaries for example Imams, Preachers and Muezzins and the 
general supervision of Muftis. The Directorate of Awkaf was allowed 
to function independently and was entrusted the responsibility of the 
administration of all the religious foundations that were taken over by 
the state along with the religious buildings and from 1931, disbursing 
the payments of all religious functionaries. The Presidency of Religious 
Affairs was concerned mainly with the appointment of preachers and 
^ Encyclopedia of Islam, Shorter, Leiden, 1974, pp. 520 ff. 
^ Karpat, Kemal H. Op.Cit; pp. 43-5. 
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censoring their sermons and occasionally giving a ruling on same 
questions of the Sharia.^ 
Impact on Religion and Society 
The fierce determination of Mustafa Kemal to modernize and secularize 
the country made him to promulgate a constitution, which virtually 
placed all power in the hands of the President of the Republic. Most of 
the reform programs launched by the nationalists under Mustafa Kemal 
had been prepared and discussed by scores of Turkish intellectuals. 
The most important contribution of Mustafa Kemal was not his original 
idea only but his ability to choose a set of inter-related consistent, and 
relevant ideas and build them into a practical programme. His reforms 
especially secularization in various fields of life met with widespread, 
opposition from many conservatives and traditionalists but Mustafa 
Kemal took little notice of it and continued it on with even greater zeal 
and vigour. Although the new constitution stated that the religion of 
the Turkish state is Islam. (Article 2). Nevertheless, the official status 
of Islam was terminated when the Ministry of Religious Affairs was 
abolished. Immediately after it on April 8, 1924, the judicial law 
Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 407. 
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abolished the religious courts administering the Sharia, and pensioned 
off their judges and transferred their authorities to secular courts. This 
was a decisive moment in favour of secularism and has been termed 
as the greatest coup of the new period.^ 
It was generally understood that a Muslim state could not be secular 
and if it was secular it could not be Muslim. But in the Republic of 
Turkey, the Turks have been able to assume a seemingly impossible 
religious position by putting into practice what appears to be a 
contradiction. Mustafa Kemal created a secular Muslim state. For the 
Turks although their law is secular, their religion is unquestionably 
Islam. Next, most revolutionary of all the secularist reforms was the 
replacement of the Sharia by the Western legal codes. In February 
1926, the assembly adopted the new codes whereby all religious laws 
were terminated. A civil code and a code of obligations from 
Switzerland, a new penal code from Italy and a new commercial code 
from Germany were adopted. Even before the new codes were finally 
adopted, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had discussed it for 
nearly two years. The new legal system obviously became more 
Berkes, Niyazi Op.Cit; p. 467. 
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palatable when identified as the Turkish (rather than the Swiss) civil 
code and the Turkish (rather than the Italian) criminal code J 
After the abolition of the office of Sheikh-ul-lslam all religious matters 
were administrated by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which 
licensed preachers, censured sermons and gave occasional advice on 
the intricacies of the Sharia.^ 
Even before the final abolition of Sharia, a law school was opened in 
Ankara in November, 1925, Mustafa Kemal had remarked that, 'the 
most important thing is to liberate our conception of justice, and our 
legal institutions and laws from the bonds which hold us under them 
unconsciously, and which are incompatible with the needs of the 
century'.^ 
The law school was intended to be not merely the training ground of 
high officials and legal specialists but, more important, the basis of a 
new jurisdiction consistent with the revolutionary ideals and in 
harmony with the social needs of the new Turkey.* 
Rustow, D.A. Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-1955, p. 8 1 . 
Armajani Y. and Rick, T.M. Op.Cit; pp. 245-246. 
Villate, George B. Ataturk, Eng. Trns., Campbell, W. Ankara, 1979, p. 365. 
Toynbee, A .J . and Kirkwood, Turkey, London, 1926, p. 202. 
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In the beginning Ataturl< liad definitely, no intentions of any break with 
Islam because in Article 2 of the constitution of 1924, it was clearly 
envisaged, the Islam to be the official religion and included reference to 
Allah in the official oath taking. In fact, Mustafa Kemal was against 
those Ulema who, through their superficial knowledge of Islam, were 
exploiting the people for self-aggrandizement. He made frequent 
reference to Islam wherever he tried to justify his reforms and the 
programmes of the nationalist government.^ 
In the past too, the Ulema had been forced by successive reformers to 
surrender large areas of jurisdiction in legal, social, and educational 
matters. However, they still had great power and influence. A large 
part of the educational facilities of the country were under their 
influence. After the termination of Sultanate and other institutions of 
the past, only those remained in Turkish society having power and 
organization, and the authority to challenge the new leadership. This 
had occurred many times when the Ulema had posed problems before 
the reformers and delayed their work.^ 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 98. 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 258-60. 
99 
The abolition of Sultanate, Caliphate and other secularizing reforms 
undertaken by Mustafa Kennal were no doubt a crushing blow to the 
then existing organizations, and were aimed at putting an end to the 
union of state and religion that had been for centuries the basis of the 
Ottoman Empire. This ended also the power of the religious class to 
limit and control the state. 
By nationalizing and secularizing the educational system\ Kemal was 
able to further limit the powers of the Ulema who had, since the 
earliest period of the Ottoman Empire, been dominating the educational 
institutions. By these measures he was able to limit the practice of 
religion within the boundaries of the places of worship and also at 
separating religion and state. Religion was thus subordinated to the 
state. The law against high treason passed by the Grand National 
Assembly on April 29, 1920 helped to stop the misuse of religion for 
political ends. However, the subordination of Islam to the state also 
betrayed the deep-rooted belief of the secularists that Islam was 
responsible for the decline and backwardness of the Turkish nation. 
^ Madaressas, the religious schools operating for centuries were closed down. 
Under the provisions of the laws of 1924, new schools were opened under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Education for the Training of Imams and 
Preachers. 
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The high tide of secularism unleashed by the Kemalist reforms 
between 1925 and 1928 continued to sweep large areas of national 
life in Turkey. His regime was impatient to achieve the maximum 
progress within the shortest possible time. It embarked, therefore upon 
a programme of complete Westernization. Secularism was adopted as 
a means to ensure the smooth operation of this policy. Political factors, 
particularly, the revolt of the Arab countries and the pressure of the 
European powers, were further responsible for the adoption of this 
policy. The extremist policy in the application of secularism as a 
principle of statecraft began in 1928, with the secularization of the 
Turkish constitution of 1924, while the wholesale adoption of western 
laws, the replacement of the Arabic script^ by Latin and the 
introduction of religious reforms sponsored by the faculty of Theology, 
University of Istanbul. 
Various arguments have been put forward to explain and justify the 
revolution in the alphabet. The Arabic letters were ill suited to express the 
sounds of the Turkish language, they were difficult to teach and trouble 
some to print, and thus constituted a barrier to education and cultural 
expansions. 
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Closure of Tekkes 
The great secularizing reforms of 1924^ were directed against the 
Ulema not the dervishes, but it soon became apparent that it was from 
the dervishes, not the Ulema, that the most dangerous resistance to 
secularism would come. The dervishes were used to independence and 
opposition, they still enjoyed the confidence and loyalty of the 
common people and, unlike Ulema were untarnished by collaboration 
with the invaders. On September 2, 1925, two decrees were made by 
the assembly; one laid down the final closure of the 'Tekkes'^ 
(religious orders or Dervish orders) and dissolved the congregations, 
the other designated those members of the clergy who had the right to 
use clerical garb and to fill positions in the hierarchy of the mosque, 
and made conditions to which their conduct must confirm. Also the 
'turbes' or tombs to which ritual offerings were made and which were 
considered miracle working were closed down. One reason behind their 
closure may be that their popular support, their radical traditions, their 
masonic organization, all made them too little amenable to state 
control. Yet another reason for the abolition of the Dervish orders was 
^ Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 385. 
^ Turks called their Sufi sanctuary a 'Tekke' 
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the revolt led by Sheikh Said, head of the Naksibendi order In Eastern 
Anatolia, which was full of Islamic sentiments. The revolt was quelled 
and special courts, known as Independence Tribunals condemned the 
Sheikh,^ other forty persons involved in this rebellion were to be 
hanged.^ 
Religious Reforms 
A committee was appointed by the faculty of Theology under the 
chairpersonship of Prof. Mehmed Fuad Koprulu to prepare a plan for 
modernizing Islam. Members of committee included professors of 
psychology and logic and a number of theologians. The report of the 
committee was published in June 1928.^ 
Two objects of the Turkish Revolution applicable to the proposed 
religious reforms were mentioned in the preamble of the report: "The 
scientific development of all social institution" and "the nationalization 
of these social institutions as all scientific and rational matters are 
' Ibid. 
^ Sheikh Said and his Nurcu movement is dealt in detail in Chapter V 
^ The text of the committee report is given in Jasckke, Die Well des Islam der 
Islam in der Neven Tukei, Vol. 1, No. 1-2 Leiden, 1951 , pp 65-68. 
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treated according to the precepts of science and reason" Explaining the 
aim of the proposed religious reforms, the report said:^ 
Religion also is a social institution like all other 
social institutions, it ought to satisfy the 
exigencies of life and pursue the process of 
development. This development, however, 
should not be outside of the basic nature of our 
religion. But it is wrong to think that our 
religion, whatever its scientific and economic 
precepts may be, should be bound to the old 
forms and conventions, and thus be incapable 
of any progress. Therefore, in the Turkish 
democracy, religion also should manifest the 
vitality and progress which it needs. 
The religious reforms can also be viewed as a step to modernize and 
nationalize Islam. If the religious reforms of 1925 had been 
implemented, it would have produced a modern version of Islam based 
on the dictates of nationalism, philosophy and science and it would 
have been another Islam outside the periphery of the Islam preached 
by prophet Mohammad (PBUH) which has a dynamic philosophy of its 
own and is not opposed to science and reason. 
' Ibid. 
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The Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished to set up a secular 
national state. However, the conversion of the Mosque into a modern 
Islamic Church proved impossible. The project was impracticable and 
the report in the proposed religious reform remained a dead letter. 
Finally, the Turkish government decided to introduce the 'adhan' in 
Turkish in 1932. The Turkish version of the call to prayers was 
prepared by the Linguistic society, and it was published by the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. This innovation caused more 
resentment among the people than any other secular reform and it was 
considered as government interference in religious affairs.^ 
Mustafa Kemal had ordered the Quran to be translated into Turkish and 
published in the new alphabet, and people were persuaded to pray in 
Turkish but they did not accede to it. However, with the change of 
alphabet in November 1928, a new generation of Turks did not read 
the Quran in Arabic. Only the devout took the trouble to teach their 
children the rudiments of the Arabic alphabet.^ 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; pp. 407-408. 
^ Armajani, Y. and Rick, T.M. Op.Cit; p. 246. 
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Abolition of Fez 
Whatever changes, Mustafa Kemal was trying to incorporate in the 
Turkish society, were directed towards undermining the religious 
classes indirectly by encouraging a spirit of modernism in the minds 
and hearts of every one in the Republic.^ A law was passed in 1925, 
which prohibited the wearing of Turbans and Fezzes in public. Fez the 
red hats was introduced a century earlier by Mehmood II as a Western 
innovation. Now Turks were required to wear a European hat and it 
was also envisaged that all had gear should be equipped with a trim or 
visor. Regarding the prohibition of the traditional headgear (Fez) of 
Ottoman bureaucrats, Kemal Ataturk defended his hat law as^: 
Gentlemen it was necessary to abolish the Fez, 
which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, 
of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and 
civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, 
the customary headdress of the whole civilized 
world, thus showing, among other things that 
no difference existed in the manner of thought 
between the Turkish nation and the whole 
family of civilized mankind. 
Shaw and Shaw Op.Cit; p. 385. 
Ataturk, M.K. A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 1927, (Nutuk), 
Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant. 
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These changes were believed to symbolize the modernization of 
Turkey. This move was met with wider criticism, for the Fez was 
compatible with the Muslim practice in a way that the hat was not as 
during prostrating the forehead touches the ground where in hat it 
seems problematic. But the Turks changed and prayers were 
performed either with a bare head or with a cap turned backwards.^ 
Status of Women 
Mustafa Kemal's modernizing reforms were also directed to improve 
and enhance the status of women in society and provide them a 
chance to prove their talent in every field as was happening in the 
civilized Western nations. 
Ataturk removed all obstacles tethering the community from the 
contemporary life. He believed that the essence of civilization, and the 
basis of strength and progress lie in family. The male and female 
elements, which comprise the family, must have possession of their 
natural rights in order to perform their family duties.^ 
^ Armajani Y. and Rick, T.M. Op.Cit; p. 247. 
^ Kuran, Ercumend (ed.), 'The Reforms of Ataturk' The Reforms of Ataturk, 
RCD Cultural Institute, Publication No, 46, n.d. p. 7 
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Thus Kemal Ataturk encouraged women to come out of the traditional 
bonds. The use of veil, particularly in cities, was discouraged, though it 
was not made illegal. Muslim women now began to present 
themselves in beauty contests and in 1929 the first Turkish beauty 
queen was chosen.^ 
Moreover, women were given extensive grounds to divorce their 
husbands. Polygamy was abolished and divorces by court action 
introduced. Civil marriages were made compulsory for all, even though 
many who wished to do so still could have religious marriages as well. 
Women were given equal legal rights to vote and be elected. They 
were first allowed to vote and contest the election of the municipalities 
in 1930, then the village council of elders in 1933, and finally in 
national elections for the Grand National Assembly in 1934.^ Women 
were admitted to the public schools, the civil service, and the 
professions on an increasingly equal basis with men.^ 
^ Berkes, Niyazi Op.Cit; p.472. 
^ Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 385. 
Ibid. 
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Education 
Development of a modern system of education throughout the republic 
was an important element of secularism. Education was mainly related 
to the religion. Now it was completely divorced from religion, and 
religious lessons were forbidden, learning them to the family or, where 
they existed, to Hojas, maintained privately, mainly in the smaller 
villages. The job to develop policy on matters of curriculum and school 
regulations was left to the Ministry of Education, helped by an 
education council, which included ministry officials and representatives 
of the various levels of education, both teachers and administrators 
who met periodically to discuss these matters. 
Elementary education was made compulsory and free for all children, 
regardless of religion, to assure a common training.^ New schools were 
built and large-scale programs training new teaching were adopted. 
Though emphasis was on technical and career training. At the higher 
level also the educational plan begun by the Tanzimat was retained but 
modernized, often with the help of foreign experts and teachers.^ The 
Ottoman university was reorganized as the university of Istanbul in 
' Shaw and Shaw. Op.Cit; p. 380. 
2 Ibid. p. 387. 
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1933, wherein many members of the old staff were replaced by 
German refugees. Improving the quality of education. 
As Shaw has given brief account of this whole process which would 
be worth to cite here.^ 
The number of vocational, technical and 
teacher-training schools were increased, 
technical academics enlarged, and the war 
academy transferred to Ankara. Between 1923 
and 1940 the number of higher faculties and 
technical schools increased from 9 to 20, 
teachers 328 to 1,013 and students from 
2,914 to 12,147, a sizable through not 
substantial improvement. 
Thus education in Turkey which was till new completely in the hands 
of Ulemas and was mainly religious education, was completely taken 
out of the hands of these people and was taught in accordance with 
the Western pattern. The aim being to produce enlightened and 
knowledgeable Turks, who could compete with the challenges offered 
by the new civilization. 
Ibid. 
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A series of Kemal's other moves were another set back for the 
conservatives, which emboldened the modernists. In 1925, the 
international time and calendar systems replaced the traditional Islamic 
ones, which already had been reduced to limited usage by the end of 
the nineteenth centuryJ 
However, religious holidays and Ramadan continued to be calculated 
by the Islamic method. That same year Turkey also began to use the 
international designation for time instead of the traditional Muslim 
method of calculating the hours of the day from the sunset. Yet 
another change in this regard was concerning the weekly holiday, 
which was affected in 1935. The weekly holiday on Friday was 
dropped and instead it was fixed from 1.00 p.m. Saturday until 
Monday morning.^ 
Abolition of Millet System 
In the secularizing and modernizing process, while institutions and laws 
were copied from the West, at the same time efforts were put in to 
^ Shaw and Shaw. Op.Cit; p. 385. 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 91. 
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unify the internal population within Turkey's new boundaries, which 
connpletely shattered the old Ottoman order. 
Under the Ottoman rule each distinctive religious group was allowed to 
organize into an autonomous, self governing body or millet whose 
highest governing official was an ecclesiastical dignitary who was 
appointed by and responsible to the Sultan. They were immune to the 
laws of the state and although they reached positions of responsibility, 
dignity and honour. There were few compulsory obligations imposed 
on them. They were exempted from military services. After the treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923 the Western nations gave up their capitulatory^ 
privileges and from then Turkey was to manage her own affairs. 
A tremendous internal readjustment was there by the abandonment of 
the Millet system. The measures taken to eliminate the religion from its 
place of control and the desire to have one modern law code which 
could be uniformly applicable to everyone in Turkey caused the 
decision on the part of the government to adopt a totally new set of 
statutes based on the Western models with this ended the special 
Special privileges enjoyed by European government were capitulations, 
which permitted citizens of those countries to be exempt from Turkish law 
and subject to the laws of 'their own country when in Turkish territory. 
For further details see Toynbee, A .J . and Kirkwood Op.Cit; pp. 136 ff. 
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long-standing exemption, privileges enjoyed by the Jewish and 
Christian population. Upon being promised equal treatment in the 
country they accepted Turkish citizenship on the same basis as the 
Muslims. As the law of citizenship of June 1928, not mentions religion 
in any way as a qualification or handicap in the attainment of Turkish 
citizenship. The government, by abandoning its official connection with 
Islam and framing its laws on the model of those of the European 
countries, was able to lay down citizenship regulations comparable to 
those of Western nations.^ 
By these reforms, Mustafa Kemal was slamming a door on the past as 
well as opening a door to future.^ Mustafa Kemal made clear his aims 
and objects of the Turkish revolution through his many speeches in and 
outside the Grand National Assembly. His most famous speeches were 
those, which he delivered between October 15*^ and 20*^ 1927 at the 
Congress of the Republican People's Party. In these speeches he 
described the events that led to the establishments of the Republic of 
Turkey and also the justification of his policies. 
' Cf. Allen, H.E. Op.Cit; pp. 69 ff. 
^ Lewis, Bernard Op.Cit; p. 273. 
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Concluding the speech he explained the chief goal of the Turkish 
revolution in the following words: ^  
Gentlemen, our new laws which will ensure 
beneficial results in the social, econonnic and in 
short, in all civilizational matters and relations 
of our nation as well as our civil law which 
ensure the freedom and stability of family life, 
have been made in the period that we have 
discussed, we shall therefore, benefit only from 
one view point. The view point is to raise the 
Turkish nation to the position that it deserves 
in the civilized world, and to strengthen Turkish 
democracy further everyday on unshakable 
foundations and to obliterate the idea of 
autocracy for this purpose. 
In the end he had appealed to the youths of Turkey to safeguard 
Turkish independence and democracy forever. Various organizations in 
Turkey have adopted this as an article of faith and is frequently quoted 
on important occasions in the schools and colleges. 
Ataturk, M.K. A. Speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 1927, (Nutuk), 
Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant. 
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The secularization program launched by Kemal was aimed at the 
separation of state from religion. Through it. State, wanted complete 
control over religious, educational and cultural affairs in order to bring 
the secularization of public and social life. The government not only 
tried to contain the role of Islam in society, but also took steps to 
reform Islam according to its own vision. The purified Islam was 
expected to promote the creation of a society composed of nationalist, 
scientifically minded and anti-traditional individuals.^ 
However, Shaw has different views, he asserts that the secularism of 
the republic was at lessening the influence of the clergy and creating 
an environment in which the individual could follow his religious beliefs 
without having to embrace predetermined dogmas and conform to 
strict rules. It did not intend to abandon Islam as some of its 
opponents have claimed. The state was not anti-clerical as long as the 
Ulema made no overt attempt to interfere with the reforms. Worship at 
Mosques was not forbidden and religious leaders never prevented from 
performing their religious functions.^ 
Karpat, Kemal H. Turkey's Politics, p. 271 . 
Shaw & Shaw Op.Cit; p. 387. 
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It is also a fact that with the Ottoman Empire's disintegration, Turkey 
would have sunk, but was saved by the reforms of Kemal, which saw 
that unless a modern state based on the principles of citizenship, 
nationalism and secularism were created, it would be impossible to 
preserve the independence of Turkey which would otherwise fall into 
the status of a colonized territory. Under the conditions prevailing in 
the capitalist world-economy and the inter-state system of that period, 
the alternative for Turkey was between the creation of modern state 
and the loss of political independence.^ 
D.A. Rustow puts it that Kemal's achievement was revolutionary in 
that it enforced a drastic change of direction from the Ottoman and 
Islamic past, and implemented a program of nationalism and integral 
Westernization that only a decade or two before, would have seemed 
visionary and unrealistic.^ The same author adds, that the Turkish 
transformation never generated any uncontrolled, accelerating 
momentum such as was characteristic of the English, French and 
Russian (or more recently the Iranian) revolutions. The threads of 
legitimacy were severely strained, but there was never any break in 
Kazancigil, Ali 'The Ottoman - Turkish State and Kemalism, in Kazancigil, Ali 
and Ozbudun, Ergun (eds.), Op.Cit; p. 38. 
Rustow, D.A. 'Ataturk as an Institution Builder' in Kazancigil, Ali and 
Ozbudun, Ergun (eds.), Op.Cit; pp. 72-73. 
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institutional continuity, never any organizational vacuum. The new 
Institutions proved durable in part because they had been prepared and 
tested, both for their support at honne and their recognition abroad, 
before they were irrevocably announced^ 
According to Professor Akmal Ayyubi, "Kemal Ataturk was a dynamic 
personality of Asia. He had devoted his life to turn Turkey into a 
modern European state without destroying its own identity and culture 
in the process. It was his leadership that developed nationalism, 
populism and secularism as response to the challenges of imperialism, 
communism and theocracy and made him an undisputed leadership of 
reformism, modernism and secularism in the East.^ He further adds, 
his achievements also made him personification of our national 
advancement and freedom. No one can deny that he was badly 
overawed by Western technology and scientific progress and tried to 
impose European civilization with the hope to enter new age of science 
and technology but he was not anti Islamic. It is also fact that in 1924 
the Caliphate was abolished and religious courts were closed and next 
year law was passed compelling men to wear a hat he also suppressed 
the powerful and rich religious orders and discouraged the use of the 
' Ibid. 
^ Ayyubi, Akmal, Kemal Ataturk, Aligarh, 1982, pp. 18-19. 
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ruthlessness, combined with patience, foresight, and judgment, which 
kemal displayed'.^ 
Moreover, Ataturk can be attributed to have initiated Western pattern 
of living in the Asian region. No doubt, he was conscious of the 
geographical and cultural proximity of Turkey with Europe. Ataturk had 
introduced various reforms to lay strong foundation and a clear object 
for future growth of Turkey on Western pattern. He had tried 
successfully to separate the state with the Church (Mosque). He was 
true reformist modernist, secularist and an excellent military officer, 
called justly the father of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal had also abolished 
the monarchy and changed the non-racial and multi-national Empire 
into a one nation and one language state bestowed with a rare sense 
of realism, he was a dynamic personality and had fired the 
imaginations of the intelligentsia of our sub-continent. 
Kemal Ataturk saved Turkey from complete annihilation and division by 
Western powers and laid the foundation of a modern nation and on the 
other hand, he led the people to religious and social reforms, which 
ultimately modernized Turkey and transformed the medieval into a 
^ Rustow, D.A. The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic' World 
Politics. 11(4) 1959, p. 537. 
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traditional veil of the women for which there is no sanction in the 
Quran.^ 
Thus some of his actions were un-lslamic but it cannot be realistically 
said that he was anti religion. His primary intention was to undo the 
harm done by conservative mullahs in the name of religion and not to 
suppress Islam, for he expressed his respects for it in his third address 
to the Grand National Assembly as early as on March 1, 1925. The 
idea of reasonableness of Islam became a deistic conviction in his 
mind. For him the abolition of the Caliphate meant liberating Islam from 
its unreasonable traditional associates and preparing the ground for its 
emergence as a national religion. He also believed that religion inspired 
by God has no need of support from the civil authorities. To wear a hat 
was also to follow the policy of a famous Turkish sociologist and a 
philosopher Ziya Gokalp who had said that we come from the East and 
go towards the West. 
According to Rustow, 'none of the highest army commanders... could 
have equaled the personal courage, resoluteness and even 
Ibid. 
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modern society. He never intended to abandon Islann. Prayers at 
Mosques was never forbidden. Performance of religious functions were 
allowed and the majority of the population of Turkey remained 
religious, as they had been in the past. Kemal Ataturk himself was 
product of the army and his main aim was to save Turkey from the 
complete domination by the Western imperialistic power or from those 
nations who attacked Turkey under their protection. Thus, while the 
Ottoman Caliphs were weak and played into the hands of the 
imperialist agents, Ataturk was successful in rousing national 
sentiment and creating a force of patriots who ultimately gained 
victories over the imperialists and established new democratic republic 
of Turkey. It is true that Mustafa Kemal was an architect of modern 
Turkey without whom the Turkish nation and State probably would 
have disappeared in the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire. He proved 
that Turks are able to live as an honorable nation without depending on 
any foreign power. 
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Chapter - iv 
STATE AND ISLAM IN POST KEMALIST 
TURKEY 
State and Religion in IVIultiparty Period 
Ataturk was a brilliant military tactician and a consummate political 
organizer. Although he led the establishment of the forms of the 
parliamentary rule, he ran Turkey as an autocrat. He setup a political 
party under his absolute control and, referring to the Committee of 
Union and Progress as a model, used his new creation to dominate the 
political scene. 
Ataturk's Republican People's Party (RPP) would create the new 
Turkish government based on the ideas of its leader. Kemal's moves 
towards Westernization and modernization would include many points, 
the strongest of which were the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman 
Caliphate, the mass closing of Islamic schools, and a new constitution 
based on quadrennial elections and the concept of universal male 
suffrage. In 1925 the Islamic calendar would be eliminated from use 
with the adoption of the Gregorian date system. This was coupled with 
the outlawing of the Fez and Turban to be replaced with a more 
Western style of headwear. In 1928 the constitutional clause calling 
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Islam the state religion would be eliminated and the Arabic alphabet 
was replaced by a Latinized Turkish alphabet created by Kemal himself. 
His six principles or ideological tenets of republicanism, nationalism, 
populism, secularism, revolutionism, and etatism would be officially 
drafted into the Turkish constitution. With these reforms Turkey as a 
nation would emerge as the bridge between Europe and the West Asia 
yet as an individual belonging to none.^ 
The Republic's political power was centered in the Grand National 
Assembly with the Republican People's Party as its driving force, and 
Ataturk serving as both the party leader and the nation's president. In 
this way he manipulated access to high political positions. 
The system was inherently a single party system. He eliminated rival 
political organizations, starting with supporters of the Caliph in the 
1923 elections and the Progressive Republican Party in 1925. The 
opposition Free Party - his own tame creation, which was intended as 
a device to promote constructive criticism and to discourage laxness in 
the Republican Peoples Party was also closed down when it threatened 
1. Islam's Rise in the Turkish Republic, 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/archive/paper2.htm. 
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to get out of hand in 1930.^ Thereafter, he adopted a modest 
approach to a corporate state in which party and government posts 
merged. But this fusion of party and state led to the atrophy of the 
former and the clear dominance of the latter.^ 
Ataturk took to the creation of independent deputies, non-members of 
the Republican Peoples' Party, whose job it was to criticize the 
government vigorously in public and to expand the theory of 'Loyal 
Opposition'. This was paired with the creation of halkevleri, or people's 
house, which were to serve as models of self-administration and 
institutions for both general education and political indoctrination. 
The period of the 1930's saw the expansion of economic and social 
development, including state education, transportation systems, and 
expansion in the fields of communication and industrialization as much 
as possible with Turkey's limited resources. This was also the time the 
nation had to face the death of Ataturk in 1938. 
The autocratic style of rule that Ataturk practiced behind the facade of 
one-party assembly could not long survive his death in 1938. In fact, 
his successor, Ismet Inonu, after taking the charge recognized the need 
^ Harris, George S. Turkey Coping with Crises, p. 57. 
^ Ibid. 
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to liberalize the regime and by the end of World War II Turkey was set 
on the path of a multiparty system. As a matter of fact, Inonu was 
well aware of the rising domestic discontent, which could not permit 
further delay in instituting competitive party politics. Calls for the 
relaxation of political party restrictions led to the government allowing 
four prominent members to split off and form the Democratic Party. 
While each and every government which followed Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk adamantly proclaimed its adherence to Kemalism in general 
and secularism, as interpreted by him, in particular, after the 
introduction of multi-party democracy in 1950, many of the strictures 
were lifted against such religious practices as the pilgrimage to Mecca 
(formerly restricted supposed to 'protect the flow of hard currency'), 
the call to prayer in Arabic and religious classes.^ 
Feroze Ahmad observes that the multiparty period ended the phase of 
militant secularism in Turkey in deed if not in word while in opposition 
the Republican People's Party used secularism as a stick with which to 
beat the government. However, the end of militant secularism did not 
mean the triumph of the Islamists. The Republican People's Party lost 
The background and growth of Recently banned Turkish Welfare Party. 
http://www.ailigs.com/turkishwelfareparty.htm 
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the election because voters associated it with the long nightnnare of 
mono-party despotism. The Democrats won because they promised to 
slay this dragon and put it to rest forever.^ 
The Democratic Party (1950 - 60) 
A number of political parties were found in Turkey, after World War II, 
owing to the internal and international pressure, which hastened the 
introduction of competitive party polities. Among the parties formed, 
the Democratic Party was most influential. It was established by four 
prominent defectors from the Republican People's Party, being headed 
by Celel Bayar, who had been Ataturk's last Prime Minister. The 
Democrats united a broad range of intellectuals, business and peasant 
constituents from the more modernized parts of the country. 
Democrats won a small number of seats in the elections of 1946, yet 
it was not until 1950 that the nation would be shocked by the massive 
victory of the party and the quiet transfer of power from the 
Republican People's Party thus ending the Kemalist period of Turkish 
politics and stayed there until it was overthrown in a military coup in 
1960. 
Ahmad, Feroze, 'Politics and Islamic in Modern Turkey', Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1991), p. 10. 
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The Democratic Party from which all center right parties turn for 
inspiration and legitimization, from its inception, identified itself 
primarily with agrarian interests and with the rural population. 
Its power base consisted of a large numbers of landowners and 
peasants in the more developed regions of Turkey who had been hard 
hit by the extensive emergency powers of Republican Peoples Party 
Government during the war, for the war time controls had induced the 
poverty in rural areas. Moreover, introduction of the land reform Bill by 
Republican Peoples Party in 1945, had shattered the confidence of the 
big farmers. Owing to this bill the big estates and nationalized farms 
were broken over a certain size. 
Thus the opposition became the political rallying point to give voice to 
an unequal coalition of peasants, provincial town dwellers, 
professionals and the business community, the later evolving from the 
Kemalist policy of national economy. The periphery in its social forms 
peasantry, urban lower strata and petty bourgeoisie - was excluded 
from political participation under the single party system.^ 
Keyder C, 'The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy' New Left Review, 
May-June, 1979 (115) p. 13. 
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In the Democratic Party era (1950-60), the military suffered a dramatic 
decline in parliamentary representation, with professionals and 
merchants replacing retired officers and state officials as the most 
powerful group. In the late 1950's nearly one half of the top 
governmental leaders came from the legal profession, while only three 
percent were from the military.^ 
The Democratic Party enjoyed also the support of urban business and 
mercantile interests that had made quick wartime profits and did not 
want to have the interventionist Republican People's Party policies in 
the postwar economy.^ For these diverse elements, which make the 
power base of the Democratic Party, Islam represents a cultural 
tradition but not a political ideology.^ The nature of the demands made 
by the rural masses of the Democratic Party is in itself an evidence of 
this.* 
Its political discourse centered on themes such as respect for 
indigenous culture and freedom for business. The Democratic Party's 
^ Frey, FW The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mars. 1965. p.268. 
^ Ahmad, Feroze, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, London, 1977 pp. 8-
1 1 . 
^ Reed, Howard A, 'Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey'. Middle East Journal, 8 
(1954) pp. 267-82. 
* Harris, George S., 'Islam and the Modern Turkey', Middle East Review 11 
(Summer 1979) p. 2 1 . 
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approach to religion involved the incorporation of Islam as a living 
cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics. Religion in this 
view was necessary social cement for the cohesion of society.^ It 
emphasized that religious commitment and social development were 
not incompatible objectives and that religion did not negate the 
positivism of a section of the single party elite who tended to present 
this relationship as mutually antagonistic.^ 
While in power, the Democratic Party introduced voluntary religious 
courses into primary schools; it re-established religious radio 
broadcasts and the call to prayer in Arabic; it set up Imam- Hatip 
lycees (Prayer- Leader and preacher schools) and also established the 
faculty of Divinity at Ankara University. Government funding for 
mosques increased and the general political discouragement of 
religious practice was eased. These changes were not aimed at 
dismantling the secular state. Some of these changes had already been 
initiated by Republican People's Party, what Democratic Party 
Ayata, Sencer, 'Patronage, party and, State: The Politicization of Islam in 
Turkey', in the Middle East Journal. Vol. (50), No. 1, (Winter 1996), p. 43. 
Zurcher, ErikJ. Op.Cit; pp. 243-44. 
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achieved, was to lend legitimacy to Islam and traditional culture in the 
context of the official politics of the country J 
However, the Democrats who ruled through out the fifties were not 
about to permit anything resembling a counter-revolution, to the 
reforms imposed by an autocratic rule. 
In the fifties, the Sufi and other religious orders^ that had gone under 
ground began to reappear. The religious orders had become active 
once more. The Democrats took them seriously enough and found it 
expedient to cultivate them though never to the extent of tolerating 
them. The accusation that Democratic Party was soft on Islam is 
unconvincing^. The Tijanis, a Tarikat group who rejected the reforms 
as aesthetic and morally corrupting, and smashed the statues and 
busts of Ataturk which are found every where, were dealt with 
seriously they were punished for their anti - Ataturk outrages. The 
Democratic Party pursued court cases against reactionaries. Islamist 
publications, and Said Nursi, the leader of the influential and 
conservative Nurcu group. Moreover it closed down the Nationalists 
Cizre, Umit 'Islam - State Interaction in Turkey', Int. Journal Middle East 
Studies 28 (1996), p. 237. 
For details about Sufi orders and other Tarikats see Chapter V 
Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; pp.237-38 
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Association of Turkey an ultra-nationalist body, and passed an 
"Ataturk Bill" to fight the anti Kemalists.^ 
In the prevailing political landscape of 1950's the Democratic Party 
promoted religion for electoral success, and took steps to appeal to 
traditional Muslim sentiment for political gain. Because the Democratic 
Party was faced with economic failures and rising unpopularity, so it 
tried to enlist the support of the Tarikats and the Nurcus.^ 
It actually served the goal of the state, because it helped the party 
maintain its political hierarchy, political unity, and national security 
feeling threatened by the propensity of the political opposition to 
organize around social class, the secular state resorted to the non-
secular use of religion for checking and blocking communism.^ 
Feroze Ahmad comments that the attitude of the Democratic Party 
towards Islam remained ambiguous and failed to win the trust of the 
Islamists, for the fact that the four founders of the party-Celal Bayar, 
Adnan Menderes, Fuad Koprulu, and Refik Koraltan had all been 
prominent members of the Republican People's Party. They had all 
Ibid 
Harris, George Op.Cit; p. 24. 
Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 238. 
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supported the party's policy of secularism and Koprulu had even been 
in charge of a commission whose task was to devise the reformation 
of Turkish Islam. Thus, the Islamist, keeping in view all these facts, 
supported the Nation Party, and thought that it will bring turkey to true 
secularism and bring a slide to atheismJ 
The period beginning with 1959 would usher in the next wave of 
reforms in Turkish politic. Though Democratic Party focused on Turkish 
economy and encouraged private enterprise and was also able to get 
large-scale aid from the United States under the Truman Doctrine. The 
government began deficit financing, which resulted in a period of rapid 
inflation, coupled with increased urbanization with the economy 
becoming unstable, opposition from the Republican People's Party 
became stronger and in May 1960 the Turkey faced its first military 
intervention as the army ousted the Democratic Party regime. 
As Weiker asserts that the increasing violation of democratic rights and 
individual liberties, as well as concessions to traditional and 
Ahmad, Feroze, "Politics and Islam", p. 10. 
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conservative forces, completely alienated the intelligentsia of the cities 
who had earlier supported the Democrats J 
Zurcher also views the same. According to him the political 
exploitation of religious sentiments among the population accompanied 
this suppression of public criticism and led to open charges that the 
Democrat regime was undermining the secularist principles of the 
Turkish state.^ 
It is said that the overthrow of the Menderes government was 
triggered not only by convergence about the country's political 
situation, but also by the fact that the privileged positions of the 
Turkish military was at stake.^ 
The Military Regime ( 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 ) 
On 2T^ May 1960, the Democrats were over thrown by a military 
coup. By then Turkey had accomplished a thorough transformation in 
almost every sphere of life except politics. The economy was no more 
agrarian in character but commerce and industry were becoming 
^ Welker, W.F. 'Academic freedom and problems of higher education in 
Turkey', Middle East Journal, 16(3), 1962, p. 2 8 1 . 
^ Zurcher, E.J. Op.Cit; p. 243-5. 
^ Harris, G.S., 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I' Middle East 
JournanQ (1) 1965, pp. 54-56. 
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dominant. This transfornnation has given rise to new social group, 
majority of which were Technocrats and managers. Their cultural 
values were neither as western nor as cosmopolitan as those of the 
elite. Such people felt quite comfortable with Islam, which had 
remained a living tradition in their daily lives despite the militant, 
secularism of the mono party period.^ 
The political transformation carried out by the military regime was 
what the Democrats had failed to do. A new constitution was adopted 
in place of the 1942 constitution, and that liberalized the entire 
system. The 1961 constitution declared Turkey a social state 
responsible for each citizen's welfare. This constitution facilitated the 
growth and the formation of different parties and associations such as 
Workers Party of Turkey and Fikkir Ku/ubu^(op\r\\on clubs). 
In 1940's communism was emerging and was perceived as an external 
threat posed by Moscow and it was thought that it would find fertile 
ground in a society devoid of Islamic values. In 1960's it was viewed 
as an internal threat to which Islam was the antidote.^ Thus, a society 
Ahmad, Feroze Op.Cit; p. 12. 
Such associations emerged out of students independent association. There 
the politics were discussed and alternatives proposed. 
Ibid. p. 13. 
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with some Islamic instincts could be tolerated just a shield against the 
fast spreading communism. 
As the left wing critique of society attracted a political following. So 
the Islamist invective against the left became more bitter before and 
after the 1965 general election, the Workers Party of Turkey, became 
the target of a red baiting in which Islamic rhetoric played a prominent 
roleJ 
As regards the role of Islam, this first coup in the Turkish Republic 
represented a watershed in its politics.^ The new constitution of 1961 
introduced measures of liberal democracy and political pluralism in 
reaction to the policies of the Democratic Party, which had turned 
increasingly authoritarian. With the result, political liberalization and 
democratization in this period facilitated growing role of political Islam 
in national issues, conflicts, and policy processes. In order to use the 
popularity of the Islamic movement to its advantage, it became more 
accommodating, to the movement.^ 
Ibid. 
^ Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 238. 
3 Ibid. 
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This military regime used Islam as an underlying ideological principle of 
its reform platform. 
General Cemal Gursel, said . 1 
Those who blame religion for our 
backwardness are wrong. No, the cause of our 
backwardness is not our religion, but those 
who have misrepresented our religion to us. 
Islam is the most sacred, most constructive, 
most dynamic and powerful religion in the 
world. 
The General Cemal praised islam not only to secure the political and 
moral legitimacy of the military regime but also to check against any 
reactionary upsurge using Islam. The state's political tradition of 
distinguishing between two Islams-one secular and dispassionate, the 
other reactionary, was also followed by the military. As already 
mentioned enlightened Islam was regarded as the best bulwark against 
communism and religious fanaticism.^ Because of this the state 
focused on training progress and secular Imams and other civil 
Courted in Ahmad, Feroze, 'The Turkish Experiment' p. 374. 
Cizre , Umit Op.Cit; p. 239. 
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servants religious cadres to deliver sermons urging political support for 
its objectives. 
The Justice Party Period (1961 - 80) 
The Justice party was formed in February 1961 by the former 
members of the Democratic Party, which had been dissolved by the 
military after the 1960 coup. It inherited much from the Democratic 
Party. The party's second general congress held in 1964, elected 
Suleyman Demirel Party Chairman. Demirel led the Justice Party into 
the 1965 national elections. From 1965 to 1971 Demirel headed three 
Justice Party governments and from 1977 to 1980 he led three 
Justice Party dominated coalition governments. Thus the party 
dominated political life for the following decade and a half (1965 -
80), either on its own or as a part of ruling coalition. 
Domestically, the Justice Party's approach to politics was adaptive and 
anti elitist. It occupied a right of center (liberal conservative) position 
on the political arena. It advocated tolerance for traditional religious 
expression. 
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The Justice Party conceived the place and role of religion in politics in 
a way similar both to the secular out look of the military regime that 
preceded it and to the rationalist positivist ideas of AtaturkJ 
In formulating and resolving the question of the political role of Islam, 
the Justice Party had certain limitations. The first being its liberal 
Western stance, which tied the legitimacy of the political system to 
popular sovereignty and eliminated Islam from the public sphere.^ 
In order to combat all the opposition to its modernization, the Justice 
Party tried to bring tradition at par with modernity and western 
civilization with religiosity. Following its military and Kemalist 
predecessor, the Justice Party supported and built new Imam Hatip 
school. In the early period of the Republic up to 1965, there were only 
26 such schools where as the Justice Party opened 46 new Imam 
Hatip schools between 1965 and 1971, when it was in absolute 
power and 147 between 1975 and 1977, when it led the ruling 
coalition. 
The Justice Party's policies regarding official Islam was also fashioned 
by the external pressure exerted by armed forces, which intervened 
^ Cizre, Umit Loc.Cit. 
' Ibid. 
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both in 1971 and 1980, when the Justice Party was in the power. 
Thus Justice Party sought a somewhat secular liberal identity, which 
had direct consequences on the form and substance of its policy 
towards Islam. With the result the Justice Party was successful in 
accomplishing and increasing prosperity and welfare benefits in the 
1960's that gave the party increased resonance. 
From 1960 to 1980, Islam became a powerful weapon against 
communism in the hands of the Justice Party and its right wing allies. 
Whereas communists were placed in the anti-Islam front, which could 
include liberals in favour of political pluralism, anti-communism became 
an ingrained component of the radical conservatism, of which Islam 
was a partJ 
However, the Justice Party's policies concerning Islam were not 
contrary to the long adopted state's secularism and modernization. 
This necessitated the incorporation of strict secularism on the official 
level and separated Islam from the public sphere as it was thought 
irrelevant for political and economic development. Domestically, the 
Justice Party advocated tolerance for traditional religious expression. 
Justice Party established direct and lasting relationships with various 
Feroze Ahmad, 'The Turkish Experiment', p. 376. 
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Islamic groups, communities and leaders. This party's relations with 
the Tarikats and Nurcus were established mainly for cultivating 
selected support. This involved a process of exchanging votes and 
political support for access to public resources and protection against 
threats from the state and secular forces. Thus, the conservative 
influence was more pronounced in the case of the Justice Party.^ 
Despite strong state control over politics, populist nationalism and 
religious revivalism started to emerge during 1970's. Religious 
organizations, which had surfaced in the 1960's, mushroomed in the 
1970's. Different Tarikats and Sufi orders helped those of lesser 
means cope with the problems of modernization and became clubs for 
dislocated groups sacking solidarity in a changing world.^ 
Some more religiously oriented groups, disenchanted by nationalism, 
sought salvation in political Islam. For those groups wanted nation not 
to be a secular political entity but rather a community of believers. 
Those groups came to the forefront under the banner of Islamic 
parties. Because of the highly religious nature of these parties, they 
have usually been banned once they gained some sort of popularity. 
^ Ayata, Sencer Op.Cit; p. 44. 
^ 'Turkish Nationalism, Then and Now' 
http://www.cyprus.conflict.net/ergil.htm 
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but are an important force as they continue to rise under different 
guisesJ 
The Islamic Parties of 1970 - 80 
The period of 1970's witnessed the emergence of the pro religious 
Turkish political parties. These parties represent the Islamic opposition 
of the grass root movements against the secular Kemalist state. No 
doubt these movements have succeeded in promoting the importance 
of Islam in Turkish politics.^ The National Salvation Party (1972 - 81) 
and its successor, the Welfare Party^ (1981 -1998) are worth 
mentioning here. Their development depended more on the organizing 
principles of the dominant culture and institutions of politics than on 
the moral and political aspirations of their followers.'^ The Muslim Sufi 
Tarikats especially Naksibendis formed the power base for the 
Nationalist Salvation Parties. Though it was the first time in Turkish 
politics that Tarikats had played a crucial role in backing a pro-religious 
political party. However, the party lost the support of Tarikats 
especially after it entered a coalition with the social democratic 
Ibid 
Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 2 4 1 . 
Rise and Demise of Welfare Party is dealt in detail in Chapter V 
Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; pp. 241-42. 
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Republican People Party In 1974. Also the Tarikats accused the party 
of deviating from the Islamic principles and adopting the norms of the 
prevailing regimeJ 
In fact, in the period of sixties, another facet was beginning to emerge 
created by the social and economic development, which found 
expression first in the National Order Party in 1970, then in the 
National Salvation Party in 1973 and finally in Welfare Party in 1983. 
They regarded Turkey's problems and its solutions in Islamic terms. As 
Feroze Ahmad observes, the Islamists laid great stress on moral 
regeneration and the restoration of religious values if Turkey was to be 
saved.^ They took pride in their glorious Ottoman-Islamic heritage and 
traditions and claimed that their party itself followed this very tradition. 
Their dogmas appealed to those who had never felt comfortable with 
the new secular culture, which they found artificial and alien, seeing 
their own culture being reasserted, therefore, supported the Islamists.^ 
^ Toprak B. 'The Religious Right', in Turkey in Transition, ed, Irvin Schick and 
Ertugul Ahmad Tonak, Yew York, 1987, p. 230 
^ Ahmad, Feroze 'Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey' pp. 13-14. 
^ Ibid 
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The standard argument for the genesis of political Islam in the 1 970's 
emphasize economic grievances^ along with the cultural alienation of 
small merchants, businessmen and artisans. The electoral base for the 
party was formed by the traditional conservative elements who were 
culturally alienated and economically deprived. Thus as the socialist 
ideology became palatable to a large proportion of the working class, 
perhaps threatening the very existence of Islam, Islam became a 
platform for rallying both socioeconomic and cultural discontent.^ It is 
because the massive expansion of modern secular education and 
economic development that led to rising expectations on the part of 
the segments which were unfulfilled by existing political and other 
organizations. Thus the party also voiced the protest of those who 
wanted a large political and economic role in expanding world of 
modernity.^ 
As a matter of fact both the parties National Salvation Party as well as 
Welfare Party had to deal with the nation, which was more oriented 
towards modern aspirations. Thus to bridge the gap between 
^ Turan, liter 'Religion and Political Culture in Turkey', Islam in Modern Turkey, 
p. 45. 
^ Ali Yasir Saribay, as cited in Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 2 4 1 . 
^ Sunar and Toprak, 'Islam in Politics, The case of Turkey', Government and 
Opposition, Autumn, 1993, p. 438. 
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traditional elements in society in which were imbibed deep the religious 
beliefs and a nationalist conservative out look, and the modern 
aspirations of its diverse power base, both parties developed a double 
discourse by espousing a combination of religious and non-religious 
themesJ 
At the one hand these parties fitted in with its advocacy of a return to 
a strict Islamic polity in terms of moral and religious value while at the 
other hand they came with a programme of scientific and technological 
development, industrialization, and social justice- oriented redistributive 
policies. At the same time these advocated a return to a strict Islamic 
polity in terms of moral and religious values. 
Nevertheless, National Salvation Party and Welfare Party's rethinking 
modernity in light of Islamic maxims, adopted a reformist posture and 
operated within the system rather than trying to bring about a radical 
transformation of society along the lines of Sharia, besides the officials 
of both parties publicly supported secularism and paid homage to the 
Ozbudun, Ergun, 'Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: the Case of the 
National Salvation Party', in The Islamic Impulse, ed. Barbara Freyer 
Stowasser, London, 1998, p. 146. 
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principles of popular sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, political, 
pluralism, human rights and individual liberties. ^ 
In Turkey after the institution of multiparty democracy in 1950, 
Laicism was challenged by a number of groups. Even though, the 
principle had rooted itself sufficiently firmly never to be removed from 
Turkish constitutional practice. In fact, the Democrat Party, which was 
often accused of having undermined Laicism, kept the principle in 
operation. However, since 1960, religious currents have not abated, 
but they have become stronger, inspite of the fact that the 
constitutional principle of Laicism is still the foundation of Turkish 
constitutional law and is upheld by the large segment of Turkish 
intelligentsia.^ On this revival of religious currents in post-Kemal 
Turkey, Serif Mardin comments that Kemalism did not understand the 
role played by Islam for Turks in the building of personal identity. No 
doubt Kemal tried to separate religion from state, it was there in one 
form of other. 
^ Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 242. 
^ Mardin, Serf 'Religion and Secularism in Turkey' in Ataturk founder of a 
Modern State, Aii Kazancigil Ergun Ozbudum (eds.), 1981 , p. 18. 
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The same author elaborates it as^ 
After all Islam had an aspect which addressed 
itself to man's being in this world, to this basic 
ontological insecurity, which enabled it to 
fasten itself on to psychological drives. It is a 
truism, but still worth emphasizing, that Islam 
has become stronger in Turkey because social 
mobilization had not decreased but on the 
contrary increased the insecurity of the men 
who have been projected out of their traditional 
settings. This insecurity is some times 
'cognitive' and appears as a search for a 
convincing political leadership or a bountiful 
economic system. Here Islam assumes an 
ideological guise and compacts with Marxism. 
1980 Military Coup and Post 1980's Period 
The military regime came to power on September 12, 1980,^ with this 
form substance and power base of the Islamic movement and also the 
state policy towards it changed radically. 
Ibid. 
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In fact, it was military itself that played a major part in making the 
Islamist political discourse socially acceptable. During the political 
turbulence of 1970's, a group of conservative intellectuals supported 
by the business world and center right politicians began to think about 
Islam as a force to counter the rise of leftist ideas. As carried out by 
left parties in their manifesto and programs. They developed the 
Turkish Islamic Synthesis as an ideological concept integrating Islam 
and Turkish nationalism. It became prominent also among right wing 
politician of Suleyman Demirel's National Front governments (1974-77) 
and also incorporated in National Action Party. 
After the 1980 coup, this mixture of fierce nationalism and a version 
of Islam friendly to state, appealed to the senior officer corps as an 
ideology to reintegrate Turkish society^. This was carried for two 
purposes, first to create the desired unitary character of Turkish 
society, and second to counterbalance the spread of nationalist 
ideologies among Turkey's Kurdish population.^ 
In late 1970's Turkish Society was shattered by ideological polarization and 
communal violence. The existing government failed to improve the law and 
order situation, which ultimately led to a military coup in 1980. 
Zurcher, E.J. Op.Cit; p. 303. 
Jung & Piccoli Op.Cit; p. 121 . 
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Though with the onset of military rule, all the parties were dissolved 
and the country underwent another period of repression. Most of the 
disillusioned youth turned to Islam especially after the success of the 
'Islamic revolution in overthrowing the Shah's regime in Iran. Further, 
as Feroz Ahmad asserts, in 1980's Islam also became a vehicle for the 
youth to protest against the military regime, especially in a period 
when politics was forbidden for students\ 
The military due to its ideological affinity to Fethullah Gulen's teaching, 
used the Turkish - Islamic Synthesis, and therefore used Islam, as an 
ideological political instrument. The generals who came to power 
considered Islam a pacifying and submissive ideology preferable to the 
threat of Communism.^ Instead of showing any disregard or even 
suppressing it, they took several steps to strengthen it. Some 
measures taken in this regard included opening of new Quranic schools 
(Kuran Kurslari) making religious courses necessary, and employing 
new preachers (Imams). 
Further, according to Yavuz, leaders of the military coup depended on 
Islamic institutions and symbols for legitimization thus they fused 
^ Ahmad, Feroze Op.Cit; p. 18. 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan 'Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey', 
Comparative Politics vol. 30(1) Oct., 1997, p.67. 
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Islamic ideas with national goals, to create a more homogeneous and 
less political Islamic community.^ 
Despite the military regime's claim to restore true Kemalism, it 
favoured the use of religion to be taught more widely in schools and 
allowed the influence of the Sufi orders to be exposed through their 
Quranic schools and student's hostels.^ 
Much contribution came from the Association of Intellectuals Hearth. 
(Aydinlar Ocaqi) which happened to be an organized association of 
conservative scholars. It played a significant role in cementing the 
various interests together. It put forth the ideology of Turkish Islamic 
Synthesis. This ideology as already mentioned, was based on 
Ottoman, Islamic and Turkish popular culture which was aimed at 
making the past relevant to the present, so that nation and state which 
was reinterpreted as a family and as a community was saved from the 
danger posed by ideological fragmentation and thus through the 
Turkish - Islamic Synthesis, the state and nation was identified as one 
' Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
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cemaat (community) modeled after the concept of Umma (religious 
community).^ 
The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) tried to evoke nationalism 
and accommodate religion as well. It may be well substantiated by 
citing the examples of establishing in 1981, a new department 
'Dawah' (Irsad Dairesi) within the Directorate of Religious Affairs, to 
fight against the Kurdish nationalism in Southeast Anatolia. 
The new hegemonic ideology that came out of the 'Islamization of 
national identity' by the Association of Intellectual's Hearth and 
nationalism of Islam by the Directorate of Religious Affairs helped in 
ignoring the multicultural character of Turkish Society comprising the 
Kurds, Alevis and other ethno-cultural communities. It promoted a 
state-centered Turkish Islamic consciousness by imposing its own 
singular meaning on symbols and historical events.^ The religious 
sentiments and traditional allegiance were employed by the military 
government to achieve political stability and national unity. 
The Islamism of the 1 980's differed from the Islamic movement of the 
1960's and 1970's in its social base, nature and capability and it was 
' Ibid 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; pp. 67-68. 
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transformed by changes in Turkish society J In the post 1980 military 
regime and during the ensuing Motherland Party government from 
1983 to 1991, state policy towards Islam underwent radical changes 
in style and substance.^ Religious instructions in primary and 
secondary schools were made mandatory in the 1982 constitution. 
It was in the post 1983 period i.e. when Motherland Party (MP) came 
to power that the emergence of contemporary Islamism was seen. 
Veiled women became visible on modern university campuses in big 
cities and Islamist periodicals, newspapers and books stuffed the 
intellectual debates in Turkey, away from the dominance of leftist 
intellectuals to that of the Islamists. 
These new agents of change represented the move of Islam from the 
periphery of the system to its center, and yet were themselves a 
product of that center of its educational institutions and its urban life.^ 
With the Motherland Party's coming to power, many initiatives were 
made in the social and cultural realms. During Turgut Ozal's 
administration special efforts were made to incorporate different 
' Ibid, p. 69. 
^ Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 244 
3 Gole, Nilufer, 'Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and 
Counter - Elites', The Midd/e East Journal; Vol. 51(1) winter, 1997, p.54. 
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ideological trends into the party structure, which eased existing 
political tensions.^ 
Turgut Ozal pursued a policy of Islamicizing the educational system, 
and his minister of education, Vehbi Dinserler, a member of Naksibendi 
Sufi order, prepared a new curriculum of national history and 
geography that constantly used 'Milli' in the religious sense.^ 
Moreover, in the late 1980's the expansion of higher education, print 
media, and mass communication played a critical role in the public 
emergence of an Islamic identity. This identity was consolidated and 
promoted by the process of democratization, to the policymaking level 
by Motherland Party of Turgut Ozal and the Welfare Party and thus 
new public spaces for Islamic groups to find their voices were opened.^ 
The Naksibendis emerged as the single most important lobbying group 
in politics during that period. Ozal himself had Naksibendis affinities, so 
the members of this Tarikats or brotherhood were given privileged 
1 Islam's Rise in the Turkish Republic 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/archieve/paper2.htm. 
Toprak, Binnaz, 'The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey,' in Metin Heper 
and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military, Berlin, 1988 pp. 
131-32. 
Yavuz, M. Hakan Loc.Cit. 
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positions in the Motherland Party.^ Their members penetrated all ranks 
of political society, including the government, civil service, 
intelligentsia, and the business and banking.^ 
The Naksibendi orders and Suleymanci were free to run unofficial 
Quranic courses and youth hostels to educate needy youngsters who 
came from provincial and rural areas to be educated in cities.^ There 
was an abundant growth of the printing materials and publications of 
Tarikats and other religious groups each disseminating its specific 
views on and method returning to Sharia. Saudi money came in Turkey 
by means of finance companies, projects and religious foundations."^ 
Though the Naksibendi networks were useful to the party beyond 
borders as they played a significant role in promoting Turkish exports 
to the Middle East and Gulf States. In short, a multitude of Islamist 
groups and networks especially the Naksibendis became firmly 
' Ayata, Sencer Op.Cit; p. 45. 
^ Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; p. 244. 
3 Ibid 
4 For details see Jacob M. Landon, The Politics of Pan - Islam, Ideology and 
Organization, Oxford, 1990, pp. 276-303. 
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entrenched in, both the state and civil society, their growing power 
and influence in one sphere facilitating access to the other\ 
Nevertheless, in the post 1980, the civilian governments of Motherland 
Party, succeeded in the military's vision of reconstructing the 
relationship between state and the society. So it could be controlled by 
the state. However, Motherland Party's enforcement of a policy 
Islamization was without the disguise of a Kemalist discourse.^ 
This comprehensive study of multiparty period in post-Kemalist 
republic clearly reveals that Islam was not banished and excluded from 
the official public sphere, rather Turkish state adopted a double 
discourse: on the one hand establishing rigid segregation between 
religion and the public political realm while on the other hand, 
accommodating and incorporating Islamic politics into the system in 
various ways. 
Secular Vs Islamic 
One important feature of Muslim societies facing the impact of modern 
civilization is a steady trend towards secularization of traditional 
^ Ayata, Sencer Op.Cit; pp. 44-45. 
^ Cizre, Umit Op.Cit; pp. 246-247. 
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institutions. The Muslinn peoples have different ethnic origins, 
geographic situations, historical backgrounds and present-day 
conditions. The changes occurring among them differ in scope, 
intensity, and velocity. Still there are some similarities in their 
experiences of social changes. 
The process of secularization is universal, but the attitude towards the 
problems created by it differs in every case, and the acceptance of a 
secular out look on religion, political, social and cultural matters are far 
from universal. 
It will be useful to make a distinction between the process of 
secularization and the doctrine of secularism. Secularization is a 
sociological process which takes place as a result of factors beyond 
the control of individuals and a doctrine of secularism involves 
individual Ideas, attitudes beliefs or interests. The two are often 
interrelated, but the later is not a necessary accompaniment or a 
necessary product of the former. 
Among the Muslim countries it was in Turkey, that, prior to World War 
II a secular concept of state, religion, law, education and economy was 
first promoted and a definite doctrine of secularism implemented as a 
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political constitutional, educational and cultural policy. The policy has 
not, however, won the approval of all Muslim nations or of most 
individual Muslims. The doctrine is being challenged even in Turkey. 
Many claim that Islam is incompatible with such an attitude. 
Traditional Ottoman polity was fashioned essentially by a patrimonial 
authority called Sultanate, Islamized by recognizing the Sharia, which 
the Turks spelled as Seriat, as the sacred law of the Muslims, and by 
assuming the charismatic title of Caliphate, which was believed to be a 
succession to the prophet's head ship of the community of Islam. In 
Turkish history, the concept of unity of state and religion (din-u-devlet) 
was applied through an imperial system, which gave unity and order to 
a great multiplicity of religions, sects, professions and social classes. 
However, this system reflected a different understanding of the unity 
between religion and government than that implied in the classical 
Islamic theory of 'Imamah', which simply meant leadership or headship 
of the community of believers. This concept led to shift the headship 
from the leader of the community to a sovereign ruler whose chief 
function was to maintain unity and order through the application of 
power. 
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Thus, like the Christian, the Muslim political view was permeated by 
belief in a social structure based on distinct orders and estates and the 
emphasis was on non-equality, on a rigid differentiation according to 
economic and political functions and religious differences and on the 
need for a power with which to oversee and hold the separate units 
together. 
In Turkey as in other Muslim Countries, Secularism is considered to be 
the prerequisite of Westernization rather than of democratization. 
Secularism, in Turkey, is linked to the State's control of the public 
sphere (rigidly in the early years of the Republic but softened gradually 
from the 1950's to the 1980s). Turkish Secularism has meant the 
banning of religious orders, dress codes for public servants, and the 
imposition of certain types audiovisual programming at state radio 
stations and television channels. According to Ernest Gellner, it 
became a 'didactic Secularism', teaching and imposing a modern way 
of life.' 
The practice of secularism in Turkey presents a very interesting 
experiment to the Islamic world. It is the first time that a Muslim 
country experiments with a secular democratic government structure. 
Ernest Getlner as cited in Gole, Nilufer Op.Cit; p.49. 
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Some other Muslim countries such as Iran and Afghanistan followed 
the Turkish model in secular modernization in such areas as women's 
rights during 1930's and 1940's, but their experiments were cut short 
by the military interventions of British and Russians in Iran and British 
in Afghanistan.^ 
The secular character of the republic was enshrined in the first as well 
as several subsequent articles of the 1924 constitution and became 
one of the cornerstones of the ideology of the politically powerful army 
and the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). 
The steps taken in order to remove the pervasive hold of Islam on 
Society and the polity included religious, social and even language 
reforms. This plan was mainly a scheme to Turkify Islam in its spiritual 
content. However, the secularizing reforms of the Kemalist government 
has led the western writers to conclude that religion was defunct in 
Turkey as a social institution. They however, failed to take cognizance 
of the deep-rooted influence of Islam over the Turkish people. The 
secular reforms actually played an important role in the resurgence of 
Kologlu, as cited in 'Public Policies, Problems in Turkey', 
http://www.indiana.edu/megs.pea/turkeycase.htm 
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Islam in Turkey because Islam was never dead in Turkey either before 
or after the Kemalist reforms. 
During the Republican Party's rule a centralized state was developed 
which was created mainly by means of the bureaucracy, the military 
and the spread of modern educational networks. No doubt, it led to the 
increased control of state over many aspects of public and private life. 
The reforms undertaken targeted the power of Religious functionaries, 
leader and communities and transferred their public functions to the 
new state institutions. Inspite of all these reforms, the religious 
activities in general remained largely unaffected in Turkey. The Sufi 
Tarikats remained active underground although the government had 
imposed a ban on their operations. The peasantry which formed three 
fourths of the entire population in Turkey remained devout Muslims. 
The influence of Islam was also profound on the labour class and petty 
tradesman in the cities. Even among the educated people in the large 
towns and cities, the inherence of secularism was never predominant. 
Keeping in view the significance of Islam in Turkish Society, Kemal and 
his associates recognized that religious faith was important for national 
unity and mobilization and that it could contribute to social and moral 
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welfare. On the other hand, they also saw Islam as a traditional force 
and a source of conservative influence, superstition, false ideas and 
dogmas that they felt were responsible for Turkish backwardness, and 
were obstacles to the achievements of national ideals. The attitude of 
the Republican leaders was supportive when it was at cross purposes 
with the main objective of modernization.^ 
In order to make Islam compatible with the modern nation and bring 
Turkey at par with the West, the secularization program was enforced. 
The Turkish model of secularism introduced radical changes at 
executive and legislative levels. As already discussed it involved a set 
of major legal and institutional changes implemented by the 
government in the years after the declaration of Turkish Republic in 
1923. These reforms had a strong impact on the cognitive 
secularization of the people.^ 
Secularism was emphasized even more under the regime of Ismet 
Inonu (1884-1973) President from 1938 to 1950, had a flamboyant 
personality who, not being popularly perceived as 'Shrouded in the 
Allen, H.E. The Turkish Transformation, pp. 172-173. 
Heper, Metin 'Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Towards a Reconciliation' The 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 51(1) winter 1997, p. 34. 
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mantle' of his great predecessor, may have felt that he needed to be 
more royal than the king' in carrying out part policiesJ 
In fact, very important factor in the maintenance and strengthening of 
a genuine interest in the principles and practices of Islam among the 
people was the strong influence of 'Umamah' both in the rural and 
urban areas, besides the 'Tarikats' that operated as powerful 
instruments in the preservation of Islam among the Turkish people 
during the crucial period of the implementation of secular reforms in 
Turkey.^ 
The only major resistance to the demotion of Islam from 'the very 
reason of existence of the state to a private matter of conscience and 
whose limited manifestations were subject to regulation by the 
government d directorate, came in the form of rebellion of a number of 
Kurdish tribes under Sheikh Said in 1925. However, it was quickly and 
severely put down and, partook of as much a nationalist as a religious 
character. 
^ To Enter the Garden: The Background and Growth of the Recently Banned. 
Turkish Welfare Party, http://www.ailigs.com/turkishwelfareparty.htm 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 111 . 
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After the second World War, when Turkey became a member of the 
United Nations and with the end of one-party rule, there were signs of 
increased religious activities and there was a demand for the 
restoration of religious education in schools. A debate was held in the 
Grand National Assembly on the subject in December 1940, although 
at that time government did not yield to the public demand. A long 
controversy raged in the newspapers and other forms of public 
opinion. The Turkish Government finally introduced optimal religious 
education in schools early in 1949. During the same year a faculty of 
Divinity was established at the university of Ankara for higher religious 
education. It provided courses in Fiqah, Tafsir, Hadith, Psychology, 
Sociology, History of religions besides instruction in Arabic, Persian 
and European languages. 
These developments brought about a tolerant attitude towards religion, 
and the people began to voice their religious views more freely and 
with it, the number of books and periodicals on Islam increased rapidly. 
A law was passed by the Grand National Assembly on 23''' March, 
1950 for the expansion of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The law 
provided for the appointment of a Deputy Director, an advisory 
committee for religious publications, a section for publications, a 
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Directorate of Charitable Institutions and a Committee for the 
supervision of the publication of the holy Quran. The provisions of the 
law also called for the appointment of Muftis in the provinces.^ 
Ever since the establishment of the Turkish republic, controversy has 
raged especially among the educated section of the Turkish people 
concerning the secularism emerging from the Kemalist Revolution. A 
set of belief is that this secularism meant the separation of religion and 
state after the fashion of French Laicism, while the other set signifies 
that it was a policy of atheism aimed at the systematic liquidation of 
Islam. The Islamists, who had strongly opposed separationism when 
they were promoting the idea of an Islamic state, favoured the 
separationist interpretation of secularism following their defeat. They 
now claimed that provisions restricting the political power of religion 
were incompatible with secularism which implied non-interference in 
the affairs of religion; therefore Kemalist secularism was not true 
secularism, but shoddy legitimization for the persecution of Islam. A 
modern secular state, said the secularist jurists on the other hand, 
should let religion follow its own course if the state did not intend to 
Ibid. pp. 99-101. 
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liquidate religion altogether. The inference was that if Kennalist 
secularism did not fit one shoe it should, perforce, fit into the other J 
Secularism in Turkey is a mixed blessing and these are contrasting 
views about the success of the Turkish experiment in secularism. Sami 
Secluk argues that there cannot be a state religion in a secular state 
which by definition has to be impartial between all beliefs and 
religions. He contends that it was a mistake for Turkey to 
institutionalize the dominant Islamic sect (Sunni Islam, /ya/7e/7 division), 
to include it into the government hierarchy, to build mosques and to 
pay the clergy with tax money. Secular believes this practice to be at 
odds with the secularism principle. He further favours that the 
Directorate of Religions Affairs needs to be taken out of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy.^ 
Yet Kemalist secularism had certain features contradicting both these 
judgments it is true that certain aspects of Kemalist secularism implied 
political, legal and educational restrictions upon religion while some 
others, such as the existence of a Department of Religious Affairs 
Berkes, Niyazi The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 479-480. 
Semi Semihik, Demokrasiya Dogru (Towards Democracy) Ankara 1999, pp. 
85-92. Cited in 'Public Policy Problems in Turkey' 
http://www.indiana.edu/~megspea/turkeycase.htm 
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within tlie government and the expenditure of public funds on religious 
affairs, seemed to be inconsistent with a secular state. However, the 
seeming inconsistencies will disappear if we leave aside two 
presuppositions underlying the two judgments. Then the aspects of 
appearing as incompatible with a doctrine of laicism (understood as a 
complete separation between religion and state) will prove to be, not 
the essence of the Kemalist secularism, but products of a process of 
severance, without which neither a secular state nor a non-political 
religion could ever come into existence on the basis of din-u-devlet, the 
legacy of medieval Islam.^ 
The Kemalist regime has been criticized by the communists for its 
tolerance of religion, and by the Islamists for its persecution of religion 
and by the western liberals for its keeping religion within the fold of 
State. Kemalism faced attacks and underwent serious tests during the 
years following World War II when conditions in Turkey had changed. 
It received its heaviest attacks from chauvinist nationalism and from 
the Islamists. The later raised or lowered their demands, depending 
upon conditions, from the restoration of the caliphate to the re-veiling 
of women. 
Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 125-126. 
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As secularism did not separate religion and politics, but rather 
subordinated religion to the political realm, it promoted the 
politicization of Islam and struggle between secularists and Muslims for 
control of the state. Any attempt by marginalized social groups to 
penetrate the state has been considered an 'Islamic revival'^ 
Indeed conservative Muslims who are opposed to a secular system of 
government are gaining influence. They are generally known as 
nationalists. Their influence has been reflected in Turkish politics since 
1950 when they joined the newly formed political parties. They have 
played an active role in the evolution of the tolerant attitude of the 
Turkish government towards religion, and the strengthening of 
Turkey's relations with the countries of the Muslim world. 
Especially, in recent history, Turkish politics has been subjected to vast 
changes in its makeup. Since the 1980 military intervention in 
particular, the subject of religious revivalism has been in the forefront 
of the Kemalist Republic.^ While many countries in the West Asia have 
witnessed religious upheaval in recent past, it seemed that Turkey's 
history and structure have protected it from the same course of 
Yavuz, M. Hakan 'Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey' pp. 64-65. 
Islam's Rise in the Turkish Republic. 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/archieve/paper2.htm 
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events. However, recent elections and trends in Turkish politics quite 
manifest a different status of one of the world's strongest secular 
governnnents. 
Islam is well embedded in the Turkish society. In fact it has remained a 
depository for regulating day - to - day social life for the masses, and 
the secularization imposed from above alienated Turkish Society from 
the state. The history of Turkish policies, therefore, is the story of a 
complex tension between these two views and identities over time, the 
state centric republican elite and its supporting groups have identified 
themselves as secularists, commonly known as Laikler, and the large 
masses as 'backward Muslims'. The debate over secularism versus 
religion, therefore, represents major and deep-seated divisions in 
Turkish society; modern versus traditional, progressive versus 
conservatives, and rationalist versus religion.^ Here it would be 
pertinent to examine the ideological clash of these elements over this 
brand of secularism. 
Moreover for the sake of reaching a viable perspective the discussion 
would be concentrated around the opinions and assessment of some 
Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; pp.64-65. 
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well-known writers and publications representing certain schools of 
thought. 
While the conservatives maintained the high nnoral and cultural 
superiority of Islam now they were not opposed to the adoption of 
Western technology. However, they have always considered the 
supporters of Kemalist's reforms as reactionaries. They criticized 
various social reforms undertaken by Kemalist regime According to 
them adoption and acceptance of Latin script, was the introduction of 
the language of the bible rather a reform. Similarly they denounced the 
law forbidding the veil, which in their opinion was anti-Islamic.^ They 
are also against the West, which they think, is about to exterminate 
the soul of human civilization. They believe that Islam is positively 
superior to the west in moral values, so there is no need to reform. 
Secularists, who admire the Kemalist religious-social reforms, are of 
the opinion that it was the need of the hour to bring about some 
radical changes in the obsolete and out-dated traditions of the various 
aspects present in the Turkish society. 
Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 137-139. 
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Prof. Bulent Daver thinks that the goal of secularism was to create a 
Turkish society and state system based on reason, reality, experience 
and freedom. The secularistic character of the Turkish Revolution has 
been reflected in the restriction of religious freedom and particularly in 
the fields of law and education. The attempt to evolve a modern social 
order can give a positive value to Islamic principles. The secularization 
of education has only fulfilled a long felt need.^ 
Prof. Siddik Sami Onar has also justified the restrictions imposed on 
religion as a preventive measure against those who wanted to oppose 
the creation of a modern social order. He believes that the 
contradictions found in the restrictions on religion are due to the fact 
that a legal system compatible with the accepted principles of the 
Turkish revolution has not yet been established, and the relations 
between the state and religion have not been determined in the 
constitution. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Islamic principles 
have been given up.^ 
As Prof. Bahri Sayci has attempted to give a definition of secularism 
beyond the generally accepted one that it means the separation of the 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 139-140. 
' Ibid 
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state from religion. He has described the Turkish Revolution as a 
movement to save the individual from wrong, beliefs and institutions, 
and to enable him to enjoy the freedom of conscience. Secularism does 
not simply mean the separation of the state from religion. 
The parallel development of secularism and democracy in Turkey 
should not be interpreted to mean that the people must conform to the 
opinion of the majority. Secularism necessitates the recognition of the 
individual, and the safeguarding of his moral and social behaviour from 
religious pressure.^ 
A young Turkish lawyer Citen Uzek, has put forward another 
interesting interpretation of secularism. He has asserted that 
'secularism has essentially a national character, and its application in 
different countries will differ according to their conditions. To accept 
secularism in the sense of independent and separate existence of the 
state and religion is erroneous, narrow and dangerous. Secularism 
consists of two elements. The first being the protection of religious 
freedom, the second being the principle that the political structure of 
the state should not be based on rules of religion. From this stand 
Ibid 
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point, the state has a right to interfere with religion in order to put an 
end to the misuse of religious rights and freedom in public interest'.^ 
Serif Mardin asserts that there was a need to find a principle of social 
cohesion for Turkish society and to develop means of raising social 
consciousness among the Turks. In so far as Islam had been found 
wanting in both these respects, it had been rejected. As Islam no 
longer served these purpose, it had indeed become a matter for the 
'private' consciences of the Turks.^ 
Prof. AN Fuat Basgil, in his book entitled 'Religion and secularism', has 
defined secularism as, 'the protection of the religious freedom and the 
rights of the countrymen born out of it against their enemies', and the 
non- interference's of the state in religious affairs and of religion in 
state affairs. It follows from this definition that the duty of the state is 
to organize the material aspects of public life, whereas religion has to 
rule the spiritual world, such as the private and family life of the 
individual.^ 
' Ibid. pp. 133-134. 
^ Mardin, Serif Religious and Secularism in Turkey, p. 211. 
^ Ali Fuat Basgil, Din re Layiklik Istanbul, 1955, cited in Rashid, M. Feroze 
Op.Cit; p. 134. 
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The author further adds that modern civilization is sicl< and cannot 
fulfill man's psychological and spiritual needs, although the progress 
achieved in the fields of sciences and material development is 
formidable. He has suggested that the remedy lies in bringing about a 
re-approachment between sciences and faith. His main criticism of the 
application of secularism in Turkey is directed against the use of force 
for bringing about a social change, which cannot produce satisfactory 
results.^ 
However, for the Republican conservative circle, the hallmark of 
Turkish modernism was the rise of the nation-state. These 
intellectuals, nationalist stand against Islamism and provided a certain 
degree of legitimacy for them on the side of the ruling elite. 
Bobby S. Sayyid asserts that the new ruling elites and 'Islam as the 
antagonistic other of Kemalism.^ It was described as 'the symbol of 
obscurantism and from that point on, was treated like a ghost in the 
political and cultural life of the nation.^ 
ibid 
Sayyid, Bobby S. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of 
Islamism, New York, 1997 p. 65. 
Ibid 
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These Republican conservatives devoted much energy in differentiating 
themselves from the Islamist groups, which in their view had betrayed 
the nationalist movement by collaborating with the foreign aggressors 
in the early 1920'sJ 
Furthermore the advocates of complete westernization are of the 
opinion that Westernization is necessary for Turkey. It involves a 
compulsory change of culture. This movement has continued since the 
days of the Tanzimat until the present day. The West signifies a 
particular set of mind and thinking. It is represented by the 
contemporary civilization. The East possesses its own character, which 
enslaves human beings and crushes the creativity of the human 
intellect. There is no human freedom in the East, which is dominated 
by the power of darkness. In the final analysis, the East is compelled 
to move towards the West.^ 
The two periodicals, 'Turk Dusuncesi's^ (Turkish thought) and 'Forum' 
have presented the views of the supporters of complete Westernization 
^ Irem, Nazim 'Turkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest 
for Cultural Renewal', International Journal of Middle East Studies, p. 34. 
2002, p. 98. 
2 Ibid, pp. 91-95. 
^ Turk Dusuncesi, One of the most conscious conservative journal of the time 
began to published in mid 1950's. 
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in an elaborate way. Turk Dusuncesi has maintained that the culture 
life of the Turks can be described as a complete anarchy of thought, 
because they try to understand the West with the help of outdated 
means and translations. The conflict of various thoughts in Turkey is a 
fight between the opponents of the constructive measures of the 
Turkish revolution and those who reject the lively values of the past. 
Both of these groups are characterized as revolutionaries and 
reactionaries yet this is not the problem of westernization. The problem 
is to mould the Turkish Revolution into the spirit of the West. It 
involves the preparation of a synthesis of the West and the East. The 
periodical has emphasized the need to understand the West not simply 
by its technological progress but by studying the Industrial and 
Philosophic movements of the West in their historical perespective.^ 
Supporters of partial Westernization are of the opinion that partial 
Westernization means simply the acceptance of Western technology. 
There are two different schools of thought in favour of partial 
Irem, Nazim Op.Cit; pp. 90-92. 
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Westernization, one of thenn is represented by Kadro (Italian Quadro 
English Cadre), a monthly journal, published between 1931 and 1934J 
The chief concern of Kadro was to determine Turkey's policy on the 
problem of westernization. It rejects European capitalism and 
imperialism, which had led to the decline of the European civilization. 
Turkey therefore, could adopt only Western technology. In the political 
and economic fields, the Turks would have to formulate their own 
policies based on the historical evolution of their nation and according 
to the conditions of their society. Thus an ideology would come into 
existence. It would be a national socialism, different from European 
socialism and other national philosophies, which could led to the 
evolution of a homogenous and classless society in Turkey.^ 
Members of the conservative group believe in the moral and cultural 
superiority of Islam. They are in favour of the adoption of Western 
technology. Their approach to Turkey's social and political problems is 
based on the principles of Islam. The conservatives have criticized 
several aspects of the social reforms introduced by the Kemalist 
regime, such as the Latin script and Western headgear. The 
' Ibid. p. 96. 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 167. 
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acceptance of the Latin script has been described as the introduction 
of skepticism. These conservatives advocate that the values of Turkish 
culture should be preserved in a programme of Westernization. 
This ideological polarization is increasing day by day and is attract 
worldwide attention towards it. In a programme of BBC about Islam 
and modernity, Robert Hardy, reported that on the streets of Istanbul 
Muslim girls march in defiance of the Turkish state. They are 
demanding the right to wear a headscarf when they go to school.^ 
Although the state is secular, there is overwhelmingly Muslim majority. 
So this issue has become highly charged symbol of the collision 
between Kemalist's and Islamists. 
Seventeen year old Zeliha was turned away by riot police when she 
tried to go to school in her headscarf. In the defence of the legacy of 
Ataturk's secular and modern Turkey, one of the guardians of that 
legacy -Sabri Yirmibesoghi, a retired general, said that it is wrong for 
women to wear head scarves in government schools or in government 
departments as the Turkish public gets upset when this is done in the 
^ Clash between religion and secularism in Turkey. 
http://www.rozanehmagzine.com/sep.oct02/wturkish.htm 
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public sphere - and when the head scarf is used as a political symbol J 
A variety of explanations can be used to give meaning to the recent 
rise of religion in both Turkey and the West Asia at large. Many 
Orientlists tend to see this reaction as an inherent part of Islam. Islam 
is not only a spiritual religion but also assigns political duties to its 
followers. Therefore, it would not be surprising to expect that Muslims 
when given the chance, would draw on their theology of aspect of 
Islam rather than the secular philosophy to guide their political 
actions.^ 
Some politicians see it as a disturbing impact of Islam on the political 
situation in the West Asia to be the natural outcome of the conflict 
between modernity and tradition. In this case the West is accused of 
the increased speed of modernization in the region, which in turn 
precipitated political and social reaction led by the traditional forces in 
society. 
R. Hrair Dekmejian points to the concept of a multifaceted crisis, that 
whenever in the past Muslims faced a multiple crisis which had 
Ibid 
Islam's Rise in Turkish Republic 
http://www.midestinfo.com/archive/paper2.htm 
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political, social, economic or cultural dimensions, they reacted by 
adhering closer to Islam. It may be due to the collapse of the old social 
order without the emergence of a viable replacement, increasing, 
economic dependency on the West, and cultural penetration by others. 
A return to the Islamic past, therefore, became necessary to regain 
their balance and recover from the deterioration in society.^ 
Ibid. 
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Chapter - v 
THE REASSERTION OF RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTIONS AND PARTIES IN TURKISH 
DEMOCRACY 
The State and Religion 
Though the role of religion, in Turkey, began to expand gradually from 
the 1950's onwards, its influence went on increasing in the late 
1980's and 1990's. It has been rightly said that in the post Kennalist 
period, religion was not dead in Turkey. What it needed was proper 
channelisation. Religious teaching and the activities of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs, are the two areas which contributed a lot in this 
regard besides, other agencies. Here we are examining briefly the role 
and contribution of religious schools and the activities of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs and the other most important factor 
that is 'Tarikats, orders and communities' in the rise of religious 
revivalism in Turkey. 
There are three basic categories of Islamic education in Turkey: 
Theology faculties, Quranic schools, and Schools for Chaplains and 
Preachers. The Islamic education is under the surveillance of the state 
and after 1950 all of these multiplied. 
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Theology departments have been established in eighteen universities in 
Turkey, fifteen of which are in the recently founded provincial 
universities.^ Their graduates take specialized Islamic courses in the 
Schools for Chaplains and Preachers as well as a compulsory religious 
course in secular middle and high schools. Most of them find jobs in 
the private sector and in government. 
According to the information provided by the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, the Quranic schools all over the country were 4,929 in 
number, with 5,295 teachers and 176,892 regular and 52,028 
evening school students in 1994, The number of children attending 
summer courses reaches 1,326,443.^ 
The Schools for Chaplains and Preachers were 466 in number, which 
were totally subsidized and controlled by the government. The number 
of students, including secondary and evening students is 446,429 with 
14,995 teachers.^ The curriculum at the secondary level, remains 
basically secular, with an elementary teaching of the Quran taking no 
more than five hours a week. At the high school level, the courses 
include Quranic teaching, theology. Islamic jurisprudence, Hadith 
^ Ayata, Sencer 'Patronage Party and State', p. 47. 
^ Directorate of Religious Affairs, 1994 
ibid 
179 
(religious sayings) preaching and history of world religions, 
accompanied by other courses such as history, geography, Turkish 
literature, nnathematics, physics and chennistry. Though this type of 
curriculum does not include any education on fundamentalist instincts, 
yet the products of these schools are highly sensitive and responsive 
to all kinds of Islamist movements because of the factors such as class 
room interaction, exchange of ideas among peers, and the collective 
religious identity conferred upon these schools. 
Among the graduates only ten percent are employed by the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs, while the remaining either continue their university 
education or find employment in other fields. 
The functions of Directorate of Religious Affairs were confined to the 
publication of Quran and a few basic sources of Islam and had a very 
limited staff until 1950's.^ However in the past four decades, the size, 
activities and responsibilities of the department have expanded 
enormously, with an increase in its number of personnel from only a 
few thousand in the 1950's to 88,533. It had now more than a dozen 
Ayata, Sencer Op.Cit; pp. 47-48. 
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departments and numerous subunits; and its share of the government 
budget was a mere 1.23 percent in 1 990J 
The Directorate of Religious Affairs has its headquarters at Ankara and 
has local branches in all provinces and sub-provinces throughout 
Turkey with 63,053 chaplains and preachers in the 68,675 mosques 
under its control.^ The religious functionaries are pulling in their efforts 
to redefine the responsibilities of the department so as to extend its 
sphere of influence from 'belief to worship' to having a say in ethics 
and the definitions of the content of religion while remaining silent on 
political matters. The officially approved version of Islam is conveyed 
to the public by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, so as to reconcile 
the values of the nation and state with those of Islam. Though the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs personnel at the local community level 
do, informally, express their own political views, but the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs has never formally asked to make specific 
pronouncements or to interpret or legitimize the decision of the 
parliament, the government or the bureaucracy. The Directorate of 
Religious Affairs personnel respond to the grass-root needs of the 
Ibid. p. 48. 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, 1994, also see statistics given in the booklet 
published under the title Turkish Republic: T/ie presidency of Religious 
Affairs, Ankara, 1989. 
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masses, which in turn make them more popular and respectable among 
these people in both rural and urban areas, which eventually 
strengthens their hold and influence on Muslim population. 
These Islamic organizations and the Schools for Chaplains and 
Preachers provide scholarships to the needy high school students and 
provide dormitories for their lodging. They also help their graduates in 
seeking admissions in Universities. In this way the Islamist students 
are found almost in every field from engineering, medicine, public 
administration, law to social sciences, and after leaving the 
Universities, they get appointed as engineers, judges, economists, 
prefects and on other ranks in the state bureaucracy. This infiltration in 
the bureaucracy is helped by the Islamic networks, which indeed aims 
at gradually diluting the earlier stringent secular attribute of the State 
and ultimately Islamizing the very character of the Turkish Republic. 
The Sufi Orders, Tarikats and other Communities 
With the Kemal's secularist reforms, the state of Turkey was never 
devoid of Islamic instincts, rather Islam was very much there 
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embedded in Turkish society. It is the Sufi ls lam\ particularly the 
Naksibendi^ Tarikats, which played a distinctive role in the rise of 
religious revivalism in Turkey. From the late 1960's onwards, there 
were active networks of these Tarikats in business, politics, the mass 
media and social and welfare services. They even played a significant 
role in the formation of political parties.^ 
The religious orders and communities such as the Nurcu, Suleymanci, 
Isikci and Fethullahci, are well organized and have broadened their 
activities than their parent organizations, the mainstream Naksibendi 
lodges, from which they originated. A brief discussion on their 
teachings and ways would perhaps be not out of place. 
Self purification, as the Sufi teaching stresses is must to strengthen 
the inner drive of Muslim believers, which in turn will enhance the 
resistance to excessive material desires. It also lays emphasis on the 
1 In the early centuries of Islam, Sufis were not organized into particular circles 
or Orders, however, gradually, a more institutional structure was given to 
their gatherings and these Sufi centers were usually called Khaneqahs or 
Zawiyyas. The Turks called their Sufi sanctuary a Tekke. 
The Naksibendi order is one of the Sufi orders, it takes its name from Shaykh 
Bahaud-Din Nakshband of Bukhara (d. 1300). It is widely spread in Central 
Asia, the Volga, the North West and South West of China, Indonesia, the 
Indian subcontinent, Turkey, Europe and North America. For more details on 
Sufi orders see Shaykh Fadhlalla Heari, The Elements of Sufism, London, 
1990, also http://www.nuradeen.com/reflections/elemetnsofsufismintro.htm 
The Naksibendi and Nurcus encouraged the establishment of the National 
Order Party and National Salvation Party respectively. 
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renewal of faith in Islam, so that the spiritual and political conquest of 
the West and its materialist culture could be overcome. They advocate 
that the great struggle, the Cihad-i-ekbar is to be waged against the 
carnal, bestial and predatory elements of the individual ego, and 
cannot take place in a state of isolation. Self-reform requires a leader 
and a devout Muslim community. An infallible mentor who has a 
profound knowledge of Islam and who is an ethical guide to 
interpreting Islamic rules in new contexts is essential.^ Sufi's assume 
that only individuals strong in faith can combat the external enemies of 
Islam. 
The Naksibendi's emphasize the role of a righteous community in 
sustaining the self-reform process. Extremely detailed codes of 
conduct derived from the Islamic Seriat are introduced into the 
everyday life of devout Muslims, and their observance is enforced by a 
vigilant community. Ordinary adherents of Tarikat with the help of 
pamphlets and cassettes make masses aware of religious worship and 
ethics. 
Ayata, Sencer, 'Traditional Sufi orders on the periphery: Kadiri and 
Naksibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon' in Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern 
Turkey, London, 1991 , pp. 236-9. 
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In the 1970's and 1980's Tarikat activities in the public sphere were 
mainly focused on the efforts to widen the basis of their organization. 
With the help of modern media techniques, such as audio and 
videocassettes, as well as their personal approaches such as house-to-
house visits, video shows, preaching in mosques, they tried to increase 
the number of followers and cadres. Teaching of Quran to the 
propagation of religious and political views is often described as the 
goal of the activities of Sufi networks and Organizations.^ 
The activities of Sufi network include the publication of dozens of 
journals that address religious, political, scientific and social issues as 
well as thousands of books on almost every major topic, the setting up 
of formal institutions such as schools and preaching in mosques, 
houses and special gathering places. All these activities have led to a 
great influence of these Tarikats and has given rise to a new Islamist 
elite of journalists, writers and intellectuals. 
It will not be out of place to make mention here two such 
communities, which have attracted world's attention and have 
contributed a lot in sustaining the use of religion in modern Turkey. 
Ibid. 
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Nurcu Movement 
The Nurcu movement, which represents a conservative group of 
Muslims, has sought to combine a modern interpretation of Islam with 
Turkish nationalism and statism. It is a religio-social movement that 
takes its name from its founder. Said Nursi (1873-1960). His chief 
work is Risale-i-Nur, consisting of 130 parts, which has been written in 
Arabic script by hand and distributed gratis. 
Though it is a resistance movement to the Kemalist modernization 
process, yet it is potent and proactive.^ Said Nursi offers a conceptual 
framework for the people undergoing the transformation from a 
confessional community to a secular national society. Folk Islamic 
concepts are redefined and revived to establish new solidarity 
networks and everyday life, strategies for coping with new conditions.^ 
Said Nursi visited Sultan Abdulhamid II (Ottoman Sultan 1876-1909) in 
1907 to seek his support for a university where natural sciences could 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan, 'Towards an Islamic Liberalism, The Nurcu Movement and 
Fethullah Gulen', Middle East journal, Vol. 53(4) Autumn 1997, pp. 585-
586. 
^ Ibid. 
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be brought together with Islamic sciences, but his proposal was 
rejected.^ 
During the World War I, Said Nursi fought along with his pupils on the 
battlefront against the Russian, Armenian forces. He spent some times 
in Siberia as a prisoner of war. He sharply attacked the British 
occupation of Istanbul, and fully supported the troops of Mustafa 
Kemal. Ataturk and hence he was invited to Ankara in 1922, where he 
delivered a series of lectures asking the new regime to obey Islamic 
precepts, but was disappointed with his exchanges with Mustafa 
Kemal and other officials in Ankara. 
Nursi believed in the power of ideas and a cognitive revolution and the 
goal thus became the construction of an Islamic consciousness. He 
wanted to prove that science and rationalism are compatible with 
religious beliefs and wanted to contemporize Islam by Islamizing 
science and also to protect the people from unbelief and those in the 
Madrassas (traditional Islamic schools) from fanaticism.^ 
Said Nursi spent most of his life in educating his countrymen in the 
teachings of Holy Quran and Sunnah. For his mission he traveled from 
^ Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp.140-141 
^ Ibid, p. 587. 
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village to village. Nursi and his followers, the Risale-i-Nur movement, 
spread throughout Turkey after 1950, despite the state's efforts to 
stop their activities, and had special success among the young and 
those educated in the secular education system J 
Indeed, he enjoyed the confidence of the government as long as 
Democratic Party was in power, when he died he left behind more than 
half a million followers belonging to all classes of people, from the 
peasants up to the highly educated persons such as advocates, 
journalists and members of the Grand National Assembly.^ 
Nursi believed that Westernization had led the people astray, and 
towards foreign politics and way of life. Hypocrites and disbelievers 
had misused religion for politics. He asserted that the Western 
civilization is not based on virtue and belief in God, but on Greed and 
avarice, jealously and domination. It is like a withering tree, and it 
would be defeated by Asian Civilization^ Nurcu movement 
accomplished transition from and an oral culture to a print culture for 
the Nurcu movement seeks to move Islam from an oral based tradition 
See Mardin, Serif, Religion and Social Changes in Modem Turkey: The Case 
of Badiuzzaman Said Nursi, New York, 1989. 
Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; pp. 141 
Tunaya cited by Feroze, M. Rashid Op.Cit; p. 142. 
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to a print based medium and to raise religious consciousness through 
education and reason. This encouraged the formation of a number of 
reading circles, known as dershane. Gradually these reading circles 
dershanes spread throughout Anatolia and updated Islamic vocabulary 
in terms of the global discourses of science, democracy and human 
rights. There are more than 5,000 reading circles, dershanes in Turkey 
and the number of Nurcu adherents varies between two and six 
million.^ Also there are fifty-three dershanes in the Central Asian 
Republics, twenty-four in Germany, four in Holland, four in Austria, 
two in Belgium and one in Sarajevo. This clearly manifests that this 
movement represents the shift advocated by Nursi from oral culture to 
print culture and from rural to urban.^ In disseminating his ideas, Nursi 
encouraged the use of new communication technology. Thus the 
Nurcus contemporary use of modern media such as radio. Television, 
magazines, e-mail and newspapers is a direct out growth of Nursi's 
earlier encouragement.^ 
Yavuz, M. Hakan, Op.Cit; pp.587-589. 
Ibid, p. 590. 
Ibid 
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Fethullah Gulen and Neo Nurcu Movement 
After the death of Said Nursi, the Nurcu movement fragmented along 
ethnic class, educational generational and regional lines^ Fethullah 
Gulen, born in Erzurum in Eastern Turkey in 1938, became a prominent 
Nurcu leader commonly called Hocaefendi (The master of higher 
religious authority). Though a moderate Islamic spiritual leader, his 
views on Islam are surprisingly liberal. His writings and world-view 
create a marriage between tradition and modernity. 
Gulen does not favour the state applying Islamic law, the Sharia. He 
asserts that most Islamic regulations concern private life and only a 
small portion of them concern state and government. Thus religion 
being a private matter, its requirements should not be imposed on any 
one^ Gulen wants to accomplish two intellectual facts: the Islamization 
of Turkish nationalist ideology and the Turkification of Islam and hopes 
to re-establish the link between religion and state that existed in 
Ottoman era. 
Ibid. 
Aras, Bulent 'Turkish Islam's Moderate Face' Middle East Quarterly 
Philadelphia, 5 No. 3, 1998 pp. 22-23. 
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He emphasizes that there should be freedom of worship and thinicing in 
Turkey. He writes of an 'Anatolian Islam'^ based on tolerance and 
excluding harsh restrictions or fanaticism. Thus he prepares two keys 
to provide peace in society: tolerance and dialogue. As reported in 
Reuters, he asserted, 'we can build confidence and peace in this 
country if we treat each other with tolerance'.^ His views regarding the 
question of women are very progressive. On the veiling of women, he 
states, 'no one can suppress the progress of women through the 
clothes they have to wear', he added, 'no one should be subject to 
criticism for his or her clothing or thoughts'. 
The neo-Nurcu movement is dormant in central Asia and has great 
influence on the Turks of that area. Perhaps because of its ability to 
communicate the message of Said Nursi.^ Other Islamic countries such 
as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are not successful in disseminating 
their versions of Islam because of the poor response from the people of 
that area. 
Gulen holds that the Anatolian people's interpretation and expression of 
Islam are different from others especially the Arabs. 
Aiistair Bell 'Turkish Islamic Leader defies Radical Label' Reuters Aug. 7, 
1995. 
The Sufi Oriented Softer Turkish Islam has been more appealing to the 
Turkish Nations than the Saudi or Iranian versions of a 'Rigid Islam'. 
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The proliferation of religiously shaped social practices that include 
shopping at pro-Islamic malls, watching pro-Islamic television programs 
and consuming popular Islamic literature, it is all encouraged by neo-
Nurcus.^ Muslims are being urged by Islamic foundations, associations 
and other publishing groups to become socially and politically active 
and control their own lives,^ 
It is really tough to assess exactly the size of Gulen's giant community 
of sympathizers (known as Fethullah's partisans of Fethullahci) but its 
range is guessed between 200,000 and 4 million.^ Its supporters 
include young urban men, doctors, academicians and other 
professionals. 
Gulen stresses education and engagement in the market economy, so 
his activities are aimed at moulding of cohesive and disciplined 
community through education, mass media and financial networks. It 
has a control over a large media empire. It owns many publications, 
magazines, journals and dailies, which are used to disseminate Gulen's 
Kasaba, Resat 'Cohabitation? Islamists and Secular Groups in Modern 
Turkey', in Robert W. Helner, ed., Democratic Civility: Tfie History and Cross 
Cultural Possibility of Modern Political Ideal New Brunswick, 1998, pp. 265-
282. 
Vavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; p. 596. 
Tempo, Feb, 1997 pp. 46-50. 
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ideas to masses in general and to elites of Turkish society in particular. 
Its publications include Yeni Umit (New Hope, a theological journal), 
Ekiogi (an environment related magazine) Sizinti (Leak, a scientific 
monthly journal), the fountain (English language religious publication), 
Zaman (a daily newspaper) Besides it has media outlets; Samanyolu 1\J 
and Burch P.M. (Radio station). It also organizes national and 
international symposia, panel discussions and conferences where 
different issues regarding secularism and Islamism are discussed. In 
comparison to most Kemalist and other Islamic groups, Nurcus allow 
more freedom of debate and criticism in their magazines/journals, 
radio, television stations and dailies, but only within the co-ordinates of 
Islamic-Turkish nationalism.^ 
This community has built a vast educational empire which includes 
schools, colleges and universities throughout the Turkey and outside. It 
has around 300 schools in some 50 countries starting with the Turkish 
republic of central Asia, where its establishments have won Turkey a 
strong reputation for good education (brief analysis of students and 
teachers in different countries is given under, in Table 1. 
Yavuz, M. Hakan Loc.Cit. 
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TABLE 1 
Country 
Kazakhstan 
Azerbaijan 
Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Tataristan (Russia) 
Tajikistan 
Albania 
Dagestan (Russia) 
Australia 
Bulgaria 
Bashkortistan (Russia) 
Mongolia 
Siberia (Russia) 
Romania 
Russia (Russia Proper) 
Chuvashia (Russia) 
Georgia 
Gagauz (Moldova) 
Crimea (Russia) 
Iraqi Turkman 
Bosnia 
Macedonia 
Karachay (Russia) 
Indonesia 
Total 
Number of Schools 
27 High Schools 
11 High Schools/1 Univ. 
18 High Schools 
12 High Schools/1 Univ. 
11 High Schools 
6 High Schools 
5 High Schools 
2 High Schools 
5 High Schools 
5 High Schools 
4 High Schools 
3 High Schools 
4 High Schools 
4 High Schools 
4 High Schools 
5 High Schools 
2 High Schools 
3 High Schools 
2 High Schools 
2 High Schools 
4 High Schools 
2 High Schools 
1 High Schools 
1 High Schools 
1 High Schools 
145 
Number of 
Students 
5539 
3023 
3334 
3295 
2093 
1802 
694 
966 
938 
718 
523 
462 
442 
438 
415 
323 
311 
244 
225 
218 
184 
109 
102 
93 
41 
26,532 
Personnel 
From Turkey 
570 
338 
210 
353 
291 
217 
107 
74 
123 
37 
123 
88 
85 
101 
78 
63 
79 
48 
40 
47 
26 
22 
16 
13 
18 
3167 
Source : Yurt Disinda Ac! an 
(Ankara MEB Yurtdisi 
Hakan Op.Git; p. 599. 
Ozel Ogretim Kurumlari 
Egitim Genel Mudurlugu, 
Temsilcileri: Ikinci 
1997) as cited in 
Toplanstisi 
Yavuz, M. 
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Gulen's community controls one of the fastest growing financial 
institutions, Asya Finans, which has over half a billion, US dollars in 
capitaP and backed by sixteen partners^. In addition to this ISHAD {/s 
Hayath Dayanisma Dernegi), a powerful association of over 2000 
businessmen and merchants supports Gulen's educational activities. 
Besides the community runs dormitories summer camps and other 
foundations. The combination of mobilized money, knowledge, media 
and students has already molded the educational landscape in Turkey 
and central Asia. Its education system seeks to discover the attributes 
of nature to consolidate faith in God. For, according to Gulen a lack of 
religious education would create atheism whereas the lack of scientific 
education would result in fanaticism. According to some critics, 
Gulen's educational institutions, give the neo-Nurcus a 'powerful and 
pernicious domination over the minds of the next generations'.^ 
As Bulent Aras comments that the unique character of Gulen's 
movement lies in the attempt to revitalize traditional values through the 
states official modernization program and aims to reconcile hundreds 
of years of tradition with the demands of modernity and seeks to 
' Ibid 
^ Aras, Bulent Op.Cit; pp. 25-26. 
^ Cited in Yavuz, IVI. Hakan p. 599. 
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construct a Turkish style Islam; Islamize Turkish nationalism and re-
create a legitimize link between state and religion^ 
However, Gulen who was seen as a moderate face of Islam, even by 
the politicians from president Suleyman Demirel to Prime Minister 
Bulent Ecevit is now seen as the state's prime enemy who is trying to 
undermine the foundation of the secular regime.^ 
This brief sketch of the Nurcu and neo-Nurcu movement clearly reveals 
that they have played and are playing an important role in supporting 
Islamic ideas among masses. Though purely a movement of faith, they 
have also concentrated on building a religious society and polity. 
There are also many other Sufi communities, which play a significant 
role in financing Quranic schools to which the government also 
contributes. They help the needy students by providing them free 
accommodation in their dormitories and also contribute to their food 
and other expenses too. 
For the past few years, these networks have been concentrating on 
welfare services as in response to the widespread poverty in cities. As 
^ Aras, Bulent Op.Cit; pp. 28-29. 
^ Pope, Nicole 'Turkey, Islamic Hysteria', Middle East International, Istanbul, 2 
July 1999 p.15. 
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the economic reformist policies of the 1980's limited government 
expenditure on social services and on the welfare state in general, it 
did provide an opportunity for the religious organizations to offer social 
services and relief to the poor and needy. They also organize medical 
centers and hospitals that offer treatment schemes and child care 
programs. 
As for the financial resources, they get contributions from people, as 
well as donations from local to international Muslim business, 
institutions and states, including Turkish migrant workers in Europe, 
the tapping of public resources. With the expansion of the economy of 
the Islamist sector, especially since 1980 with large-scale holding 
companies, investment houses banks and insurance companies are 
also contributing to these orders 
The Turkish Democracy 
The democratic essence of Turkish politics has long been questioned 
and debated.^ According to Sonar and S. Sayari there are serious 
difficulties and limitations involved in the development of Turkish 
Mango, Andrew, 'The Turkish Model', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29(4) 
October, 1993, pp. 726-727. 
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democracy because the government has imposed narrow limits within 
which political activities can take place. Statism, one of the main 
features of Turkey's Kemalist political culture acts as a center-
periphery schism; and a persistent inability to come into terms with the 
more subtle nuances of democratic politics^ In fact, Turkey's resilient 
statist tradition has led to the centralization of power among a 
consistent core of elites.^ 
The military government in the coup of 1980 imposed a five-year ban 
on political activity of the members of the parliament at the time of the 
coup. This ban aimed at changing the composition of the elite political 
classes in parliament in its endeavour.^ As a matter of fact, Turkish 
politics is still ridden with familiar faces and personalities, which are 
cyclically rising to the power and then falling from it only to rise and 
fall again. However, this elite has failed in accommodating the 
dissenting voices within itself and, as a result there is always a marked 
chronic digagreements and internal conflicts as well as intra-elite 
^ Weiker, Walter, The Modernization of Turliey: From Atatur/c to the Present 
day, London, 1981 , pp. 5-7. 
^ Ibid p. 2 1 . 
^ Ahmad, Feroze, The making of Modern Turl<ey, p. 187. 
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discords, which give rise to a chaotic nature of the Turl<ish political 
party scene J 
A truly democratic culture is marked by a social spirit of compromise 
and accommodation, which is lacking in Turkish political system. This 
argument may be well supported by the instances of intense rivalry 
even at the highest levels of political system. In the late 1950's, there 
surfaced conflicts between President, Suleyman Demirel and former 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, and Tansu Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz, their 
mutual wranglings and discords in fact, did bring the country's political 
machinery to a virtual halt during those periods.^ 
It was this intense rivalry among the elites, which was going to push 
the system to the verge of paralysis and provide an opportunity for the 
self ascribed saviours to come to rescue, be they in military uniform or 
armed with absolututist even religious solutions. Although largely 
unsubstantiated, there have been rumours of a possible military coup 
by elements within the armed forces.^ It came in one of the country's 
leading newspaper that, 'Turkey is rapidly moving towards a yearning 
Kamarava, Mehran, 'The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party' British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 25 (2), 1998, pp. 282-283. 
See, for example, The Turkish Daily News, 7 June, 1994, p. 1. 
Tur/(ish Daily News, 4 May, 1994 and Turkish Daily News, 10 Oct. 1995. 
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for authority that goes beyond military coups, a yearning not for a 
military coup as an alternative to democracy but for an authority that 
goes beyond it'.^ To the disenchanted voters on March 1994 and 
December 1995, the Welfare Party appeared as the most likely party 
capable of averting potential disaster. In such prevailing circumstances, 
it appeared that the Welfare Party provided a better alternative to 
'politics as usual' and symbolized a political movement that was in 
tune with the social and cultural currents gripping the nation. 
Eric Rouleau sees the Kurdish conflict among other factors which 
contributed to the remarkable revival of Islam in Turkey, for the results 
of the parliamentary elections of December 24, 1995, is a testimony 
that the Welfare Party which is the main political body of the Islamist 
trend raised its percentage of votes from 7 to 21 percent (between 
1987 and 1995, respectively) because of the Kurdish support.^ 
Welfare Party: Rise and Demise 
The history of the Welfare Party stretches back only to 1970 when Dr. 
Necmettin Erbakan, born in 1926 and educated as an engineer at 
Milliyet, 25 June 1995. p. 15. 
Rouleau, Eric, 'Turkey : Beyond Ataturk'. Journal of Foreign Affairs, Summer 
1996, p. 77. 
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Istanbul Technical University, appeared on the political scene. As 
president of the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industries, he had spoken for small business, which he claimed was 
being subordinated by big capital and, especially foreign interests 
under the aegis of the then Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel's Justice 
Party J 
As early as 1970 Erbakan had also begun to make pronouncements 
against not only communism but also against the 'infidel' West and 
'international Zionism'. The latter statements led opponents to charge 
him with 'anti-Semitism' an allegation, which Erbakan and his 
subordinates have subsequently denied.^ 
Erbakan became an independent member of parliament for Konya 
province in 1970. Konya city contained the tomb of Jelal ed-Din Rumi, 
preeminent mystic and founder of the whirling Dervishes and was the 
traditional stronghold of religious conservatives. There Erbakan 
founded the National Order Party. This party was dissolved after the 
military ultimatum of March 12, 1971 which demanded, amongst other 
things 'a strong Kemalist government' The National Order Party, 
^ The Background and Growth of the Recently Banned Turkish Welfare Party. 
http://www.ailegs.com/turkishwelfareparty/htm. 
^ Ibid. 
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however was not singled out for closure, and not only was Erbakan 
not prosecuted but he was allowed to re-establish his party some 
eighteen nnonths later under the name of the National Salvation Party. 
At that time Erbakan was included in socialist Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit's left-of-centre government as vice-premier and minister of 
state. 
Thus Welfare Party has been around in various guises and under 
different names since the late 1960's and is not a new player in 
Turkish politics.^ First as the National order party in 1969 and then 
National Salvation Party founded in 1972. The National Salvation Party 
was represented in parliament between 1973 and 1980 and also took 
part in three different coalition governments: one led by Bulent Ecevit, 
the leader of the Social Democratic Republican People's Party, in 
1974; and the other by Suleyman Demirel of the Justice Party, 
between 1975 and 1977 Necmettin Erbakan remained its unchallenged 
leader until the 1980 military coup disbanded the party. 
The welfare party, the successor of National Salvation Party came into 
being in 1983 after the ban imposed by the military on all political 
activities was lifted, and the political parties were allowed to openly 
Kamrava, Mehran, Op.Cit; p. 286. 
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participate in political processes. In the highly unstable and volatile 
climate of the 1970's the National Salvation Party had found much 
support among members of the civil services, a support that in the 
newly charged atmosphere of the 1990's was once again proving to 
be a great asset.^ 
The National Salvation Party had adopted the Islamic platform up to 
the limit as was allowed by the constitution of 1961 and the political 
climate of the 1970's. But neither the National Salvation Party and nor 
the Welfare Party in its early years could gather much support among 
the Turkish electorate. During the 1970's and the early to mid 1980's 
it was not Islam but rather social democracy that attracted increasing 
numbers of Turkish youth and intellectuals, in turn evoking sharp 
reaction from the far right.^ The National Salvation Party represented 
those who were not fully integrated culturally and economically into 
the 'modernist center'.^ The National Salvation Party's goal was to 
return to traditional social and cultural life and laid emphasis on Islamic 
mores as a cure to social problem. In contrast the Welfare Party aimed 
' In the 1970's both the National Salvation Party and the National Action Party 
were alleged to use their participation in government to place supports in the 
bureaucracy. 
^ Ahmad, Feroze, 'Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey', p. 17. 
^ Toprak, Binnaz, 'Politicization', p. 131 . 
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to modernize traditional norms and institutions by breatliing new life 
into them. 
The Welfare Party fitted well within the category of organized Islamic 
popular movements that operate as political parties J It superseded 
other political parties, not only in the size of its membership, but in the 
efficiency of its party organization. Its activists were highly motivated, 
well disciplined and strongly committed. The Welfare Party, offered 
people three major things. First, the ideology that explained what was 
fundamentally wrong with the country and the solution to put things in 
order. Second, its activists provided poor people some material support 
and benefits as health care and medical aid. Finally, they showed 
sympathy and appreciation of the difficulties of every day life for 
ordinary people and respect for their work and struggle, thus creating 
an atmosphere of closeness, affection, congeniality and companionship 
with their voters.^ In addition the Welfare Party helped in the political 
socialization of Islamic groups by mobilizing them to take part in 
political system thereby ensuring their political participation. It even 
attracted the voters ignored by other parties. Moreover, it even 
mobilized and included the people imbued with Islamic values and were 
^ Samizubadla, Islam, The People and the State, London, 1993, p. 50. 
^ Ayata, Sencer Op.Cit; p. 52. 
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on the political periphery and the large Kurdish population, though their 
inclusion was not costly because the Islamic periphery did not request 
the immediate redistribution of political power. It rather helped the 
state's strategy to expand its social base by incorporating Islamic 
voices into the system J 
The Welfare Party, unlike other parties, was an institutional expression 
of a modern social movement that was based on a new form of 
consciousness created by mass education, the expanding impact of 
print media, and the shift of religious authority from traditional Ulema 
to urbanized university graduates. This movement strives to redefine 
socio-cultural and economic relations through political means.^ 
Though the Welfare Party was established on July 19.1983 by All 
Turkmen and his thirty friends, but the party could not enter the first 
national election after the coup, held in 1983. However, the party 
contested local elections on March 25, 1984 under the leadership of 
Ahmad Tekdal. The party secured a total number of 778,622 votes 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan 'Political Islam and the Welfare Party', p. 66. 
^ Ibid. 
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with a percent of 4.4 of the total and won mayoral seats in 'Van' and 
'Urfa'J 
In the first general party congress on June 30, 1985, Tekdal sharply 
criticized Ozal's economic policies and stressed social justice and 
political freedom for the working classes. Binnaz Toprak comments 
that party wanted to expend its social base, but assumes that it was 
molding and leading the passive Islamic masses.^ 
When the ex-politicians were allowed to enter into politics, in the light 
of the referendum of 1987, Necmettin Erbakan and some of the pre-
1980 cadres came to the forefront and took the reins of the party in 
their hands and rally the support of the Nurcu sect of Muslims. 
Erbakan known as Hoca (master), speaks German and English, and is a 
veteran politician with 27 years of experience. Upon his return to the 
party, his style of leadership and drive were restored to the 
organization and a new party mission was based on his own ideology. 
The platform which Erbakan derived, leading into the December 1995 
^ Akinci, U, 'The Welfare Party's Municipal Record Track: Evaluating Islamist 
Municipal Activism in Turkey', Middle East Journal, 58, (1), 1999, pp. 75-
94. 
^ Toprak, Binnaz 'The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey', p. 129. 
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elections, was based on his desires to maintain democracy while 
stripping the Turkish constitution of its secular character.^ 
The Welfare Party's first electoral showing in the parliamentary 
election of 1987 was not, so good, in which it failed to secure any 
representation in the Turkish parliament. In these elections its share 
was only 7.16% with 1,717,425 votes, in 1989 local election the 
party won only 9.8 percent of votes. This unsatisfactory electoral 
showing compelled its policymakers to form a purely pragmatic alliance 
with the Nationalistic Action Party and Reformist Democratic Party on 
September 23, 1991. This alliance won 62 seats in parliament in the 
1991 general elections and its vote percentage raised to 16.2. 
The Welfare Party became a significant force in Turkish politics when, 
in local elections on March 27,1994, it won 19.7 percent of the 
national votes and its pro-Islamist mayors took control of twenty-nine 
large cities, including Ankara and Istanbul.^ This percentage increased 
even further by late 1995 to 21.4% and 158 seats giving the Welfare 
Party the largest single bloc of representatives in the parliament and 
for the first time in Turkey's Republican Party history an avowedly 
Islam's Rise in the Turkish Republic, 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/archieve/paper2.htm. 
Akinci, U, Op.Cit; pp. 75-94. 
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religious party gained a relative majority of the votes in the general 
elections. Welfare Party's steady rise in its electoral base can be 
ascertained by looking at table 2. 
Table 2 
Elections in Turkey, 1987 - 1995 
Parties 
Center Right 
True path 
Motherland 
Center left 
Democratic left 
Republican people 
SODEP 
Nationalsist 
National Movement 
People's Democratic 
Pro-Islamic 
Welfare Party 
1987 
% 
19.1 
39.3 
8.5 
--
24.8 
--
--
7.2 
Seats 
59 
292 
--
--
99 
-
--
--
1991 
% 
27.0 
24.0 
10.8 
--
20.8 
--
--
16.2* 
Seats 
178 
115 
7 
-
88 
--
--
63 
1995 
% 
19.2 
19.7 
14.6 
10.7 
--
8.1 
4.1 
21.4 
Seats 
135 
132 
76 
49 
--
--
--
158 
* This is the vote of the Alliances of the Welfare and the Ultra Nationalist 
National Movement Party. Source : Cited in Yavuz M. Hakan, Op.Git; p. 71 . 
It is not only its pro-Islamic stance, but there are other reasons, which 
culminated in the Welfare Party's victory in the 1995 elections. The 
Mayors of Welfare Party which took charge of many cities after the 
1994, local elections, have worked hard to improve public services and 
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offered better services than their predecessors. Moreover, they 
reduced corruption and nepotisnn in their municipalities, and acted 
more professionally than the other parties on the left and right J 
Further, it cannot be denied that the Welfare Party's electoral success 
was also greatly facilitated by the paralysis and failure of its principle 
competitors, especially the main ruling centrist coalitions. The 
mainstream secular political parties were perceived as immersed in 
corruption, in particular the True Path Party and the Motherland Party 
were engaged in endless squabbles, in particular with the new 
Republican People's Party.^ 
Metin Heper, argues that some members of the secularist intelligentsia 
were constantly engaged in de-legitimizing the political regime by 
trying to belittle such key institutions as the military, the National 
Security Council, the Presidency, and even the parliament, and this too 
played into the hands of Erbakan and his colleagues.^ 
Mehran Kamrava sees four specific reasons that underlined the WP's 
steady rise in stature and power. They included the Welfare Party's 
Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; p. 72. 
Barkey, Henri, 'Turkey, Islamic Politics and the Kurdish Question', VJorld 
Policy Journal, 13 1 spring, 1996, p. 45. 
Heper, Metin 'Islam and Democracy in Turkey' p. 36. 
2 0 9 
highly populist agendas; its concerted efforts to tap into previously 
ignored electoral sources {as the Southeast region, the army etc.); its 
internal cohesion and organizational strength, especially when 
compared to the wide spread lack of discipline in most of the other 
parties; and its grass-root efforts and general posture as a 'movement' 
rather than a political partyJ Moreover, the political events in the 
neighbouring West Asian region also had their impact on the success 
of Welfare Party. All of these factors gave it a distinct identity and an 
edge over the other parties. 
The Welfare Party and its program 
The Welfare Party's popularity is attributed to its highly populist 
agenda, that contained the enunciation of party's various theorists as 
well as party's platform, its corner stone being what the party called 
the 'Just Order'. 
Just order (Adil Duzen) 
It was the most appealing programme presented by Welfare Party. The 
party's supporters identified social equity as the main objective of the 
just order system. People saw in it justice, a secure social and 
Kamrava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 287. 
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economic environment, the protection of state property, an end to 
nepotism and corruption, cooperation between state and nation, 
protection of the unity of the sate and an end to undue western 
influence over Turkey. Such responses indicate that Just Order was 
seen as Islamic political system, but at the same time addressing 
Turkey's immediate social and economic problems^ 
The Just Order was the brainchild of Erbakan, the party's leader, and 
Suleyman Karagulle, a former collaborator who later severed his ties 
with Erbakan and the Welfare Party.^ 
Comprising thirty-one articles, some of it dealt with Socio cultural and 
theoretical issues, however, the most of which revolved around 
economic matters. In fact, article 1 explicitly states that 'in the just 
order, the state does not engage in any economic activities, the private 
sector runs the economy', the state's concern is to prevent 
monopolies. 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan, Op.Cit; pp. 73-74. 
^ Milliyet, 27 Feb., 1994, p. 19, in Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 287. 
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The aims and objectives of Just Order are enumerated below^: 
• foster rapid development, as there will be no interest on loans, 
and the money diverted to interests go as towards investments 
instead (loans will be provided by the wealthy to 'trust worthy 
entrepreneurs'); 
• prevent unemployment, in fact tripling the work force from its 
current 10 million to an estimated 30 million workers; 
• result in an explosion of exports, as production will rise by 'five 
fold to six fold' and so will capabilities to export; 
• lower the country's foreign debt, because of the increased 
wealth of the nation and the capable management of Just Order 
'cadre': and 
• eliminate inflation although there might be small increases and 
drops in prices associated with changes in supply and demands. 
The Just Order is not to be confused with 'capitalism' neither is it to 
be misinterpreted as communism. According to Mehran Kamrava, 
The information on the Just Order written above comes from the English 
translation of a 43 page booklet published in Turkish by the Welfare Party 
under the title Adil Duzen (with no name of author or date and place of 
publication) as printed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Western 
Europe (Here after FBIS: WEU), Turkey's: Welfare Party explains its 'Just 
Order. 5 December, 1995, pp. 1-15. 
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capitalism is bound to go bankrupt just as communism has. The Just 
Order is 'an order of harmony not discord' and one in which there is a 
congruence of interests between workers and employers, government 
administrators and the people, doctors and patients, and lawyers and 
clients.^ 
As a matter of fact, the quest of the poor and newly urbanized masses 
for equal distribution of economic goods and for economic prosperity 
finds expression in the Welfare Party's just Order. Thus this party 
offered an institutional framework for the voiceless and suppressed 
masses of Turkey and for social movements, seeking to redefine and 
transform social, cultural and political interactions.^ 
The main objectives of the Just Order, as manifest from its 
stipulations, were the protection of the state and its property and was 
more concerned with the country's social and economic problems. The 
Just Order did not imply an interest free economic system or a welfare 
state; it stood for the prevention of injustice and religious 
discrimination against pious people.^ 
^ Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; pp. 288-289. 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; p. 74. 
Ibid. 
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Identity (Kimlik) and the Welfare Party 
The Welfare Party provided a forum, for diverse ethnic and regional 
identities to flourish and coexist, by means of using Islamic idioms and 
symbols. In practice the party leadership had implied no bar on its 
participants, rather it functioned as a space in which to negotiate 
political tradeoffs between competing identities and loyalties. Islamic 
identity thus became a mobilizing tool in the hands of the party 
leadership. Necmettin Erbakan often quoted a famous saying of 
Mevlana, 'Come, regardless of your background come what ever you 
are, you should come. Come and internalize our identity in due time'. 
This manifests that Erbakan did not see the party platform as a flexible 
structure that could be altered by new participants rather he demanded 
that new comers accept the form of the party, which acts as a school 
to mold and shape individuals.^ It seems that this party having an 
articulate ideology, had the potential to mould its supporters and 
imbibe among them Islamic interests and thus transform them, with a 
new Islamic identity. 
Ibid p. 75. 
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The leadership of the Welfare Party admitted three spheres of 
confrontation in Turkish society: ideological (left versus right and 
Islamist versus both Marxist and capitalist), ethnic (Turkish versus 
Kurd), and religious (different sects of Islam such as Sunni versus 
Alevi). The liberal wing of the party sought to harmonize these three 
zones of conflict by opening a series of communication channels and 
public spaces to socialize differences through interaction. Bahri Zengin, 
with his liberal views, played a key role in the opening of new channels 
of interaction between the different segments of Society. Because he 
emphasized the importance of social peace and the need to bring 
different factions- westernized 'open' women and traditional 'covered' 
ones, Kurdish and Turkish nationalists, Kemalist intellectuals and 
Islamists, together in a common ideological ground. However, the 
conservative core of leadership of the party, which includes Necmettin 
Erbakan, reacted negatively to this openness and insisted on the 
subordination of cultural and political cleavage in Turkish society to a 
single ideology. This clearly revealed the ambiguous trends present 
within the Welfare Party^ and the ideological fragmentation among its 
party leaders. 
Ibid. pp. 75-76. 
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Other Aspects of Welfare Party 
The Welfare Party maintained that West had developed at the heavy 
cost of undermining the Islamic world in general and Turkey in 
particular. Erbakan, in a speech before the Welfare Party's fourth 
Grand convention in 1993, claimed that the other political parties 
'have been dancing to a tune played by some one else', namely the 
United States.^ He decried that the Turkish state is nothing but an 
'imitator region', which is more eager to serve the interests of the 
Europeans and the United States, than that of Turkey or any of the 
other Muslim countries. The remedy was to pursue foreign policies that 
were more genuinely nationalistic and involved greater solidarity with 
other Islamic countries. So Welfare Party opposed Turkey's application 
for membership to the European union that was supported by roughly 
40% of the Turkish population^ (according to a public poll). The 
popularity of Welfare Party's this stance increased with the constant 
rebuffing of Turkey's application for membership to European Union. 
Although giving assurances that it had no intention of damaging either 
Turkey's republican order or its Western relations, Erbakan initiated 
' FBIS: WEU, 5 Dec. 1995, p. 28. 
^ Nehar April- May, 1995 pp. 14-15 as cited by Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 
290. 
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some bold symbolic changes in domestic and foreign politics. Some 
Instances which are worth to cite here are: paying his first state visits 
to a number of Muslim countries, allowed female bureaucrats to wear 
the head scarf in the office and agreed to the adjustment of working-
hours during Ramadan, the holy month of fasting.^ 
On the domestic front, the Welfare Party adopted a deliberate 
ideological ambivalence towards it. As the Southeast region has good 
electoral resources. Welfare Party could not afford to even appear 
sympathetic to the cause of Kurdish separatism. Instead the Welfare 
Party often focused on the region's economic and industrial 
underdevelopment. In fact the Welfare Party never outlined their 
political policy or solutions for this region, once in power, yet it 
frequently criticized the governments harsh treatment of Kurdish 
activists.^ 
The overall ideology of the Welfare Party was a form of Islamic 
'liberalism' for it did not see Islam as an alternative to politics but 
searched for ways in which to integrate Islamic identity and its 
Salt, J . 'Turkey's Military "Democracy"', Current History February, 1999 pp. 
72-78. 
Ibid 
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symbols into the political sphereJAIthough the Just Order and the 
party's other ideological expositions did not specifically refer to 
religion, Islam did provide the overall theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the Welfare Party's platform and agendas.^ 
No doubt, the Welfare Party's popular image as an 'Islamic' party was 
due more to the history, activities and enunciations of its main activist 
especially Erbakan rather than its adherence to the theoretical works of 
a synthesizer of religion and politics in the Turkish context. 
For Welfare Party's members and its supporter's, Islam was not so 
much of a guide for the acquisition and conduct of political power as it 
was a comforting source of identity and a larger, more general 
philosophical framework in which to operate. However it seemed that, 
most of the members of the Welfare Party not only accepted and 
internalized the separation of politics from religion but had gone further 
and given primacy to the winning of political power over pursuing 
regions goals.^ 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; p. 76. 
^ Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 291 . 
' Ibid. 
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Organization and Regionalism of Welfare Party 
In Turkey, the political scenario was changed by the 1994 and 1995 
elections, which some secularists interpret as a revolt against 
Kemalism where as it is viewed as democratization by Islamist 
publicists. 
One of the major reasons for the success of the Welfare Party and the 
rise in its electoral base in these elections was its organizational 
flexibility besides the strategic use of modern means in mobilizing 
traditional networks. Its highly evolved administrative organization was 
designed to reach the most basic local level of every neighbourhood. 
The organizer of each neighbourhood appointed street representatives 
to collect information about the age, ethnicity, religious origin and 
place of birth of the inhabitants on each street. Every week the work 
of the organizers was received by inspectors of district level, which in 
turn reported to district chairman and finally, through district chairman 
to a provincial party council, made up of 50 regular members and 50 
reserves. This set up was replicated at national level.^ 
Milliyet, 10 April, 1994 p. 23 as cited in Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 296. 
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In fact it was this organizational hierarchy that made the Welfare Party 
more efficient and unique from the other political parties of Turkey, 
which lacked such type of communication with their neighborhoods. 
Further more, there were unofficial divisions that are generational and 
regional, these two categories just differentiated between the various 
members of the party. All party workers fell into one of the three 
categories. 
At the top were men of considerable experience, who were the 
primary administrators of the party. These party men were in their 
sixties and seventies, and, besides, their political activities, most of 
them were successful engineers and academicians. Many of the 
party's parliamentarians were drawn from them.^ 
The second category consisted of men in their thirties and forties, 
most of them were serving as administrators in provincial organizations 
and local authorities and others were government employees, teachers 
and lecturers. They served as a moderating force against the more 
indoctrinated and often more radical members of the third category 
comprising the party's grass root workers and supporters. These 
members, were in their late teens. Some of them were also in late 
Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; pp. 76-77. 
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twenties and early thirties. However, most of them tended to be 
current or former students who could not get jobs according to their 
qualifications. Also among this group were young workers and men 
and women from lower middle classes, most of whom were drawn to 
religion during the Islamic wave that swept across the West Asia in the 
1980's. 
Unlike other parties which have a centralized campaign strategies, and 
which do not have face to face contacts, the Welfare Party's district 
organizations were quite autonomous in the sense that they could 
utilize local resources, devise its own strategies and adopt the local 
languages to win elections. They shared the grief of a bereaved family 
thus brought a human touch, which differentiated the party from the 
callous and face less image of other political parties.^ 
Jenny B. White argues that, the Welfare Party also maintained many 
types of clubs that brought together potential voters. Thus, the 
Welfare Party's strategy relied on building interpersonal trust.^ 
Ibid p. 78. 
White, J . B. 'Islam and Democracy The Turkish Experience', Current 
History, January, 1995, p. 1 1 . 
221 
Nevertheless, some regional differences could be found among Welfare 
Party members, which mirror their regional preferences, found in the 
different parts of the country. Party members from central Anatolia, 
which mainly comprised the middle class workers, small merchants 
and farmers; tended to be more provincial and conservatives, both in 
terms of their religious beliefs and in their greater degree of 
nationalistic fervour. In this region the party has become an 
institutional expression of Sunni Turkish verses Alevi identity.^ 
Those from the Black sea region though cosmopolitan in their outlook, 
are more willing to mix religion and politics while in the Southeast, 
Kurdish identity, mixed with religion, became more prominent and this 
was clear from the growing number of Welfare Party supporters and 
members from this region. Party members belonging to bigger cities of 
Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir showed any of these characteristics. 
Although the Welfare Party did not muster much support in the coastal 
strips of Aegean, the Mediterranean, and the western Black sea. 
^ The Welfare Party was able to gain more support in central and eastern 
Anatolia, because of its certain policies, like adoption of a new policy of 
indifference to the Kurdish problem in 1995 thus neutralizing the accusation 
of being pro-Kurdish, adopting anti - Alevi posture by Welfare Party and 
improved public services by its mayors also paid it in the elections. 
2 2 2 
perhaps because of the high concentration of wealth at the hands of 
the Istanbul or Ankara based elits.^ 
In South East Anatolia, the Welfare Party increased its vote by 1.40 
percent in the 1995 election and won more seats than other parties. 
For gaining Sunni -Turkish votes, the Welfare Party ignored Kurdish 
problem and did not nominate Pro Kurdish nationalist from the region. 
The Islamic appeals of the Welfare Party had also enjoyed the support 
of the dominant Sufi orders of South East Anatolia. The Welfare Party, 
in the Marmara region (Istanbul and Adapazi) had a Social Democratic 
image. In Istanbul, the Welfare Party emphasized justice and the 
distribution of benefits and responsibilities.^ This also adds to its 
popularity in this region. 
Although Welfare Party supporters varied from one region to another 
with respect to their regional concerns, yet each regional socio 
economic problem was expressed in Islamic terms because the very 
structure of Turkish society is Islamic, defined differently by each 
group. Turkish Muslims understand the significance of Islam and try to 
Miiilyet, 11 April, 1924, p. 2 1 , as cited by Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; p. 
297. 
Ibid. 
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imbibe it in their daily practices, but they do not ignore the culturally 
rooted conventions and rules of every sphere of social life from 
education to politics to the economy and to medicine, which may not 
be strictly in line with Islamic preceptsJ What makes Islam relevant is 
its flexibility and not its rigidity or inherent quality to govern human 
conduct. For example, on one hand in South East, the land owners and 
party bosses invoked Islam to consolidate the old power structure, 
while in industrialized cities, Islam rallied the oppressed masses around 
the demands for justice and equality.^ 
The Welfare Party's victory in the 1994 local elections and then in 
1995 general elections had clearly shown that it had become a 
formidable force in Turkish Polities before it was banned in January 
1998. In fact, this party with a 'pro-Islam' attitude had won the votes 
basically because of the anger of the lower middle class as well as the 
failure of its competitors especially the True Path Party and the 
Motherland Party to cater to the needs of the common masses. As Erik 
Cornell puts it that Republican Party's advance should be interpreted 
as an expression of dissatisfaction from the voters and a warning 
signal to the politicians of the established parties whose political 
^ Yavuz, M. Hakan Op.Cit; p. 79. 
' Ibid. 
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mistakes proved more advantageous to Welfare PartyJ Besides one 
more reason of the Welfare Party's strength was the expansion of the 
economy, resulted form Turkey's open door trade policies. 
In fact, Turgut Ozal's free market Policy, in the late 1980's and 1990, 
were supported by small businessmen in the provinces, and 
contractors, small industrialists, restaurant owners, textile shop 
owners and food producers of the big cities. This class, not in favour 
of state intervention in the economy, were supporters of economic 
liberalization. Therefore, they thought Islamist symbols and ethics, the 
best weapons to generate public opinion against statism and big 
industrialists.^ 
Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that its success was because of the 
party's own grass-root efforts in a climate that was marked by a high 
rate inflation and unemployment, the consequent disillusionment with 
the mainstream parties coming on top of the social costs of economic 
policies of the past decade, added to the resonance of the party's 
largely traditional but only loosely Islamic platform which promised a 
^ Cornell, Erik 'Turkey in the 21* ' Century: Opportunity, Challenges, Threats'. 
Surrey, 2 0 0 1 . 
^ Vavuz, M. Hakan 'Turkey's Imagined Enemies, Kurds and Islamists', The 
World Today, April, 1996. p. 100. 
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way out to these problems.^ The steady rise in the popularity appeared 
astounding inspite of a few blennishes on the party's image. 
Nonetheless, the party continued to appear strong to the younger 
member of the more traditional classes, the lower middle and lower 
classes and the economically marginalized elements. 
The Welfare Party's ascendance to power did not prove fruitful, 
especially with its highly fragile coalition. While in power, Erbakan had 
to play a crucial and a delicate balancing role. He pursued populist 
domestic and foreign policies in order to cater to the constituents of its 
party. He toured a numbers of Muslim countries to develop friendly 
relations with them and to appease his party supporters. However, at 
the home front he could not placate the worries of the armed forces 
and Turkey's other secular politicians. 
In these pursuits, the Welfare Party had to down play its religious 
identity. For instance, in 1996's convention, Erbakan called its party 
Welfare Party a guarantor of democracy and secularism in Turkey.^ 
Welfare Party's rise to power in 1996 was as a result of its unique 
brand of populism and it was this populism that the military of Turkey, 
Kamarava, Mehran Op.Cit; pp. 299-300. 
The Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 1996 p. 7. 
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which sees itself as the 'guardian of the secular republic' was 
threatened which eventually led to the removal of the party fronn office 
and its banning. On January 16,1998, Turkey's constitutional courts 
dominated by the military announced the closure of so-called 
fundamentalist Welfare Party, on the ground that it had violated the 
constitution's secular provisions^ 
The undemocratic way in which the Islamist experiment came to an 
end stirred little protest among Turkey's Western allies. On the 
contrary, reminded of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the countries of 
Europe and the United States silently approved the 'post-modem coup' 
in order to get rid of the Muslim fundamentalists.^ The real reason 
behind Western fears was the fact that many Western observers still 
believed in the Kemalist brand of the secular revolution, perhaps being 
unaware of the prominent political and social role that religion has 
always played in the West Asian Muslim countries in general and in 
Turkey in particular.^ 
Following the detailed discussion above in the subject, one can safely 
reach a conclusion that the revival of Islamic sentiment distinctly 
^ The Hindu, Madras, February 19, 1998. 
^ Jung and Piccoli, Op.Cit; p. 118. 
3 Ibid. p. 119. 
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constitutes the most significant development taking place not only in 
the West Asian region but in Muslim countries of Southeast Asia^ as 
well. No country having Muslims as majority are unaffected. 
Particularly in Turkey the success of Welfare Party in nation wide local 
elections as well as in the national elections was the manifestation of 
the steady growth of Muslim consciousness besides seeking salvation 
against a deteriorating economic background. 
The growth of Muslim sentiments in Malaysia and Indonesia is gaining 
momentum in these countries. 
2 2 8 
Chapter - vi 
CONCLUSION: 
TURKEY AT THE CROSSROADS 
Turkey is born out of the ashes of Ottoman Sultanate. Historically and 
geographically Turkey's location itself presents a challenging duality of 
tradition and modernity, urbanity and simplicity, earnestness and 
tolerance, and unilateralism and pluralism. There is an unresolved, 
unease among the various conflicting forces existing there, they are 
traditional Islamists and secularists. Like other Muslim countries, there 
is a critical polarization of Westernized modernists and traditionalists. 
While modernists see no other way out other than adopting whole sale 
modern civilization through its various manifestations like speaking 
English, adoption of Western culture and education. At the same time 
the traditionalists inherently Pan Islamic, are more oriented towards 
Islamic values and Islamic culture. Though willing to adopt some 
Western values but at the same time they want to retain their Islamic 
ethos. 
Until the founding of the Turkish Republic (Oct. 1923), Sultan Caliph 
was both the temporal and the traditional head with Islam as the chief 
component in its ideology. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his followers 
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were modernists to their core. They criticized the exploitation of Islam 
for political and feudal purposes. They were against the prevalent rigid, 
outdated and irrational interpretation of the Sharia. They were 
reforming the country both from inside and outside to rid the country 
from these malaises. They decided to adopt secular nationalism as the 
ideology of the new state in order to modernize Turkish political, social 
and economic structure by relegating Islam to the back seat. 
Kemal's policy of modernization was more like Westernization and it 
seems that, for him, the progress and power of Europe was an 
attainable model and he wanted to achieve more in less time. 
Kemalism has its own supporters and opponents. Its supporters admire 
the reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal as the only measure to save 
the country from total annihilation after the disintegration of the Great 
Ottoman Empire. They don't see any fault in his ideology, as they 
believe it to be the only foregone and unalterable consensus on 
Turkishness that Kemal had to adopt. 
However, its opponents quite dissatisfied with the secular measures 
tended to use Islamic discourse to challenge the legitimacy of the 
state. Though the Republic took many measures to contain the role of 
230 
Islam but It seems that the Turkish version of radical Islam, like that 
else where in West Asia, has asserted itself effectively in all aspects, 
and at all levels of society. Though secular nationalist politics of 
Turkey has defined the parameters of political discourse but Islam was 
never totally excluded from the official public sphere. On the one hand 
Islam was separated from the public political realm but at the same 
time it was accommodating religion into the system in various ways. 
The resurgence and revival of Islam in Turkey since 1950's is thought 
to be a reaction to the failure of Kemalism to achieve its goal of 
complete Westernization. Neither the secularization nor the 
Turkification of the nation was negotiated with the people in a serious 
way. The Grand National Assembly, Turk's national parliament was an 
elite club and held unchallenged power. So whenever the need arose 
Kemal got his secularization reforms passed and promulgated. 
Here it may be pertinent to add that while Kemal was vigorously 
secularizing the state and reforming its traditional institutions, he made 
little effort to impose the new ways on the daily lives of the masses 
especially the peasantry who were more traditional and for whom 
religion had such a great social function. This resulted in two diverse 
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cultures, one Westernized culture of bureaucrats centered in Ankara 
and the other traditional Islamic still prevailing in the rural masses. 
Thus, Kemalist reforms did not penetrate deeply into Turkish society. 
While religion in public life was frozen during the Ataturk era, the 
Kemalist icecap started to melt after the World War II and gave way to 
the almost unchanged religious expression of Turks and Kurds al ike\ 
Nevertheless, the end of the monoparty rule, and the transition to a 
multiparty political system marked the beginning of the re-emphasis of 
Islamic values, which has continued until the present day. So with the 
entrance of the peripheral rural masses immersed in traditional Islamic 
outlook into politics, re-appearance of dormant Islam came. This 
Islamic revival was further precipitated by the contributions made by 
Democratic Party government in this direction, which included abolition 
of Ataturk's prohibition of the Arabic call to prayer, building of new 
mosques, government funded new schools for the education of 
preachers and prayer leaders. Also from 1950's onwards, the religious 
orders (Tarikats) and communities (cemaat) reappeared and played an 
important role in Turkish politics and society. 
Jung and Piccoli, Op.Cit; p. 119. 
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In the post 1980 period, there has been a series of complex interaction 
between Islam and state. Indeed, the incorporation of Islamists into the 
system has softened Islamic demands and voices. Islamization of 
Turkish nationalism by 1980 coup, besides the rising religiosity of the 
masses, has brought more power to the religious functionaries of 
Islam, which in turn led to the crystallization of some Islamic 
movements. Further Sufi and other new cultural associations provided 
an extra political space for some parties, which thus gained momentum 
in the political scenario of Turkey. This resulted in the incorporation of 
Islam in the social, economic and political fabric of Turkey in the 
1990's. 
The transformation of Turkish society in being viewed as a great threat 
to the ideology of Kemalism by its supports. Thus during the 1970s 
and 1980s, Islam experienced a kind of political rehabilitation because 
right of centre secular leaders perceived religion as a potential bulwark 
in their ideological struggle with left of center secular leaders. 
Moreover, the increasing polarization of Turkish political life in the 
1970, created opportunities for existing religious trends to be pushed 
even further. 
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Turkey is predominantly a Muslinn country. It has a society with an 
Islamic ethos, regardless of its political super-structure. If we have a 
general look on the results of the national elections since the last two 
decades, it becomes amply clear that the Turkish people have generally 
voted for anti-statist, liberal and religiously inclined parties and have 
shown a dislike for the establishments especially the military ones. As 
after each military intervention the people voted against it. In 1961 
and 1965, the conservative Justice Party was the people's choice. In 
1973, the electorate split its vote between three right wing parties and 
in 1983 it voted for the Liberal Conservative Motherland Party and in 
1994 local elections Welfare Party increased its strength and in June 
1996, it was finally able to put together a ruling coalition government. 
Nevertheless, the victory of these parties suggest that the majority of 
the Turkish electorate has always voted for parties that claimed to 
respect religion, were liberal in their politics and were modernists in 
working style. 
In party political terms, the growth of the Welfare Party is the most 
striking aspect. Apart from gaining support from the masses, who have 
their roots firmly held in the Islam-centered values. Welfare Party's 
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resonance added as it promised dispossessed masses, wlio had 
migrated to cities a better life, and the social and economic justice. 
Moreover, its rise is also attributed to the mistakes committed by its 
adversaries that proved more advantageous to it. Turgut Ozal was 
generally charged with nepotism and for economic favours to relatives 
and followers, leading to a number of lawsuits against him. True Path 
Party was also accused of economic irregularities if not to the same 
extent and also Tansu Cellar's newly acquired and considerable fortune 
was her weak point. Social Democrat People's Party though considered 
honest had been hit by a corruption scandal in the running of public 
utilities in Istanbul. 
The economic crisis of 1994 made the situation more acute. It created 
a collapse of living standards as Turkish income failed to keep pace 
with 134 percent of inflation. The rate improved into 1995 dropping to 
90 percent but still has resulted in severe economic hardships in the 
lower classes. Such economic problems had made wage earners, 
simple tradesman and middle class shopkeepers suffer the most. 
So in these circumstances, the party leaders of the other political 
parties in and around took their hold on power and tenure in office for 
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granted. They failed to fully cater to the needs of the people and were 
seldom concerned with reaching to the masses. In the circumstances 
Welfare Party seemed to be the only pure and untried alternative, 
which could be a defender of labourers, artisans and small tradesman 
threatened by unemployment and high interest rates. Furthermore, the 
efficiency shown by the Welfare Party mayors kindled a new hope 
among the so far ignored masses. Thus these disenchanted voters 
looked up to the Welfare Party, and became its source of strength 
which started threatening other political elites who could not gather a 
good following among the voters and thus they exaggerated the 
Welfare Party's anti-secular image in order to cause its downfall. 
At the international level the rise of Welfare Party to power gave rise 
to certain apprehensions as they are: whether Turkey would still be an 
ally of United States, and there could be segregation of Turkey from 
the West, which might become a stumbling bloc for Turkey in 
becoming a member of the European Union. 
As there are close ties between Washington and Ankara, Turkey firmly 
supported United States policy during the Kuwait war, participating in 
the coalition against Saddam Hussain and had even endorsed 
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Washington's policy of 'Dual Containment' of Iraq and Iran. It hosted 
'Operation Provide Comfort' to provide relief to Kurds in the Northern 
Iraq and has 1,500 troops stationed in Bosnia to help with the 
implementation of the 'Dayton Peace Accords' the United States in 
turn supports Turkey's attempts to win full membership to the 
European Union. It has endorsed the Turkish plan to build a pipeline 
through Azerbaijan and Turkey for the exportation of petroleum from 
the Caspian sea basin, as opposed to using alternative Russian routs. 
But it was assumed that, as for Turkish foreign policy, the Islamists in 
power wish to loosen Turkey's ties with the Western world, including 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. They were 
being blamed to advocate closer ties with Arab states proposing a 
military alliance of Islamic states (with Turkey as its leader), and an 
Islamic common market. 
In fact, Welfare Party, though critical of Turkey's Western alliances 
was not in favour of breaking them. Neither was it opposed to 
Ankara's integration in the European Customs Union but called for the 
renegotiation of the agreement, which it considered unfair in its current 
form. No doubt, Welfare Party was in favour of the creation of an 
Islamic common market, where according to it, national interests of 
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Turkey would be better preserved. But Welfare Party has not been 
virulently anti-Annerican. It supported North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization during the cold war. However, it threatened to ask for 
Turkey's withdrawal from the Western alliance if North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization pursued what it took as anti-Islamic policies. 
Welfare Party was taken as a Conservative Mainstream Party by the 
West for its criticism of Western oriented policies. However, Erbakan 
often made statements, which are quite reassuring and 
accommodating and deny the charges of its anti Western stance. 
Erbakan once declared: 
Every body should know that it is in the 
interest of the West if the Welfare Party comes 
to power Turkey will be a powerful country, 
ensuring peace and stability in the most 
sensitive regions of the world. Turkey will be a 
strong economic power and as such will 
constitute a stronger partner for the West. 
Investments made by the West will be 
protected by the Welfare Party. The resulting 
stability will provide a state of comfort for the 
West. 
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Thus Erbakan was careful to accommodate Washington on host of 
important issues. No doubt, he worked for closer ties with Iran and he 
visited rouge states like Libya, but they were symbolic gestures to 
appease his more radical followers. 
It seems that what bothered Washington was not because Erbakan 
was promoting Islamic principles, but that his type of Islam did not 
seem friendly to the West, being an Islamic society does not disqualify 
a country from being an ally of the United States. Even the country 
which is ruled by the Sharia, the law of Islam, and which is a 
fundamentalist country, that is, the oil rich Saudi Arabia, and the other 
Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are not secular democracies. The 
United States went to war in 1992, to protect all these Islamic 
regimes. 
By implication one can draw an inference that even anti-secular and so 
called Islamic regimes could be allies of the United States and her 
Western partners as long as they continue to cater to their needs and 
dictates. However, United States along with her European lackeys 
could in no time snap there ties with them if they did not subscribe to 
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their demands, declaring them undemocratic, fundamentalists and 
violating all sorts of human rights. 
As matter of fact, Erbakan and his Welfare Party was not threatening 
democracy and it certainly lacked the revolutionary characteristics of 
Khomeini's brand of Islamic movement. Welfare Party came to power 
in a very democratic way but it was pushed out of the office in June 
1997 by military, who consider themselves as the guardian of Kemalist 
secularization. Many Turks called it a 'soft coup'. They considered it to 
have overstepped the bounds of acceptable political behaviour within 
the country's narrowly defined democracy. However, it was the most 
undemocratic way in which the Islamist experiment came to an end. 
Although Islamists justified their claim to power and fiercely attacked 
the democratic institutions of the West they behaved and acted as 
silent spectators. 
Its fall caused a little stir among Turkey's Western allies, the Welfare 
Party contrary to their preconceived notions was not a staunch 
religious party in true sense. Its leaders were not clerics, and its 
programmes were not based on the Sharia. Its campaign was secular 
in style and substance. Further, the Western anxieties were much 
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exaggerated, for the real power of this party was very limited and it 
could hardly bring about the feared transformation of Turkey's society. 
Moreover different ideological wings internally fragmented the party 
and only a minority of its voters supported fundamentalist policies. The 
anti-Western and anti-secularist rhetoric of welfare had been largely 
provoked by what many see as the passive and apologetic policies of 
the formerly governing parties. 
The moderate secularists recognize the significance of religion for the 
people. They accepted that Welfare Party had the right to compete in 
the politics and if got majority to form a government though they had 
some apprehensions that Welfare Party might be instrumental in 
establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. Yet, they refrained from 
assuming a hostile attitude towards it. This tolerant stance towards 
Islamic party may hopefully lead to the amelioration of relations 
between the secularists and the religiously oriented class. 
As James Brown asserts, the resurgence of Islam, has disproved the 
misconception prevalent among Western observers that Islam and 
democracy are incompatible. There may be some temporary 
discrepancies in the functioning of democracy in Turkey from the 
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Western viewpoint, but it cannot be denied that the trend of 
developments has been towards a better democratic system based on 
a self-supporting economic structured 
Probably, the misfortune of Turkey was to model it self after France, 
which had historically been revolutionary adopted 'state and law' 
highly divided among competing social groups, politically unstable 
administratively highly centralized, and taken secularism as a militant 
ideology that tries to suppress religion rather than co-existing with it . 
which is quite in contract to the Anglo-Saxon countries which are 
historically evolutionary and have a tradition of comprise among social 
groups and enjoy a type of secularism that is in peace with religious 
beliefs. 
Thus, Turkey being a democratic country should soften its stand 
towards the moderate Islamists. This will move Turkish democracy in a 
more liberal direction. Otherwise denying them the political right will 
put a question mark on the democratic credentials of Turkey. 
At the same time if the moderate Islamists only seek freedom of 
conscience to be safeguarded in a secular democratic state where both 
Brown, James, 'Islamic Fundamentalism and Turkey' Journal of Politics and 
Military Sociology, 16 Fall, 1998, p. 239. 
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religion and the state are separate and autonomous, it will be an 
invaluable contribution to Turkish democracy. 
Furthermore, Turkey has to be an open society preaching and 
practicing a vibrant democracy, secularism and decentralization. It also 
should have traits of genuine separation of power, enhanced freedom 
of expression, improved human rights, a more participatory and 
pluralist democratic practice and supremacy of law. And the solution 
to the frictions between the Islamic and modernist groups in Turkey is 
not to be sought in the area of clash between these groups. There 
should be tolerance for change, openness to dialogue and diversity and 
the strengthening of constitutional democracy. 
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